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CONFLICT AND CO-OPERATION

J.S. CAMPSIE

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CONFLICT AND CO-OPERATION

An Introduction to Some Problems
of International Relations
in the Twentieth Century

Experimental Edition

J. S. Campsie

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INTRODUCTION

By the time the 19th century came to an end, the Western world was able to look back on an unbroken period of the most intensive material progress in its history. The years since the Battle of Waterloo had not been by any means as peaceful as they are sometimes made to seem in retrospect from our mid-20th-century standpoint. Wars had, in fact, been hardly less frequent than in other periods. The bitter and bloody civil war that had racked the United States in the 1860's had cost that country more lives than she was to lose in either of the world wars of the 20th century and had permanently affected the pattern of her national life. In Europe new Great Powers had been forged by "blood and iron". Africa, where as recently as 1875 European control had been limited, with one or two exceptions, to coastal strips, had been carved up and shared out among a handful of European nations. Empire-building is rarely a peaceful process: even as the new century dawned, British armies were fighting in South Africa to extend their country's rule over the independent Boer republics. Yet in spite of all this - and much more besides - the century that followed the final overthrow of Napoleon in 1815 has come to be designated the era of Pax Britannica - the British Peace.

The designation is not inappropriate. The 19th century, by any reckoning, was Britain's century. Ruling the seas and controlling the trade routes of the world through the unchallenged might of her Royal Navy, Britain made her power felt in every corner of the globe. Her position as a world power was unequalled; and, since peace and the maintenance of the existing order are generally to the advantage of any power that has achieved supremacy, peace was in Britain's interest. In her role of world policeman she was, in the main, successful in maintaining it. The international wars that did take place in the 19th century remained limited and comparatively small-scale affairs. From the downfall of Napoleon to the outbreak of the First World War the established international order endured without substantial alteration, and the world was free from those titanic upheavals that shake the very foundations of the nations and shatter all the familiar landmarks of the international scene.

By the turn of the century, nevertheless, there were already clear indications that winds of change were blowing through the world. Other nations were swiftly overtaking the industrial lead which Britain had gained in the earlier days of the Industrial Revolution, challenging her imperial and commercial supremacy and disturbing the balance of power on which the 19th-century world order rested. The intensifying rivalries among the European powers brought clashes of interest and ambition in many parts of the world. By the early years of the 20th century international relations were increasingly dominated by the problem of preventing these rivalries and competing ambitions from issuing in the disaster of a general war. No solution was found, and the problem of establishing a peaceful world order is with us still. The attempts and the failures to solve it, and the renewed attempt in our own day, provide one of the main themes of this book.

World problems do not arise in isolation from one another. Closely associated with the problem of peace were economic and social problems, some of them created,

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and others given a new scope and urgency, by the Industrial Revolution; for while the international order remained comparatively stable, the 19th century had been in other respects an age of continuous and accelerating change. The Industrial Revolution of the 18th century had proved to be only the beginning of a permanent revolution, or series of revolutions, that produced entirely new patterns of life and culture wherever its influence was felt - and already by 1900 this influence had spread to all the continents of the world. The phenomenal advances of science and technology, the applications of new discoveries and inventions in almost every sphere of human life and activity, the flood of cheap manufactured goods, the huge variety of new products, the unprecedented speed of the new methods of transport and communication - all these had begun by transforming human life from generation to generation, and were now transforming it from decade to decade, more radically than it had been changed by centuries of the pre-industrial era. In the long run these changes were to make life vastly more comfortable for most of the people whom they affected; but for great numbers, at first, they had seemed anything but beneficial. In its early stages industrialism had been the cause of an immense amount of human misery and suffering. And even though the measures of social reform undertaken to remedy the situation had by 1900 assumed the scope of a social revolution, the new wealth of the industrial countries was still concentrated in the hands of small minorities while millions continued to live in squalor and wretchedness.

But the millions were no longer prepared to suffer in silence, and the problem of achieving a more equitable distribution of wealth in society pressed insistently for an answer. Meanwhile voices were heard proclaiming ever more stridently that mere reform would not be enough and that something much more drastic was needed, something that would sweep away the old forms of political, social, and economic organization evolved in agrarian societies under the rule of privileged minorities, in favour of an order of things more appropriate to a swiftly changing industrial age of swarming urban populations.

The ferment did not stop short at the frontiers of the industrialized nations. Imperial rule and worldwide commerce carried a knowledge of Western civilization to the far ends of the earth. Societies which for centuries - millenia even - had been content with static, traditional ways of life now suddenly glimpsed the possibilities of progress. They too began to demand a share in the heritage of the Industrial Revolution. Thus our own times have seen, as it has been said, "a revolution of rising expectations". The problem of satisfying these expectations provides another main theme of this book. Let us begin by seeing in more detail how they arose.

CHAPTER 1

THE EUROPEAN ASCENDANCY

A. THE EXPANSION OF EUROPE

The spread of Western influence over the rest of the world, begun four centuries earlier in the age of exploration and discovery, reached its most intensive phase in the four or five decades before 1914. The extent of this influence was one of the most striking features of the period. By the outbreak of the First World War the world was almost completely dominated by Europeans or people of European descent.

Emigration to the Empty Lands

One of the factors of which this domination was the result was the emigration of Europeans from their homelands. Soon after the discovery of vast empty lands overseas there began a steady exodus from Europe of people seeking new homes and brighter prospects and opportunities. They went for many different reasons. Some went to escape religious persecution. Some were driven from their farms by the agricultural changes of the 18th and 19th centuries. Many were fugitives from famine or poverty or unemployment and all the terrible sufferings of a world in the early stages of industrialism. At first the numbers involved were small; but what began as a trickle in the 17th century had become by the second half of the 19th century a flood. By far the greatest number of emigrants went to North America, but considerable numbers also went to South America and, after the middle of the 19th century, to Australia and New Zealand. By the early years of the present century nearly 1½ million people were leaving Europe every year.

The impact of the Europeans upon the indigenous peoples of the new lands varied. Before the coming of the white man North America, Australia, and New Zealand had been sparsely inhabited by culturally primitive people. The North American Indians and the Australian aborigines were almost completely submerged by the newcomers and the depleted survivors were relegated to a place on the fringes of society. The Maoris of New Zealand were luckier. Though in the early days of European colonization they fought fiercely against the invaders, they were eventually integrated into the new community on terms of equality with the Europeans. In all these lands, however, the outcome was the almost total obliteration of the indigenous culture by that of the new arrivals. Thus there grew up in these widely separated parts of the world societies of nearly 100-per-cent European origin, with traditions, cultures, and ways of life derived directly from Europe and only slightly modified by local conditions. These societies became new strongholds of Western influence; indeed one of them, the United States, was destined eventually to replace Europe itself as the centre of Western power.

The situation in Central and South America was somewhat different. Though this region was by no means heavily populated before the coming of the Europeans, it did contain perhaps as many as 15 or 20 million people, as compared with about one million who lived north of the Rio Grande. And these people were not all culturally primitive. Impressive civilizations had grown up in parts of Mexico and Central America and along the western side of South America. Although these civilizations were not able to offer any effective resistance to the Spanish invaders and were quickly destroyed, the Indians remained a numerous and important element in the population. Moreover, they intermarried freely with the newcomers and so gave rise to another important element of the population, the Mestizos. Today there are only four Latin American republics (Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, and Uruguay) in which people of unmixed European origin constitute a majority of the population. The indigenous culture of Central and South America, though heavily overlaid by that of the Spanish and Portuguese colonizers and more recently by that of the United States, has by no means been completely obliterated.

Imperialism in Asia and Africa

The process by which the extension of Western influence to Asia took place followed a rather different course from the one we have just described. The lands of Asia were not empty territories, but were teeming with millions upon millions of people. And theirs was no primitive culture: India and China had been the scene of some of the earliest civilizations on earth and had enjoyed a high level of culture before the Europeans had progressed beyond the life of wandering forest tribes. These civilizations, however, were not dynamic, like Europe's, but had become static, and the great majority of people still subsisted at a very low standard of material life. Thus there were few opportunities or attractions here for Europeans seeking to settle new lands and build new homes. Those of them who came to Asia in the first instance came either to trade or to spread Christianity. Both these enterprises could be dangerous. Missionaries were often persecuted; merchants were arrested and their ships attacked. Even when they were not actually molested, their undertakings could be carried on much more successfully when they could look to rulers and administrators for support and when law and order were efficiently maintained. Thus it was largely to protect and assist the traders and missionaries that the areas of European control were extended beyond the original small trading settlements until they constituted vast empires. Sometimes territories were directly annexed; but often a more convenient method of securing control was to establish a protectorate. Under this system the European power guaranteed protection to a native ruler in return for political and economic rights and privileges that made it the effective ruler of the country.

In Africa there was a greater variety of conditions than in America or in Asia. In the northeast corner was Egypt, another of the original sources of human civilization and, like the others, densely populated. The rest of the northern coast of the continent also had a long tradition of civilization behind it. South of the Sahara desert belt was a varied terrain including tropical forest and desert but also a number of regions suitable for European settlement. Central and southern Africa, however, had a moderately large native population. Though these people were mainly of primitive culture, they could not be submerged or swept away like the North American Indians. In one way or another Europeans

who chose to settle in this part of the world would have to devise ways of co-existing with the original inhabitants.

By the third quarter of the 19th century two European nations had established extensive empires in Asia - the British in the subcontinent of India and the Dutch in the island chain of Indonesia. A third nation, France, was in the process of extending her rule over Indo-China, the region comprising Laos, Cambodia, and what is now Vietnam. In Africa, the main inland penetration by Europeans before the 1880's was in the extreme south, where the British held Cape Colony and Natal and the Boers their two independent republics, the South African Republic (Transvaal) and the Orange Free State. At the other end of the continent the French were colonizing the hinterland of Algeria, which they had first entered in 1830 in order to suppress piracy. Otherwise, European possessions in Africa were still limited to strips of coastline.

In extending their rule to these far-off lands the European imperialists had not as a general rule been particularly avid of conquest and sovereignty as such. They accepted it as their responsibility to protect their traders and missionaries. But after the initial period of claim-staking in the 17th and 18th centuries, the European powers had had some disillusioning experiences as the rulers of overseas empires. By the 19th century many statesmen in Europe had come to regard overseas possessions as encumbrances and liabilities rather than as assets.

In the last quarter of the 19th century, however, this attitude changed rather abruptly. In the early days of imperialist expansion the chief source of commercial profit had been the new and exotic products imported from the recently discovered lands. But as the Industrial Revolution ran its course, what was wanted was reliable sources of raw materials to feed the voracious machines of the factories, and markets to absorb the endless stream of products that they churned out. The industrial powers of the West now awoke to the realization that colonies closely controlled by the home government could best fulfil these functions. Such colonies would provide also safe areas where the profits of expanding trade and industry could be fruitfully invested. In order to protect such colonies the imperial powers needed also strategically situated military bases, coaling and supply stations for their ships, and control of vulnerable areas and potential trouble-spots. Moved by such considerations, the Western powers embarked, between about 1875 and 1914, on one of the most intensive periods of aggressive empire-building that the modern world had yet experienced.

It was in Africa that the richest and most easily available colonial prizes were still to be had. The French, already established in Algeria, occupied neighbouring Tunis in 1881. In the following year the British took control of Egypt to safeguard the Suez Canal lifeline to their empire in the East. In 1884 an international conference was convened in Berlin to discuss a number of European claims in Africa. The conference established the principle that a colonial power in Africa could only claim territory which it could effectively occupy. There followed a wild frenzy of land-grabbing - "the scramble for Africa" - and within two decades the European powers had partitioned among them the whole of the continent with the exception of Abyssinia, Liberia, Morocco, and Tripoli. (The two latter territories lost their independence in 1912, Morocco to France and Spain, and Tripoli to Italy.)



The scramble for colonies in Africa had its counterpart in the Far East and the Pacific. In the last two decades of the 19th century, Britain, France, Germany, and the United States each took possession of a number of Pacific island groups. Britain annexed Burma to her Indian Empire, established protectorates over a number of the Malay states, and gained possession of parts of the islands of Borneo and New Guinea. Germany took northeastern New Guinea. France consolidated her hold on Indo-China. All of them, as we shall see presently, established spheres of influence on the Chinese mainland. The "sphere of influence" was the loosest of the many forms of imperial domination: it gave the imperial power special commercial privileges and advisory rights but left the territory nominally independent under its own rulers.

The new burst of colonialism brought with it an intensification of the westernizing process. Native methods of manufacture and production, which had sufficed for the early trade in exotic commodities, were wholly inadequate for the systematic exploitation of the colonies' resources - particularly of their raw materials - as required by the industrial countries with their mass markets. Now, therefore, all the apparatus of Western industrialism - factories, mines, warehouses, railways, docks, offices, banks, and the rest - appeared in the colonial territories themselves. Cities in China, India, Africa, and wherever the Europeans carried on their activities, took on more and more the appearance of their Western counterparts, and the pattern of Western industrial life reproduced itself in all the corners of the globe. But when the class distinction between owners and managers on the one side and workers and wage-earners on the other was transferred to the lands of the coloured races, it was deepened and embittered by the fact that the Europeans constituted the former class and the local population the latter.

American Imperialism

For most of the 19th century the United States had no interest in imperialist adventures overseas. A nation with half a continent to be annexed and exploited just beyond her own frontiers was not likely to be tempted by the kind of prizes for which European powers were competing half a world away in Africa and Asia. After the United States had established her own frontiers in North America, the trials of the Civil War and its aftermath fully occupied her attention and energies. But with the return of more settled conditions and the great economic expansion which followed the Civil War, the United States was not slow to join the race for power and influence farther afield. The Hawaiian Islands, already firmly under the economic domination of the United States, were formally annexed in 1898, and in the following year American control of the eastern Samoan Islands was established. After her victory in the Spanish American War the United States took possession of the Philippines and Guam in the Pacific, and Puerto Rico in the Caribbean, at the same time establishing a virtual protectorate over Cuba.

In the Caribbean and Central and South America the United States, thanks to the enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine, had a field of imperialist exploitation all her own. In 1903, when negotiations with Colombia for the building of the Panama Canal threatened to break down, a revolt was engineered with Ameri-

THE FAR EAST AND THE WESTERN PACIFIC, 1914



can backing and naval support to secure Panama's independence. The United States then obtained from the new state sovereignty over the Canal Zone and powers of protection over Panama itself. The usual reason for which the United States intervened in the affairs of Latin American states was to safeguard the investments and interests of American business corporations in those countries. The occasions for such intervention in the 20th century proved to be numerous. The Dominican Republic, in which the United States had taken over financial control in 1905, was subjected to an American military occupation from 1916 to 1924. United States marines were landed in Nicaragua in 1912 and 1926 and in Haiti in 1915, and both countries were garrisoned and controlled by the United States for considerable periods. Time and again, in Mexico, Costa Rica, Honduras, and elsewhere, the landing of American forces underlined the fact that the independence of Latin American countries was conditional on their not thwarting or imperilling any United States interest.

B. THE IMPACT OF WESTERN CIVILIZATION

Economic Interdependence

The impact of Western imperialism on the world at large, and the changes that it brought about, were vast and revolutionary. One of its most obvious effects was the multiplication and strengthening of economic ties between all parts of the world, as a consequence of the great increase and diversification of world trade. This development was encouraged by the comparative freedom of trade that prevailed in the 19th century. Thus the world economy became more closely integrated than ever before, and the various regions of the world became increasingly interdependent. A change or a disturbance in one part of the world might have drastic effects on the life of a community thousands of miles away. The discovery of a new synthetic material in an American laboratory might seriously reduce the demand for a raw material whose production was the chief means of livelihood for communities in Asia: a famine in India might produce unemployment in Lancashire cotton mills. It was not only for sources of raw materials and for markets that the industrial nations had to look to distant overseas territories. Industrialization was always accompanied by a rapid growth of population. To feed these large populations the industrial nations of Europe became dependent on foodstuffs imported from abroad. The possibility of economic self-sufficiency was gone for ever.

Though many people looked upon the progressive integration of the world economy as a development making for peace, it did hold certain political dangers. Among nations whose interests were worldwide and multifarious, the possible points of friction and discord were greatly multiplied; and because of the ramifications of these interests, any war involving the major industrial powers was likely to spread to a large part of the world.

Western Domineering

All this economic activity meant growing wealth for the industrial nations of the West. However, its benefits to the native populations of the Western-

dominated lands in Asia and Africa were much less easily discernible. Under their Western masters these peoples found themselves relegated to a position of inferiority. At the worst they were subjected to a degree of exploitation indistinguishable from slavery - and worse than some forms of slavery. But even at the best they were regarded by their white masters as "lesser breeds", to be treated as savages or as children or perhaps just as subjects or servants, but certainly not as equals. Their cultures - even the cultures of ancient civilizations - being alien and unfamiliar, must, it was supposed, necessarily be backward and inferior. The white man, whether ruler, administrator, trader, or settler, firmly convinced of the superiority of his own civilization and culture, usually had no doubts whatever that it was his natural and appointed role to hold the positions of power and authority and privilege. The role of the other races was to labour, to fetch and carry, to take orders, and to be ruled for their own good. This assumption of superiority, even when it was justified, could hardly fail to cause resentment. But it was resented most by ancient and proud peoples who could claim that their civilizations in many ways surpassed that of the West. When a British trade mission visited China in 1793, the Chinese Emperor Ch'ien Lung sent the following answer to King George III:

You, O King, live beyond the confines of many seas; nevertheless, impelled by your humble desire to partake of the benefits of our civilization, you have despatched a mission respectfully bearing your memorial....I have perused your memorial; the earnest terms in which it is couched reveal a respectful humility on your part which is highly praiseworthy....

As to your entreaty to send one of your nationals to be accredited to my Celestial Court and to be in control of your country's trade with China, this request is contrary to all usage of my Dynasty and cannot possibly be entertained.... If you assert that your reverence for our Celestial Dynasty fills you with a desire to acquire our civilization, our ceremonies and codes of laws differ so completely from your own that...nothing would be gained thereby.

Swaying the wide world, I have but one aim in view, namely to maintain a perfect governance and to fulfil the duties of the State. Strange and costly objects do not interest me....Our Dynasty's majestic virtue has penetrated into every country under Heaven, and kings of all nations have offered their costly tribute by land and sea. As your ambassador can see for himself, we possess all things. I set no value on objects strange or ingenious, and have no use for your country's manufactures.*

The terms in which Europeans sought trade concessions from Chinese emperors soon lost their "respectful humility". But men of the stamp of Ch'ien Lung clearly

* Quoted by Arnold J. Toynbee, A Study of History (abridged edition), London, Oxford University Press, 1947, p.37

would not take kindly to being treated as equals, let alone as inferiors, by anyone.

Rising Expectations

Yet, of course, there were a great many valuable and desirable things that Western civilization could give to the rest of the world; and in some measure they were given. In the lands which came under European control, schools and hospitals were established, roads and railways built, new cures for age-old diseases introduced, public health measures instituted, and agricultural methods improved. In some instances the indigenous peoples were initiated into the arts of government and administration, and the experience thus acquired was to stand them in good stead when they eventually regained their independence. But what was accomplished in this way was pitifully little compared with what needed to be done. There were always devoted administrators, doctors, missionaries, teachers, and others, whose whole concern was for the welfare of the subject peoples and whose lives were spent in conscientious service to them. But they were exceptions among the white populations as a whole. All the benefits that the imperial powers conferred upon their overseas possessions were never enough to conceal the fact that the main motive of imperialism was to enrich the imperial power. And in all the wealth that was being created and all the material progress that was being achieved by the great economic expansion of the decades before the First World War, the great masses of people in Asia and Africa had very little share.

They had, however, begun to glimpse the new possibilities. They had been introduced to the products of an industrialized economy and could recognize in them the opportunity of a new standard of life. For centuries they had accepted it as their lot to live close to the subsistence level, because there had seemed to be no hope or means of changing the situation. To live meant to be close to starvation: that was simply what life was. As they became acquainted with a system in which increased prosperity for one man did not necessarily mean impoverishment for another - a system in which there could be increasing plenty for everybody - they began to see that want and hunger might not, after all, be inevitable conditions of life. Though they might not by any means accept wholesale the values of the Western civilization which seemed to have discovered the secret of material plenty, the Western level of material sufficiency became the standard of living at which peoples the world over began to aim. With the help of modern technology, there seemed no reason why it should not be universally obtainable.

In sum, then, two of the consequences of Western imperialism that were to be most significant for the future of the world were, first, the vast fund of resentment built up in the hearts of the coloured peoples for the white man because of his overbearing and domineering ways; and secondly, the substitution of the restless dynamism of Western civilization for the age-old attitude of acceptance of things as they were. Thus Western imperialism was generating the very forces that were to be its undoing.

The Impetus to Westernization

The new restlessness of the peoples of Asia and Africa was not simply a manifestation of a materialistic desire for better living conditions. At a deeper level it often betokened also a search for an identity. In the traditional, unchanging social patterns, the individual had found both significance and security through his recognized role, however humble, in the pattern. In tribal or village life every member of the community had had his acknowledged place. But the imposition of Western imperial rule, bringing with it the urban and industrial ethos of Western civilization, shattered traditional patterns of social life. Robbed of the security of a fixed place in an age-old pattern, and having no status in the white man's society, the former tribesman found himself adrift as simply one among a horde of solitary, unrelated individuals. Since there could be no going back to the vanished traditional patterns, his only hope was to create a new society for himself, and the only available pattern was the Western one. It was a choice between becoming westernized and remaining in a social limbo.

To be fully westernized, however, meant to enjoy self-government. Thus movements among Asian and African peoples to take their destinies once more into their own hands were unintentionally given impetus by the Western powers themselves. For imperialism brought to the new lands not only the material products of the West but also its ideas and ideals. Among these were the idea of nationalism and the ideal of democratic liberty, both of which had been determinative forces in the shaping of Europe and America themselves. The national songs and literatures of the imperialist powers rang with the determination to surrender life rather than liberty; their history books celebrated the heroic achievements of the united national community in the face of foreign conquerors; their philosophies spoke of the dignity and rights of the human individual, and their religion of the brotherhood of man. Is it any wonder that subject peoples should eventually begin to take them at their word, to assert their dignity as human beings and their democratic rights, and to demonstrate that they too were prepared to die for the achievement of their liberty from alien rule? Anti-imperialist and nationalist agitation thus derived its inspiration, its justification, and its values and principles directly from the imperialist powers themselves.

C. THE EMERGENCE OF CHINA AND JAPAN

The attitude of lofty arrogance displayed by the Emperor Ch'ien Lung towards George III's emissary could not long be maintained by his successors in the face of Western firearms. An attempt by the Chinese government to put an end to the illegal importation of opium from India by the British East India Company led to a war in 1839-42 as a result of which Britain obtained possession of Hong Kong, and China was forced to open Canton, Amoy, Foochow, Ningpo, and Shanghai to British trade. Other Western countries now hastened to secure their share of the new opportunities. Among the concessions extracted from the Chinese government by the foreigners was that of extraterritoriality. This meant that foreign residents were to be subject only to the laws of their own country and not to those of China. The Treaties of Tientsin, made in 1858 between China and Great

Britain, France, the United States, and Russia, opened eleven more "treaty ports", allowed foreign legations to be established in Peking, and admitted missionaries and traders to the interior. It took an occupation of Peking by 17,000 British and French troops and the burning of the Emperor's Summer Palace to enforce all the terms of the treaties. Such episodes did nothing to commend Western civilization to its new beneficiaries.

The Rise of Japan

As the 19th century moved towards its end, not all the nations pursuing imperialist designs in China were Western ones. A new Great Power was arising in the Far East itself to join the European powers and the United States in battenning upon the vast Chinese empire. This was Japan. In 1853, when Commodore Perry of the United States Navy sailed his squadron into Tokyo Bay, Japan was a feudal country which had been virtually isolated from the rest of the world for centuries. Perry had been sent to insist upon the rights of foreigners in Japan, and within a very short time the Western nations were about their familiar business of extracting trade concessions and exploiting the commercial possibilities of the country. The methods, as usual, were high-handed, and they generated the usual resentment. For a few years the Japanese made efforts to expel the foreigners from their shores and to maintain their isolation, but it soon became evident that this was impracticable. In 1868, therefore, the Emperor Mutshuhito, taking into his own hands the power that had been allowed by his predecessors to devolve upon the Shogun, or military commander, reversed the policy of spurning everything foreign and set Japan upon a new course altogether.

What followed was one of the most astonishing transformations that the world had ever seen. Recognizing that the only way to hold their own with the Western powers was to imitate them, the Japanese set out methodically to turn their country into a modern industrial nation, and in the space of less than fifty years they had succeeded in their aim. Drawing upon the best European or American models in every field and helped by Western experts and advisers, they completely reshaped the country's political, economic, and social organization. Feudalism was abolished, a strong central bureaucracy was set up, a national system of education was established, industrial plant was acquired, Western banking methods and business procedures were adopted, and a modern army and navy were created. In addition, a new constitution (modelled on Germany's) was adopted, and new codes of law (modelled on France's) were introduced so as to make the granting of extraterritorial rights unnecessary. By the beginning of the 20th century Japan had emerged from her obscurity to take her place as a modern Great Power.

Imperialism in China

Japan's emulation of the Western powers did not stop short with her own internal reconstruction. Impelled by her new industrialism to seek foreign markets and raw materials, she also began to pursue a policy of aggression against China. The interests of the two countries clashed in Korea, and war broke out between them in 1894. It ended in the following year with a Japanese victory.

and China was forced to recognize the complete independence of Korea and to cede Formosa (Taiwan), the Pescadores, and the Liaotung peninsula to Japan.

The cession of the Liaotung peninsula provoked strong opposition from Russia, who had designs on the region herself. With the backing of France and Germany she persuaded Japan to return the peninsula to China and to accept in its place an increased indemnity. Three years later, to the anger and chagrin of the Japanese, Russia herself extracted from China a lease on the Liaotung peninsula and Port Arthur. Japan's defeat of China, in fact, touched off another burst of concession-grabbing on the part of the Western powers. In 1898 the Germans obtained a lease of Kiaochow Bay and Tsingtao, the British of Kowloon and Weihai-wei, and the French of Kwangchow Bay. But while the Western powers were able to secure for themselves extensive spheres of influence and commercial privileges in Eastern China, they were restrained from the outright annexation of large areas by a number of considerations. One was the fact that Japan and Russia were very much better placed for this kind of enterprise than the rest of them. Another was the insistence of the United States on an Open Door policy in China; that is, on the right of all nations to trade on equal terms in one another's spheres of influence.

In 1900 Chinese nationalism, inflamed by the years of foreign exploitation and by the fact that the foreigners enjoyed a privileged status in China, broke out in violent rebellion. A secret society calling itself "The Society of Harmonious Fists" (and consequently nicknamed "The Boxers"), reinforced by members of the national militia and encouraged by support from the Imperial court, began a campaign of terror and persecution aimed at driving foreigners out of the country. Two hundred and thirty-one foreigners and a great many Chinese Christians were murdered before order was restored by an international army comprising troops from Britain, France, Russia, Austria, Germany, Italy, the United States, and Japan.

The imperialist powers made the suppression of the Boxer rebellion the occasion for securing still further concessions from China, and a large indemnity also was exacted. The Russians, who in 1858 and 1860 had annexed large districts to the north and east of Manchuria (and had consolidated their possessions by building Vladivostok), now seized the opportunity to occupy Manchuria itself. This step further angered and alarmed the Japanese, who were already incensed by the business of the Liaotung peninsula and by Russian penetration of north Korea. When attempts to reach an agreement with Russia failed, Japan began to prepare for war.

The Russo-Japanese War was launched in 1904 with a Japanese attack on Port Arthur, although war was not formally declared until two days later. The Russians were confident that their military superiority was sufficient to ensure them a fairly easy victory; and it was therefore a shock both to them and to the rest of the world when they suffered an unbroken series of defeats. A great Russian defeat at Mukden early in 1905, followed by the obliteration in the Tsushima Straits of a Russian fleet that had steamed all the way from the Baltic, put the result beyond doubt. A peace conference, proposed by President Theodore Roosevelt of the United States, met at Portsmouth, New Hampshire. By the terms of the treaty drawn up at the conference, Russia was obliged to evacuate Manchuria,

which was returned to China. Russia also ceded the southern half of Sakhalin Island to Japan and transferred to her the lease of the Liaotung peninsula. Finally, Japan's paramount interest in Korea was recognized. (Japan formally annexed Korea in 1910.)

The outcome of the Russo-Japanese War gave a tremendous impetus to the cause of nationalism among the peoples dominated by the imperialist powers. For the first time a non-white nation had stood up to a European power and had defeated it. There was no longer any doubt that Japan had to be reckoned with as a Great Power. And what one nation could do others too could do.

The Chinese Revolution

Not all the agitation in China was directed against the foreign exploiters. Movements were afoot also to reform the country's archaic political and social structure which was not only an organized system of exploitation in itself but had shown itself hopelessly incapable of resisting the imperialist inroads. The Manchu dynasty had been growing progressively weaker, and its weakness had now been made apparent. In 1907 both the Emperor Kuang Hsu and the Dowager Empress died. The successor to the Imperial throne was an infant of two, and consequently power was exercised on his behalf by his uncle, as regent. The regent proved to be both weak and reactionary, and in 1911 a revolution overthrew the Imperial government and established a republic. One of the leaders of the revolution was Sun Yat-sen, a liberal who had had a Western education in Hong Kong and Honolulu and who was familiar with both Europe and the United States. Sun's Nationalist Party (the Kuomintang) was dedicated to the "Three People's Principles" of nationalism, democracy, and people's livelihood. However, neither Sun nor any other leader at the time was strong enough to unite the whole country, and China was now destined for many years of political turmoil during which much of the effective power was in the hands of independent warlords. Nor had she yet seen the last of foreign imperialism.

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. The period since 1945 is sometimes called Pax Americana. What are the resemblances between the role of the United States in the world today and that of Britain in the 19th century? What are the differences?
2. Compare the impacts which European civilization made on the indigenous peoples of North America, China, and Japan. How do you account for the differences?
3. "Exploitation occurs whenever people treat others simply as means to their own ends rather than as ends in themselves." - Say what you understand by "imperialism", and then discuss the question whether imperialism necessarily involves exploitation.
4. Is imperialism an inevitable feature of any dynamic civilization?

CHAPTER 2

THE RISE OF SOCIALISM

A. THE BEGINNINGS - SOCIALISM TO 1848

The progress of the Industrial Revolution gave good grounds for confidence that men at last had within their reach the means of overcoming the age-old scourges of want and poverty, not simply for small privileged minorities as in the past, but for entire peoples - even for the whole world. But to have the means is one thing: to know how to use the means so as to encompass the desired end is another. If the solution of the problem of production was within sight, the problem of distribution remained. A spectacular increase in the total wealth of a nation did not necessarily of itself narrow the gap between rich and poor; it might even widen it. Even today, in the richest and most powerful industrial country in the world, namely the United States, one person in every six still lives in poverty. (The statistician's definition of poverty in the United States is a family income of less than \$3,000 per annum.)

The Laissez-Faire Background

The economic theory that prevailed at the time when the Industrial Revolution was getting under way in Britain was the one denoted by the term laissez-faire. This theory sprang partly from a reaction against the government-controlled economy represented by the mercantile system, and partly from a philosophical belief, popularized during the 18th century, that all processes were subject to and were determined by inexorable natural laws. Economic processes were no exception. It was believed, therefore, that an economic system flourished best when it was left to the operation of these laws unimpeded by any kind of governmental regulation or control. Freedom, then, should be the watchword in economic affairs. Each individual should be left free to enter into his own agreements (as between employer and employee, for example) and to make his own economic decisions in the light of his own interests and in competition with the interests of others. The guiding hand of competitive interest operating through all these individual decisions in accordance with the immutable economic laws - so the theory ran - would ensure a result that was in the best interests of the community as a whole.

With the advantage of hindsight, it is not hard to see that the theory contained some very serious fallacies. Few people today would contend that a decision made by an individual in his own self-interest will necessarily further the general interest of the community. Freed from all regulation many people choose courses that are highly profitable to themselves and at the same time highly injurious to other people or to the community at large. G.M. Trevelyan writes ironically of the slum-landlords and jerry-builders of the 1840's "who, according to the prevalent laissez-faire philosophy, were engaged from motives

of self-interest in forwarding the general happiness;"* and he then goes on to describe the terrible consequences of their activities. Moreover, the theory of laissez-faire ignores the fact that the interests of the poor do not compete on the same terms with the interests of the rich. A man whose wife and children will go hungry if he is out of work for a few days has precious little freedom of choice or decision when bargaining with an employer. He may have to take whatever work he can get on the terms on which it is offered. If the employer is free to make any terms he likes, there is nothing to safeguard the employee against exploitation.

The theories that gave rise to laissez-faire economics were worked out in Britain by a group who have come to be known as the "classical economists". The first and greatest of them was Adam Smith (1723-90) who, in his book Wealth of Nations, drew to some extent on the ideas of Quesnay and the French Physiocrats. ("Physiocracy" means "rule of nature".) The classical economists, however, were not doctrinaires: they were not unalterably opposed to every form of government regulation if such regulation seemed really desirable or necessary. It was not the theorists but those who stood to gain most from lack of regulation, namely the industrialists and factory-owners and speculators, who pushed the theory of laissez-faire to its absurd extremes. Even legislation requiring the fencing of dangerous machinery and other safety measures in factories was attacked by the owners as an interference with the economic liberty of the individual. Presumably the owners felt that they should be free to decide for themselves whether it was cheaper to introduce safety measures in their factories than to continue to lose workers through accidental death or injury.

It was eventually borne in upon 19th-century industrial society that, whether or not laissez-faire methods were best in the field of production, they could not be relied upon to provide tolerable living and working conditions for the industrial worker. John Stuart Mill, (1806-73) himself one of the classical economists, advanced the view in his Principles of Political Economy, published in 1848, that it was only the laws governing production that were "natural". "The distribution of wealth", he wrote, "depends on the laws and customs of society"; that is to say, it is a matter for artificial arrangements. Even before Mill perceived this, the inhumanly harsh and squalid conditions in which many of the industrial workers in Britain lived and worked had made it necessary to start taking legislative action to deal with some of the worst abuses. After 1833, when the first effective Factory Act was passed in Britain, the 19th century saw a growing volume of social legislation constituting an outright reversal of laissez-faire principles.

Utopian Socialism

Britain was the first country to experience the problems of industrialism. Other countries, such as France, faced the same kind of problems as they too made the transition to an industrial economy. But both in Britain and in France there were those who contended that merely tampering with factory conditions within the

* G.M. Trevelyan, English Social History, Longmans, Green, London, 1944, p.528

existing social framework was not enough: what was needed was a new framework altogether. Plans were now put forward for rebuilding society from its foundations along entirely new lines. To some degree these plans were prompted by a simple humanitarianism. But some of them were also political and economic corollaries of a certain philosophical view of man and society that had taken shape during the 18th century as part of that movement of thought that has come to be known as the Enlightenment. Though this movement was thoroughly international in scope, it had its centre in France.

The men of the Enlightenment believed firmly in the perfectibility of man and hence of human society. Human nature, like everything else, was held to be subject to fixed and unvarying laws; consequently, the application of the appropriate influences in accordance with those laws would make it possible to shape human nature to the point of perfection. And since human nature was thought to be shaped entirely by its environment, the way to make sure that it was subject to the appropriate influences for attaining perfection was to provide it with the proper environment. This meant, in the first instance, the proper political, social, and economic institutions. The philosophers of the Enlightenment had a boundless faith in the possibility of making men both happy and virtuous by legislation and governmental action. "When laws are good," said one of them, "morals are good." "It is the good legislator," said another, "who makes the good citizen." (Some went so far as to believe that even intellect is a product of social environment, and that in a well-organized society all men would have an intellectual capacity of the highest order.) Here, then, is to be found the chief source of the utopian strain that runs through so many of the 19th-century schemes for remaking society.

The change of laws and institutions which France underwent at the time of the Revolution failed to produce utopia. The reason, some people concluded, was that Revolution had not gone far enough. One man who proposed more radical changes was the Comte de Saint-Simon (1760-1825). Saint-Simon called for a society planned and controlled by a government of economic experts in such a way as to ensure that each man's reward was proportional to his contribution to the community. However, he gave no very clear directions as to how this aim was to be realized. Another man, François Marie Charles Fourier (1772-1837), was more explicit about the plans for his utopia. The basis of the plan was the division of society into phalanstères or co-operative communities of about 1,600 people each. Fourier's phalanstères were not unlike the Villages of Co-operation which, at about this same time, another utopian, Robert Owen (1771-1858), was proposing in England. But while Fourier relied on voluntary co-operation, Owen did not exclude state action as a means of attaining his ends.

Many of the proposals put forward by these men were unrealistic, and some were fantastic. But their authors all had a common end in view. They all wanted to put an end to the exploitation of man by man that seemed inherent in a system in which a minority had immense economic privileges while the vast majority lived in want and privation. And they were convinced that social justice would not be attained until economic capital and the means of production were taken out of private hands and put under public or communal ownership and control. They thus came to be called "socialists", because of their opposition to unrestricted individualism. (The word was first used about 1827 to denote a fol-

lower of Robert Owen.) It was Karl Marx who called this socialism "utopian" to contrast it with his own "scientific" kind. In that it rested on an idealistic faith in human nature, it perhaps merited the epithet; but, as we shall see, Marx's own socialism was scarcely less utopian in its own way.

Socialism and the Revolution of 1848

In the 1840's revolutionary pressures were growing everywhere in Europe. In most of the revolutionary situations the forces of liberalism and nationalism were pitted against the reactionism and repressiveness of Metternich's Europe. In France the agitation had a rather more complex character. It was here, among various factions each with its own reasons for opposition to the drab and stagnant mediocrity of the "bourgeois monarchy" of Louis Philippe, that the socialists were clearly recognizable for the first time as a distinct revolutionary element.

Industrialism in France, as we have noted, was a later growth than in Britain. Industrial exploitation had not, therefore, been one of the matters on the minds of the revolutionaries of 1789. By 1840, however, the evils of industrialism, as they had been - and were being - experienced in Britain, were reproducing themselves in French cities, with the difference that in France the existing political regime apparently had its face set firmly against reform. Revolution was in the air. The Germany poet-journalist Heinrich Heine, after visiting some of the factories near Paris in 1842 wrote:

Here in the workshops I found several new editions of speeches by old Robespierre, Marat's pamphlets at two sous a copy, Cabet's History of the Revolution...all writings which smell of blood. The songs which I heard them singing seem to have been composed in hell and had a chorus of the wildest excitement. Really people in our gentle walk of life can have no idea of the demonic note which runs through these songs.

Revolution broke out in Paris, as in many other European capitals, in 1848 - the "year of revolutions". The leader of the socialist faction was Louis Blanc (1811-82), who had set forth his ideas for the reorganization of industrial society in The Organization of Labour, published in 1839. One of his main proposals was for a system of "national workshops" financed by the state and managed co-operatively by the workers under public ownership. It was Blanc who was the author of the slogan: "From each according to his ability: to each according to his needs."

Blanc favoured a democratic parliamentary system with universal suffrage as the instrument of social advance. Pierre Joseph Proudhon (1809-65), another figure of the 1848 revolution, held all such systems in contempt. Proudhon believed that society should be organized by voluntary co-operation among men without any governmental control, and he is regarded therefore as the father of modern anarchism. His claim to rank as a socialist rested on his opposition to capitalism, individualism, and private property. In a work entitled What Is Property?, published in 1840, he returned a famous and dangerous answer to his own question. "Property," he declared, "is theft." Neither Proudhon nor Blanc was an advocate of violent revolution as such. That role was assumed by Louis

Blanqui (1805-81), an insurrectionist who spent more than half of his life in prison. Blanqui advocated the establishment of socialism through the violent seizure of power by a revolutionary minority.

The revolutions of 1848 all proved abortive. In France the Second Republic, doomed from the beginning, was only a stepping-stone to the Second Empire. Blanc fled to England. Proudhon and Blanqui went to prison. But the defenders of the established order in Europe had now been made aware of a demand that not only constitutions but society itself should be remade. From 1848 onwards socialism was a force to be reckoned with in European politics.

Now, moreover, socialism itself was about to take a new turn. For in that same year 1848 there appeared a document entitled The Communist Manifesto, by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, that ended with the ringing call: "Working men of all countries, unite!" In an age of nationalism the appeal was thus made to a class interest transcending national boundaries - an interest which, it was claimed, united the working class in one country to that of other countries more closely than they were united to the rest of their own countrymen. Socialism had become international.

B. THE DOCTRINES OF KARL MARX

Karl Marx (1818-83) was born of German Jewish parents in the town of Trier in Prussia's Rhineland province. He studied at the universities of Bonn and Berlin and in 1842 became the editor of a liberal newspaper in Cologne. Marx's radical editorials quickly brought about the suppression of the paper by the Prussian authorities, and he moved to the editorship of a journal in Paris. It was here that he began his collaboration with Friedrich Engels (1820-95), another Rhinelander, who worked in a textile business owned by his father in Manchester, England. But Marx's journalistic activities in Paris again offended the Prussian government, and at their request he was expelled from France. He went to Brussels, where he and Engels became members of a secret society of German workers called at first the League of the Just, and later the League of the Communists.* For this society they wrote The Communist Manifesto at the end of 1847. During the revolutions of the following year Marx moved back to Cologne and, together with some friends, founded a revolutionary newspaper. It was the same story as before. The paper was suppressed by the Prussian government, and Marx was ordered to leave. He printed his last edition in red and sought refuge in London where he spent the rest of his life, for the most part in dire poverty. It was in London,

* The word "communism" was coined in the 1830's not long after the word "socialism". There was little difference between the two except perhaps that "communism" embodied more explicitly the notion of the communal ownership of property. "Communism" did not come into general usage until it was revived by the Bolsheviks in 1918 to denote the revolutionary type of socialism preached by Marx. "Socialism" is now chiefly used of a system of public ownership of the principal means of production and distribution and a planned economy adopted within the framework of democratic institutions. Socialists, in this sense of the word, do not advocate the abolition of private property.

where he now lies buried in Highgate cemetery, that he wrote his great work Capital.

Capital is a vast compilation of some 2,500 pages contained in three volumes. Only the first volume appeared in Marx's lifetime (in 1867). The other two were put out by Engels after Marx's death. Capital is mainly a work of economic analysis, and as such it displays much penetrating insight into the nature and operation of the capitalist system. As the bible of a world-shaking revolution, it has proved one of the most influential books that have ever appeared. But underlying Marx the economist and Marx the prophet was Marx the philosopher of history. Marx was not charting a course for society: he was uncovering for it the working of historical laws that determined what was happening to it and what was going to happen to it, regardless of its own efforts to help or hinder the process.

Dialectical Materialism

The utopian socialists, as we saw, had as their philosophical background the thought of the Enlightenment. The thinkers of the Enlightenment had regarded human progress - the advance of human society to a condition of greater justice, virtue, and happiness - as something inevitable; but their belief in its inevitability had rested chiefly on a faith in human reason operating with a growing accumulation of scientific knowledge. In the 19th century progress came to be thought of as something that goes on, so to speak, over men's heads - something that inheres in the processes of history itself. Philosophers sought for general laws of historical development governing and unifying the events of history much as the law of gravitation had been found to govern and unify the events of nature. The German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) had already discerned this turn of events when he said that to find the law of historical movement another Newton was needed.

The man who is usually thought of as the father of modern philosophy of history was Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831). For Hegel history was essentially a logical process - a process of thought manifested in the external world. And just as thought proceeds in certain determinate ways called logic, so, he believed, the events of history are joined to one another by logical connections. To this logical process he gave the name dialectic. Each idea (thesis), he held, necessarily gives rise to the idea of its own opposite (anti-thesis). The two are combined in a synthesis. But this new synthetic idea, in turn, is a thesis which gives rise to its own antithesis: and so the process goes on.

It was Marx's boast that he took Hegel's dialectic and, as he said, "stood it on its head". While for Hegel history was a movement of thought reflected into the external world, for Marx the initial movements took place in the external world, and ideas were "nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind and translated into terms of thought". This was why Marx used the term dialectical materialism to describe his philosophy. And it was because he thought he had found the inexorable laws of historical movement that he characterized his socialism as "scientific".

In Marx's view, the particular factor in the material world that determines

the process of historical change is what he calls men's powers of production - the natural resources at their disposal, their knowledge of the use of these resources, and, in general, the means by which they get their living. At any given time these determine the network of relationships that constitutes the fundamental economic structure of society; and this economic structure in turn determines everything else - not only all the political and social and economic arrangements and institutions of society but also its spiritual, cultural, and intellectual life. All historical changes, therefore, originate as changes in the fundamental economic order.

What causes this economic order or structure to change is the advent of new material conditions, new inventions, new techniques. When such changes in the powers of production occur (and they are occurring all the time), new political institutions, new forms of social organization, new legal and moral systems, and so on, are needed, because the existing ones have ceased to correspond to the basic, economic realities of human life. But the governing classes will not voluntarily relinquish their power, and they resist changes in the political and social organization that embodies it. By various means they are able to maintain this organization even after the economic order that brought it into existence has changed. Eventually, however, the discrepancy becomes so great that a revolutionary readjustment is needed to bring them into accord and to arrive at a new political and social organization appropriate to the changed economic substructure.

It is in terms of this theory* that Marx interprets all the large movements of history. All the economic systems that have so far prevailed, he maintains, have been based upon exploitation and have involved a constant class struggle. Each class of exploiters that has risen to power has, by a dialectical process, called into being an antagonistic class of exploited (or more precisely, it has given the exploited cohesion as a class and has made them class-conscious). Each system, therefore, has generated the forces that have overthrown it. In this way the slave-holding societies have given way to the feudal societies, and feudalism in turn has given way to bourgeois capitalism. Now it is the turn of capitalism itself to go down in the class struggle before the proletariat which it has brought into existence.

The Proletarian Revolution

Capitalist exploitation, says Marx, takes the form of the accumulation by the capitalist of the surplus value of the worker's product. The value of a commodity, according to the theory which Marx took over from the classical economists, depends on the amount of labour involved in its production. Now, by means of co-operation and the division of labour a worker is able to produce a value

* The materialist interpretation of history, as this theory is called, underlies and is implicit in all Marx's writings. The explicit statement of it is found in Marx's Critique of Political Economy, a preliminary sketch of Capital published in 1859.

greater than the cost of his subsistence. The difference between this value and the subsistence wage that is all that he can actually command in the capitalist employment market is the surplus value. This surplus value, which belongs by right to the workers (collectively), accrues to the capitalist as profit, interest, and rent. The system leads to larger and larger concentrations of capital in fewer and fewer hands.

While there is thus a progressive diminution in the number of the capitalist magnates,...there occurs a corresponding increase in the mass of poverty, oppression, enslavement, degeneration, and exploitation; but at the same time there is a steady intensification of the wrath of the working class - a class which grows ever more numerous, and is disciplined, unified, and organized by the very mechanism of the capitalist method of production. Capitalist monopoly becomes a fetter upon the method of production which has flourished with it and under it. The centralization of the means of production and the socialization of labour reach a point where they prove incompatible with their capitalist husk. This bursts asunder. The knell of capitalist private property sounds. The expropriators are expropriated.*

In the proletarian revolution thus described, the workers will seize control of the state and of the means of production. The revolution will necessarily be violent because it will only come when desperation gives the exploited proletariat the power to act. But it will be the last stage in the historical dialectic, because the proletariat is not just a class but the representative of all humanity. It will be followed by an interim in which the proletariat will control the state in order to complete the work of the revolution and the suppression of the bourgeoisie. This will be the period of the "dictatorship of the proletariat". But in the final classless society which will emerge when the proletarian state has done its work, the state itself will disappear. As Engels explained it:

Since the state is only a temporary institution which is to be made use of in the revolution in order to forcibly suppress the opponents, it is perfectly absurd to talk about a free, popular state: so long as the proletariat needs the state, it needs it not in the interests of freedom, but in order to suppress its opponents; and when it becomes possible to speak of freedom, the state as such ceases to exist.

C. THE GROWTH OF SOCIALISM

Although the events of 1848 represented a setback for socialism and many socialist leaders were driven into exile, the movement now had adherents in al-

* Karl Marx, Capital, Everyman's Library Edition (Dent), vol.2, p.846

most every advanced country. In 1864 Marx played a leading part in the formation in London of the International Working Men's Association (the First International), which soon had branches throughout Europe. The crisis for the International came in 1871 with the rising of the Paris Commune against the French National Assembly. The suppression of the Commune in a welter of blood and the dissensions it aroused among socialists proved fatal to the First International, which was dissolved soon afterwards. But the Commune was celebrated by socialists as the first occasion on which the working classes actually for a brief period wielded political power.

Socialism in Germany

In connection with the Paris Commune a fundamental question of socialist strategy now came to the fore. Was it essential for the proletariat to overthrow and destroy the bourgeois capitalist state and institute a "dictatorship of the proletariat", or could it capture the apparatus of the bourgeois state and use it for its own ends? Marx maintained that the bourgeois state had to be destroyed, because a state was essentially a class institution and could only serve the class in whose image it was created. Among those who believed otherwise and who held that the state could be taken over by constitutional means and made an instrument of socialist ends was the German socialist Ferdinand Lassalle (1825-64), the founder, in 1863, of the Universal German Working Men's Association. In 1875 Lassalle's followers united with the German Marxists in a single Social Democratic party. The new party was Marxist in most of its doctrines but, in deference to the Lassalleans, included in its program the objective of winning control of the state by constitutional means and the attainment by parliamentary methods of immediate social reforms. Such reforms were urgently necessary, for Germany was now experiencing all the evils that industrialism had brought earlier to Britain. The German Chancellor, Prince Otto von Bismarck (1815-98), tried hard to suppress socialism in Germany, but without success. In the elections of 1878 the socialists had mustered half-a-million votes: in 1890, when Bismarck had done all he could, they polled $1\frac{1}{2}$ million and their numbers were still growing.

In 1891 the German Social Democratic party adopted a new program which eliminated the concessions made to Lassalle's followers in the earlier program. But the main currents were running in the other direction. In 1899, Eduard Bernstein published a book called Evolutionary Socialism in which he rejected a number of Marxist doctrines including those concerning the progressive concentration of capital, the increasing wretchedness of the workers, and the imminent collapse of capitalism, and proposed a program of social reform and of gradual socialization by democratic and parliamentary methods. "Revisionism", as this proposal to revise Marxist doctrine was called, was rejected by the congress of the German Social Democratic party; but the course pursued in practice by German socialists followed ever more closely along revisionist lines. Their numbers meanwhile continued to grow. By 1914 socialists formed the largest single party in the Reichstag with thirty per cent of the seats and a popular vote of $4\frac{1}{4}$ million.

Following Germany's lead, Social Democratic parties were formed in almost all the countries of Europe in the 1880's and 1890's. Though allegiance to

Marxist doctrine was not renounced, the main socialist parties concentrated their attention more and more on the nearer objective of social reform and on parliamentary activity as the means of achieving it. The Second International, a loose federation of socialist parties founded in Paris in 1889, was much less revolutionary and less international in outlook than its predecessor (among its members were Lenin, Mussolini, Briand, Ramsay MacDonald, Laval, Pilsudski, and Bernard Shaw). It foundered with the outbreak of the First World War, when the nationalist sentiments of the member parties were found to outweigh their internationalism.

Socialism in France

In France, as in Germany and elsewhere, there was dissension among socialists on the question of socialist participation in capitalist government. The Parti Ouvrier Francais, founded in 1880, was soon split by faction, and it was not until 1905 that the main socialist groups came together and were united in the Parti Socialiste Unifié. By the outbreak of the First World War there were over 100 socialist deputies in the French Chamber. But since the suppression of the Paris Commune in 1871, the industrial workers in France had been distrustful of national governments and of politics in general, and there was heavy support from the rapidly growing trade unions for a movement called "syndicalism" which repudiated all political methods in favour of direct action by the workers.

The leading theorist of syndicalism was Georges Sorel (1847-1922) whose Reflections on Violence appeared in 1908. The syndicalists were opposed to government as such and held that the state had to be destroyed, not just captured. The weapon for destroying it was the general strike brought about through the trade unions. Society was then to be organized by industries as a loose federation of self-governing associations based on collective ownership and controlled by workers' syndicats. While socialists proposed to organize industry in the interests of the community as a whole, syndicalists maintained that each industry should be organized in the interests of its own workers. The influence of syndicalism was seen in the epidemic of strikes in France in the years before the First World War and in the attempt to turn the great French railway strike of 1910 into a general strike.

Socialism in Britain

The situation that socialists faced in Britain was quite different from that in other European countries. By the time that Marxism was becoming influential on the Continent, political and social reform had already made great strides in Britain, and the trade unions had established themselves as an accepted part of the industrial machinery. The unions were not eager to jeopardize their status or their achievements, and the Social Democratic Federation (founded in 1881 as the Democratic Federation) made little headway with its program of doctrinaire Marxism. Much more in keeping with the temper of the British working classes was the Independent Labour Party founded in 1893 by James Keir Hardie (1856-1915), a Scottish miner who was resolved that the workers enfranchised by the Reform Bills of 1867 and 1884, rather than voting for Liberals, should have candidates

of their own. Hardie himself was elected to Parliament in 1892. The policies of the I.L.P. reflected the powerful influence of a group of middle-class intellectuals (Sidney and Beatrice Webb, George Bernard Shaw, and H.G. Wells were prominent among them) who in 1884 had constituted themselves the Fabian Society. In Fabian Essays (1889) and a flood of other writings the Fabians worked out plans and methods for the socialization of British institutions through the gradual reform of the existing order.

In 1899 the Trades Union Congress in Britain decided to call a conference of "co-operative, socialistic, trade union, and other working-class organizations" to "devise ways and means for the securing of an increased number of Labour members in the next Parliament". The result was the Labour Representation Committee, whose efforts resulted in the election of twenty-nine members to Parliament in 1906. The Committee was renamed the Labour Party in the same year and, though not explicitly socialist in its early days, has come to be a party dedicated to the task of creating a socialist state in Britain by democratic and parliamentary methods.

Socialism in Russia

According to Marxist theory, the proletarian revolution should have begun in one of the most advanced industrial states. Marx himself expected it to begin in Britain, or perhaps Germany. But in all the countries with some form of parliamentary government the prospects of immediate and progressive reform lured the working classes into the paths of revisionism. In defiance of theory, it was in Russia, a country which in Marx's time was only just beginning to emerge from feudalism, that popular socialism was to attain its full revolutionary fervour.

The revolutionary storm that swept over Europe in 1848 raised no ripple in Russia. The Tsar of the time, Nicholas I, was a reactionary despot whose whole domestic policy was directed towards the savage repression of even the faintest hint of liberalism. It was not until the more enlightened reign of Nicholas's son, Alexander II, the emancipator of the serfs, that the new currents of socialist and revolutionary thought, channelled through intellectuals and writers of the middle class and the enlightened nobility, began to circulate in Russia. But so radical and so vast was the transformation needed to cure the ills of Russian society, so apparently irredeemable was the existing regime in spite of Alexander's modest reforms, that revolutionary thought tended to run to the extremes of anarchism and nihilism. Both these creeds repudiated government and authority of any kind and aimed at the destruction of all the institutions that embodied them. Nihilism, however, is perhaps more aptly described as an anti-creed, since it rejected all systems of belief and principles of value in its assertion of the sovereign freedom of the individual.* Many nihilists and anarchists believed in

* It is difficult to give a consistent account of nihilism, a creed that denies all creeds. The word is first found in Ivan Turgenev's novel Fathers and Sons (1862), in which Bazarov, the proponent of nihilism, declares: "We have decided merely to deny everything." Such a procedure, of course, is logically self-defeating. Bazarov, however, did in fact profess a strong belief in science.

terrorism and violence as the means of attaining their ends. All looked forward to some sort of communistic society in which men would live in free and voluntary association without authority, owning the land and the means of production in common.

In 1881 Alexander II was assassinated by a terrorist's bomb. Under his son and successor, Alexander III, a new campaign of repression, as savage and brutal as Nicholas I's, was instituted. The campaign was continued by Nicholas II, who inherited the imperial throne in 1894. But Nicholas was a weak Tsar, and the revolutionary opposition to the monarchy was now ready to become organized. Moreover, a period of rapid industrialization was now beginning in Russia, giving rise to an urban working class among whom, concentrated as they were in cities, it was much easier to carry on propaganda than among the peasants. The year 1898 saw the formation by Marxists of a Social Democratic Party, which a few years later split in two, the Bolsheviks advocating a direct seizure of power by a tightly organized revolutionary party, while the Mensheviks wanted a broad proletarian party that would work towards socialism through democratic constitutional government.* The leader of the Bolsheviks was a man named Vladimir Ulianov (1870-1924), better known to history as Nikolai Lenin. Another party, the Social Revolutionaries, whose members practised acts of individual terrorism in reply to Tsarist methods, directed its appeal to the peasants with a program for the communal holding of land.

The mounting unrest, giving rise to a wave of strikes, was met by Nicholas II with an intensification of repressive measures in which thousands of people were executed, exiled to Siberia, or massacred by government troops. However, the debacle of the Russo-Japanese War, revealing the hopeless incompetence and corruption of the government, brought things to a head. In January 1905 the workers of St. Petersburg (now Leningrad) marched to the Tsar's Winter Palace to demand a representative assembly. Cossack guards opened fire on the crowd and hundreds were killed. In the renewed outbreak of strikes and riots and disorders that followed, culminating in a great general strike in October, public order broke down, industry came to a halt, and the country was reduced to a state almost of anarchy. To regain some kind of control, Nicholas was forced to promise a representative assembly or Duma.

Nicholas's concessions were not enough to satisfy the Bolsheviks. They denounced them as a sham and tried to organize another strike through the St. Petersburg soviet (workers' council), which had directed the strike of the previous October.** When the members of the soviet were arrested, the Moscow workers rose in revolt. Troops were called out, and the insurrection was put down only after much bloodshed.

* "Bolshevik" means a member of the majority, "Menshevik" a member of the minority. The names were assumed during the Social Democratic party congress in 1903 at a point where Lenin's group did have a majority. During the years that followed, however, the Mensheviks were actually the larger group.

** One of the members of this soviet was Léon Trotsky (1879-1940).

The Duma met in 1906, and its first demands were moderate enough. The Bolsheviks and the Social Revolutionaries boycotted it, and the largest party consisted of the Constitutional Democrats (Cadets), whose objectives were such things as manhood suffrage, constitutional law, and responsible government. But the suspicions of the Bolsheviks proved correct: Nicholas was not really prepared to make any significant concessions whatever, and within three months the Duma had been dissolved. A second Duma in the following year was equally ineffective and short-lived. Finally, by a drastic revision of the electoral law so as to give the preponderance of power to the propertied classes, Nicholas obtained a harmless and compliant Duma. The government continued its repressive policies. The revolutionaries, meanwhile, digested the lessons they had learnt, and waited. The first lesson seemed to be that peaceful, constitutional methods would avail nothing. That was what the Bolsheviks had said from the beginning. Another was that success could be assured only by careful preparation of the ground and by the presence of a well-trained, professional revolutionary organization. These conditions of success the Bolsheviks set themselves to provide.

The Russian Revolution

When at last the Tsarist monarchy was brought down, however, it was not by any organized or deep-laid insurrectionary plot but in a manner that seemed unpremeditated and almost casual. So rotten had its fabric become that it took only a push to send it toppling. "The break," wrote N.N. Sukhanov, a member of the Petrograd soviet, "was accomplished with a sort of fabulous ease."

The situation, of course, had been well prepared, not only by the stupidity and inefficiency of the Tsarist government itself and by Bolshevik propaganda, but by the experiences of two and a half years of war. By March 1917 the morale of the whole country was in a desperate state. The initial successes of the Russian armies in the First World War had been followed by cataclysmic defeats. Short of every kind of supplies and equipment, vast armies of peasants had been sent into battle against the most deadly of modern weapons without even rifles in their hands. Millions had perished. Hunger stalked through the land. The outbreak on March 8th* of strikes and bread-riots in Petrograd (as St. Petersburg was now called) set in motion the whole accumulated mass of misery and despair. The disorder spread, the troops in the capital mutinied, the Duma defied the Tsar and set up a provisional government, and on March 15th Nicholas abdicated.

The provisional government, under Prince George Lvov, was made up mainly of liberal reformers. Its only socialist member at the beginning was Alexander Kerensky (1881-), who became Minister of Justice. Its policy was to continue the war in fulfilment of its obligations as an Allied Power and to defer major

* The old Russian calendar, which is thirteen days behind the Western calendar, is sometimes used in dating the incidents of the Russian Revolution. The Western calendar, adopted by the Russians in 1918, is used in this chapter.

social and economic reforms until they could be referred to a constituent assembly. This policy brought it into conflict with the Petrograd soviet, a council of workers' and soldiers' deputies set up by the socialists. Of the two bodies the soviet was in the stronger position: its approval was required before any decree of the provisional government could be promulgated; it could look for support to the other soviets that soon sprang up in almost every town, factory, and regiment in the country; and it could play upon the war-weariness of the masses and on their impatience for the benefits of the Revolution. The provisional government, for its part, found itself caught between the socialistic demands of the soviet and the apprehensions of its own conservative wing.

Nevertheless, the Bolsheviks did not at first have a majority in the soviet. The return from foreign exile of Lenin and Trotsky provided them with resolute leadership, but an attempted Bolshevik coup d'état in July proved premature and was suppressed. Three months later Kerensky, now premier of the provisional government, found himself resisting insurrection from the opposite quarter, when the conservative commander-in-chief of the Russian forces, General Kornilov, attempted to march on Petrograd to destroy the soviet. The failure of this counter-revolutionary attempt played into the hands of the Bolsheviks. Finding themselves at last with a majority in the soviet, they swiftly organized another coup. On November 7th soldiers of the Petrograd garrison, sailors from Kronstadt, and contingents of workers' Red Guards stormed the Winter Palace and arrested the government. Next day an All-Russian Congress of Soviets approved the assumption of power by a Council of People's Commissars - in effect, the Bolsheviks. Lenin was to be President of the Council and Trotsky the Commissar for Foreign Affairs.

The "dictatorship of the proletariat" thus turned out in practice to be the dictatorship of the leaders of the Bolshevik party - renamed in the following year the Communist party. Had Blanqui, in this respect at least, perhaps discerned the necessities of revolutionary socialism more clearly than Marx?

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Do you think that Marxist socialism is any less "utopian" than the doctrines to which Marx himself applied that description? Give reasons for your answer.
2. What kind of political and economic arrangements would you make if you were drawing up a blueprint for an ideal state?
3. Detail some of the ways in which the development of capitalist society in the last century has belied Marx's prophecies.

CHAPTER 3

THE END OF AN ERA

A. THE GREAT POWERS ON THE ROAD TO WAR

It is a custom among historians - for the sake of convenience and to make their subject more manageable - to divide history up into ages, eras, periods, and so on. The dates given for these divisions are often rather arbitrary. The larger changes of direction in history cannot usually be pinned down to a particular year or decade, or even, in some cases, to a particular century. There is, however, one date in modern history which most historians treat, with a good deal of confidence, as the clearly defined end-point of an era. That date is 1914, the year in which the First World War began. It may be that, as time progresses and the 20th century passes into a more distant perspective, even this turning-point will come to seem less absolute; but at our present distance from it in time, it is still seen as the point at which a whole world order passed away.

In international affairs that vanished order was characterized by the unquestioned predominance of Europe over the rest of the world. The fate of Europe itself by the latter part of the 19th century rested in the hands of half-a-dozen Great Powers, five of them monarchies whose royal houses were linked together in varying degrees of propinquity by ties of blood or marriage. In each of these countries the men who conducted the affairs of state were still drawn largely from traditional ruling classes. They regulated the relations between their countries by a diplomacy that was carried on usually in private, often in secret and on a personal basis, with the general aim of maintaining a balance of power. By means of this balance, which, as we shall see, was now breaking down, each of the powers endeavoured to ensure that it could muster enough support to meet a challenge from a rival power and, above all, that decisive strength could be deployed against any of the other powers that threatened to grow so strong as to dominate Europe as a whole and so to overturn the existing international order.

The development of events in the 19th century had bred some dangerous ambitions. None of the powers, certainly, wanted a general European war: all the powers recognized the risks of any radical upsetting of the status quo. But the will to peace was far from absolute. "Every Foreign Office," writes the historian H.A.L. Fisher, "cherished dreams which might be realized in war." If the powers wanted peace, they wanted it on their own terms; and some of them wanted, even more than they wanted peace, things which could only be had at the cost of war. And meanwhile, whether they pursued peace or gambled with the risk of war, the world in which they carried on these enterprises was changing drastically around them, so that all their actions were taking place in a new and unfamiliar context, with incalculable consequences. In the end the European order proved no longer able to contain the forces and pressures that had built up within it. In 1914 it finally broke down and vanished beyond recall. In this chapter we shall examine some of the events that led to the breakdown.

The Rise of Germany

The English historian Herbert Butterfield writes:

There is one historical fact which all Englishmen...should stare at for a long time. I mean the fact that at the end of the Napoleonic Wars the British were so convinced that the French always would be the aggressors and the enemies of mankind that they insisted on installing a strong Prussia in the Rhineland to fortify Germany, even though the Prussians were unwilling to be aggrandized in that region and complained that it would only bring them into conflict with France.*

The fact to which Professor Butterfield draws attention is one which not only Englishmen but all students of history can profitably ponder; for it provides a forceful reminder that even those factors in a historical situation which at the time seem part of a permanent and immutable frame of reference can undergo the most astonishing transformations in comparatively short spaces of time. By the end of the 19th century the Prussia that had been so nervous about offending France and had had to be pushed into the Rhineland by Britain had invaded and humiliated the one and was setting out to challenge the other's hitherto unrivalled position as a world power.

The rise of Germany was one instance of the working of those forces of nationalism whose prevalence during the 19th century we have already noted in Chapter 1. In Asia and Africa nationalism manifested itself in attempts to throw off foreign rule. The same kind of nationalism was at work in Eastern and Southeastern Europe where the Russians, the Austrians, and the Ottoman Turks all ruled empires comprising many different racial groups. But both here and in other parts of Europe the nationalistic impulse was at work also in another form; namely, in the desire of people of common origins, language, culture, and traditions to come together within the borders of a single state. Such was German nationalism after the downfall of Napoleon. Germany at the end of the Napoleonic Wars was an assemblage of thirty-eight different units - kingdoms, principalities, duchies, and city-states - dominated by Austria, whose Chancellor Metternich had made it his policy to crush nationalistic movements and to prevent the emergence of any rival to his own country's leadership. Prussia, however, was an increasingly powerful contender for supremacy, particularly after Metternich's fall from power in 1848 had removed the strong hand that had guided Austrian policy. When Prince Otto von Bismarck became Prime Minister of Prussia in 1862, he lost little time in making it clear that the strongest hand in Europe was now his. By a series of swift, decisive wars and by shrewd, unscrupulous diplomacy, he succeeded in less than a decade in bringing about Prussian military victories over Austria and France, the extrusion of Austria from German affairs, and the unification of all the German states in a German Empire under Prussian domination. The new empire, with King William I of Prussia as Emperor (or Kaiser) and Bismarck as Chancellor, was proclaimed in 1871 in the Palace of Versailles ten days before the people of Paris opened their gates to the besieging German armies. By the Treaty of Frankfurt, which formally ended the Franco-Prussian War in May, France yielded her border provinces of Alsace and Lorraine to the new German Empire.

* Herbert Butterfield, Christianity and History, Bell, London, 1949, p.140

Though Bismarck is usually portrayed as a militarist, he was the very opposite of a military adventurer. He knew the limitations of war as an instrument as well as its potentialities, and he used it with measured precision for carefully calculated ends. Having attained these ends in 1871, he settled down to attain his further ends through a policy of peace. He was reluctant even to enter Germany in the scramble for colonies and overseas empire, knowing that such a course would inevitably embroil her with Britain. Bismarck had no intention of precipitating the kind of catastrophic change in the European order which would be a common disaster for everyone.

The chief danger of war came from the possibility that France would seek revenge for the humiliation of 1871, and the return of Alsace-Lorraine. But for such an undertaking France would need allies. Bismarck therefore set himself to the task of keeping France isolated by bringing the other powers into a closer relationship with Germany. In 1872 he achieved an understanding between the Emperors of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia in the League of the Three Emperors. Though the relationship with Russia became strained because of conflicting Austro-Hungarian and Russian interests in the Balkans, the understanding was renewed at regular intervals until 1887, when it was replaced with a bilateral Reinsurance Treaty.

Bismarck, nevertheless, distrusted Russia, and in 1879 he made a secret treaty of alliance with Austria-Hungary behind her back. Three years later Italy, forestalled by France in an attempt to obtain Tunis and suspicious of French designs to restore the Pope's temporal power, became party to the treaty. The Triple Alliance thus formed lasted until the outbreak of the First World War. So long as Britain, in the detached position that she chose to occupy, remained friendly to Germany, and so long as Bismarck could continue to perform the difficult trick of keeping Germany on good terms with both Austria-Hungary and Russia, the objective of isolating France was achieved.

Imperialist Rivalries

The Greek historian Thucydides, writing long ago of the great war between Athens and Sparta, observed that the mere fact of being powerful itself exercises a compulsion on a state to seek more power by expansion. In the years after 1871 German power increased enormously as a consequence of the country's stupendous economic and industrial progress. Soon there were demands in Germany for expansion overseas and the acquisition of a colonial empire. Even Bismarck, reluctant though he was, was not able to hold out against these demands entirely. Under his chancellorship, Germany acquired colonies in East and West Africa, Southwest Africa, and the Pacific. Otherwise, while never letting its existence be forgotten by the world for a moment, Bismarck kept German power under prudent restraint.

Bismarck's prudence was not shared by Emperor William II who inherited the Imperial crown in 1888. A headstrong man determined to conduct his own policy, William forced Bismarck into retirement in 1890. Within a short time there came about the two situations that Bismarck had so resolutely avoided. First, the lapse of the Reinsurance Treaty drove Russia to form an alliance with France (though, in view of Germany's alliance with Austria-Hungary, it is doubtful whether

even Bismarck could have maintained an agreement with Russia much longer); and second, Germany entered upon a naval and imperial rivalry with Britain. Among William's most cherished objectives - and forming the substance of the "place in the sun" which he demanded for Germany - were a more extensive overseas empire and a powerful navy to go with it. With these acquisitions Germany might become a world power to rival Britain herself. Britain, however, dependent for her very existence upon imported food, felt that she could not in any circumstances allow her control of the seas to be challenged. The inauguration of Germany's naval building program by the Navy Laws of 1898 and 1900, and the mounting tempo of the naval building race that ensued between Britain and Germany, convinced many people in Britain that the two countries must eventually go to war.

The intense imperialist activity of this period, described in Chapter 1, was in fact now causing rivalries and dangerous clashes of interest among the powers all over the world. In the Far East the Russo-Japanese quarrel over Korea and Manchuria issued in the war of 1904-5. Farther west, Russian penetration of Persia and Afghanistan from the north threatened British interests in the Middle East and the British position in India. Both Britain and Russia, meanwhile - the one because of her Eastern interests and the other because of her Balkan ambitions - viewed with alarm Germany's proposal to build a railway from Berlin to Baghdad.

The "scramble for Africa" could hardly have taken place without collisions between the powers as they rushed to stake out their claims. The conflicting claims and boundary disputes brought the European powers close to war on more than one occasion. France and Italy entered on a long period of strained relations when France forestalled Italian ambitions in Tunis by establishing a protectorate over the region in 1881. An even more serious crisis occurred in the relations between France and Britain in 1898. The British General Kitchener, after his defeat of the dervishes of the Sudan at Omdurman, learnt that a French party under a Major Marchand, after a two-year journey from the west, had reached the upper Nile and had hoisted the French tricolour at Fashoda. Kitchener went to Fashoda, handed Marchand a written protest, and hoisted the British and Egyptian flags. Marchand, however, refused to abandon his claim and the dispute was transferred to the governments in London and Paris. For some months the two countries were on the brink of war. When at last it became clear that she could not find any support among the other powers France gave way, but it was some time before Anglo-French relations recovered from the strain.

The Triple Entente and the Moroccan Crises

Britain's policy during the 19th century had been to avoid formal involvement in European politics as far as possible. So long as her naval supremacy gave her control of the seas she was content to stand aloof in her "splendid isolation". Bismarck had wisely refrained from giving her cause for anxiety, knowing that if she were to become alarmed she would almost certainly seek closer relations with France. William II's naval policy was just such a cause for alarm. Britain's splendid isolation suddenly became a dangerous loneliness; and the dangers were underlined during the Boer War in South Africa, when the sym-
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thies of the European nations were clearly ranged on the side of the Boers and there were even rumours of a possible intervention by France, Germany, and Russia, acting in concert against Britain.

Britain's awareness of her need for a friend in Europe led her at length to compose her differences with France and to conclude an Anglo-French Entente (the Entente Cordiale) in 1904. The Entente was not a full alliance. It was in the first instance a settlement of outstanding colonial differences, of which the most serious were in North Africa. Here France agreed to recognize Britain's position in Egypt, while Britain agreed to recognize the French position in Morocco. A similar settlement of differences with France's ally Russia took place three years later in the Anglo-Russian Entente of 1907. In a situation which to Bismarck would have seemed like a nightmare, and which he had exerted every effort to prevent, the Triple Alliance - Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy - was now confronted by the Triple Entente - France, Britain, and Russia.

Germany did not wait long before testing the strength of the Anglo-French Entente. While France had asserted that her ambitions in Morocco did not extend to an alteration of the country's political status, a secret agreement had been made envisaging the eventual partition of the country between herself and Spain. But secrecy was hard to maintain and German suspicions were aroused. Germany herself had interests and ambitions in Morocco, and she resented her exclusion from the arrangements for the country's future. In March 1905 the German Emperor paid a surprise visit to Tangier and made a speech in favour of Moroccan independence. The German government immediately followed this up with a demand for an international conference on Morocco. The conference met in the following year at Algeciras in Spain, but German hopes of disrupting the Entente Cordiale came to nothing, for Britain stood firm with Russia in support of France's claims. France and Spain were entrusted with the policing of Morocco, and France obtained a preponderance of control over the banking system. Thus, while France was favourably placed for extending her hold on the country, Germany suffered an undisguised diplomatic defeat and was faced with the fact that she could only interfere with the French position in Morocco at the cost of war.

If there was any doubt about this, it was dispelled five years later, in 1911, when the French sent troops into Morocco ostensibly in fulfilment of their responsibilities for policing. The Germans, charging that this was a violation of the Algeciras agreement, countered by sending a gunboat to the port of Agadir. There followed a tense international situation in which Britain came close to threatening Germany with war if she persisted in her attitude. The Germans, however, were not ready for war, and they eventually acquiesced in the establishment of a French protectorate in Morocco in return for some French territory in Central Africa by way of compensation.

Austria-Hungary and Serbia: the Outbreak of War

The bitterness created by these Moroccan crises contributed their share to a situation that was rapidly devolving towards war, as did many of the other conflicting ambitions and rival imperialisms of the Great Powers. But the immediate causes of the imminent catastrophe lay in the Balkans. In this area, occupied by the successor states of the Ottoman (Turkish) Empire in Europe (Serbia, Rumania,

Bulgaria, Montenegro, Greece) and the truncated remainder of the Ottoman Empire itself, the interests of Russia and Austria-Hungary collided, as both sought to extend their control over the region and to push down towards the Mediterranean.

In 1908 a nationalist revolt in Turkey by the Young Turks forced the Sultan to grant a constitution. Powers with Balkan interests became alarmed lest, if the tottering Ottoman Empire were reformed and regenerated, it might lay claim once more to the territories that had passed from its control. Austria therefore took the opportunity to annex the Turkish provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina which she had administered since 1878. This move enraged the Serbians; the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina were Serbs like themselves, and all Serbs cherished hopes that they would one day be united in a single state. In her protest to Austria-Hungary about the annexation Serbia had the support of Russia, to whom all the Slav peoples looked as their protector and champion. But the German Emperor declared that if Russia supported Serbia against Austria-Hungary, Germany would stand by her own ally. At that point Russia decided to back down, and the annexation was recognized by the other powers.

The inveterate hostility between Austria-Hungary and Serbia had now entered an acute stage. On the Serbian side the hostility sprang from the fact that two-thirds (about 6 million) of the Slavic Serbian people were under the rule of the Germanic Austrians and the Magyars of Hungary; and as long as this continued to be so, they were denied their dream of a single united Serbian nation under one flag. On the Austro-Hungarian side there was an awareness that Serbia, with Russia behind her, was the chief obstacle to Austrian ambitions in the Balkans. The obstacle was greatly enlarged by the Balkan Wars of 1912-13, which added a large part of Turkish Macedonia to Serbia's territory. An even more immediate cause of hostility was the knowledge that the nationalist aspirations among Austria-Hungary's subject peoples threatened the very fabric of the Empire itself, and that these aspirations were being constantly fostered and encouraged by propaganda and incitement from Serbia. Ancient empires that sense a possibility of their own impending dissolution are apt to react viciously towards those to whom they attribute the blame for the situation. Austria-Hungary resolved that the Serbian trouble must be dealt with once and for all. Serbia must be crushed: all that was needed now was an opportunity.

The opportunity came in 1914. On June 28th the Crown Prince of Austria, Franz Ferdinand, was assassinated, together with his wife, during an official visit to the Bosnian capital, Sarajevo. The assassin was a Bosnian Serb, but the Austro-Hungarian government chose to regard Serbia as being responsible for the incident. It presented the Serbians with a list of humiliating demands, and then, when Serbia undertook to meet all except two, on which she requested arbitration, treated her reply as a refusal and declared war on July 28th.

Germany had already promised her ally Austria-Hungary unconditional support, believing that the other powers would stand aside and that the war would be localized. But Russia could not afford to let a Slav power be crushed by Austria-Hungary, and ordered general mobilization on July 29th. France mobilized in support of her Russian ally, and Germany in support of Austria-Hungary. Germany, having received no reply to an ultimatum demanding the cessation of Russian war preparations, declared war on Russia on August 1st, and on France on August 3rd. Britain was not militarily allied with any of the European powers, but she was one of the guarantors

of Belgian neutrality. Consequently, when the German army invaded Belgium on August 3rd in its advance towards France, she too was drawn in. That same evening, watching from his window the lamps being lit in the courtyard of the Foreign Office in London, the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, uttered his famous epilogue on the century of Pax Britannica: "The lamps are going out all over Europe; we shall not see them lit again in our lifetime."

B. THE PASSING OF THE OLD EUROPEAN ORDER

The Breakdown of the Old Diplomacy

The First World War was a war which none of the powers wanted and which nevertheless the resources of diplomacy seemed powerless to avert. How had this situation arisen?

Some historians have emphasized the element of sheer miscalculation in the process by which Europe found itself committed to a general war. If each nation had known more clearly what the intentions of the others were, how they would react, what they would tolerate without going to war and what they would not tolerate, then, it is suggested, the war might never have occurred. One reason for the ignorance of the nations in these respects was, of course, the custom by which they often kept secret the terms of the alliances and agreements that they made with one another.

But while ignorance on the part of the Great Powers of one another's intentions was certainly a danger and a complicating factor, there were other, more deep-seated causes of the breakdown of diplomacy before the First World War. For centuries the maintenance of the European order had rested on a balance-of-power system. The object of this system was not to prevent any wars whatever in Europe - that was not thought to be necessary, or even possible - but to ensure that no power should become so strong in relation to the others that it could overcome and dominate them all. Not war but catastrophe - the radical overturning of the whole established international order - was the thing to be avoided. For this purpose the balance of power had to be a flexible system within which it was always possible to shift and regroup the weights so that any power whose ambitions imperilled the established order could be opposed with sufficient countervailing force.

The balance of power, then, at its most effective, was not constituted by two equally matched blocs of powers maintaining peace by mutual deterrence. On the contrary, it was just when the European state system became rigidified as Triple Alliance versus Triple Entente that the proper working of the balance was destroyed and its purposes frustrated. Flexibility was the essence of the balance-of-power system: permanent alliances were its undoing. It was this flexibility that had now been lost. Moreover, a rigid alliance system, obliging states to go to one another's aid automatically in the event of war, regardless of circumstances, made it impossible to limit or localize a European war. When France and Prussia fought in 1870, the other powers had stood aside, ready to act as umpires, to keep the dispute within bounds, and to see that the victor did not attempt to exploit his victory beyond the limits of moderation. The victor was still accountable to the rest of the European community. In 1914 no one could stand aside. There was no one to mediate, to hold the ring, or to insist on moderation. The victors would be accountable to no one but themselves.

In sum, the balance of power required, for its successful operation, that the primary loyalty of each European power should be to Europe as a whole rather than to some permanent ally. It demanded of those who held the destinies of nations in their hands a certain restraint and limitation of ambition, and the wisdom to recognize that any catastrophic change of the existing order was likely to be damaging to everybody's interests. Wars might continue to be fought in Europe, territories won or lost: the balance might shift now this way, now that. But since the nations of Europe were all members of one community, any fanatical extreme either of ambition or vindictiveness could only be ruinous for everybody. Napoleon tried to be an exception; but he only succeeded in proving the rule. The men who made peace in the aftermath of Napoleon's wars returned to the principles which he had tried to discard. The terms worked out at the Congress of Vienna were far from crippling for France. They were not designed to consign her to some inferior status: it was clearly better for everybody's sake to get her back into the community on the same basis as everyone else as soon as possible. The peacemakers who gathered in Paris a century later at the end of the First World War unfortunately had a less enlightened view of their self-interest.

Thus the failure of diplomacy in the years before 1914 was not simply that it was unable to prevent the outbreak of war. Diplomacy had, after all, failed in that respect over and over again throughout history. The failure was that diplomacy was unable to limit the war and to prevent the involvement of the whole Continent. And there was a second failure. For the role of diplomacy does not cease once war has been declared. War is always a disaster; but if it cannot be prevented, then it is the task of diplomacy to see that it is conducted in such a way as to have the best chance of attaining the ultimate political objectives for which it is undertaken, and that it is brought to an end as soon as possible. The statesmen of the First World War, however, found themselves completely unable to prevent the war from getting out of hand, from passing entirely beyond the control of the combatants so that all political objectives were lost sight of and both sides became its helpless victims. Winston Churchill wrote afterwards:

Events passed very largely outside the scope of conscious choice. Governments and individuals conformed to the rhythm of the tragedy, and swayed and staggered forward in helpless violence, slaughtering and squandering on ever-increasing scales, till injuries were wrought to the structure of human society which a century will not efface, and which may conceivably prove fatal to the present civilization.*

One reason for the helplessness of diplomacy was the sheer scale of industrial-age warfare, whose potentialities were now being discovered for the first time. In order to make the losses and the suffering, the strain and the cost, of industrial-age warfare supportable, governments found it necessary to rouse their nations to a pitch of passion and hatred at which they no longer regarded their enemies as human beings like themselves, bound to them even in their enmity by the bond of their common humanity, but as creatures totally alien, devils incarnate. The statesmen themselves were not

* Winston S. Churchill, The World Crisis 1915, Scribner's, New York, 1923, p.1

immune to their own propaganda. The war, which had had its immediate origin in the tangled politics of the Balkans and its remoter causes in far-ranging imperial and commercial ambitions, became an ideological crusade of democracy against despotism (even though Tsarist Russia fought on the Allied side), of good against evil, of the forces of light against the forces of darkness. In such an atmosphere there could be no hope of keeping in mind the limited political objectives for which the war had originally been declared, or of negotiating a peace on the basis of those objectives. The war just had to go on until one side or the other was physically incapable of continuing it.

The First World War: Opening Phase and Stalemate

The chain reaction which plunged Europe into war in the summer of 1914 left Germany in a situation which her strategists had contemplated with considerable anxiety; namely, at war on two fronts simultaneously with France and Russia. However, plans had been made to meet the situation. They envisaged a swift advance through Belgium and the defeat of France in short order, before the lumbering Russian war-machine could get into its stride. Once France was disposed of, the whole might of the German army could then be directed against Russia.

But the plan miscarried. The German armies advancing into France turned south before encircling Paris, and then were held and pushed back by the French and the British at the Battle of the Marne (September 5th-12th, 1914). Both sides then tried to outflank each other to the north until the opposing armies stood on the North Sea coast. By the end of 1914 the Western Front had been established as a trench system running from the North Sea to the Swiss frontier. On the Eastern Front, meanwhile, the Russians moved more quickly than had been foreseen, advancing both into East Prussia and into Galicia. Though they were decisively defeated by German armies at Tannenberg (August 26th-30th) and the Masurian Lakes (September 6th-15th) they enjoyed considerable successes against the Austrians in Galicia and threatened to invade Hungary, before a German army arrived on the Carpathian front and thrust them back with enormous losses. Thereafter, though the Russians fought on with blind courage, the war on the Eastern Front was a deepening disaster.

The Western Front was clearly the decisive theatre of the war, but the cost of the decision was to be gigantic. It happened that when the First World War broke out, the progress of military technology had reached a point at which the defence had a marked advantage over the offence. Even after artillery preparation, a frontal attack on a trench system defended by barbed wire and machine guns was a tragically costly operation with very little chance of any spectacular success. The war in Western Europe thus became a colossal stalemate which each side attempted to break at intervals by massive attacks costing scores or hundreds of thousands of men each, but rarely gaining more than a few hundred yards or a mile or two of ground at the most.

While this terrible slaughter went on in the muddy fields of Flanders and Picardy and Champagne, as well as on the Eastern Front, both sides sought other ways of breaking the deadlock. In November 1914 Turkey entered the war on the German side. Early in the following year, after an unsuccessful attempt by the British and French navies to force the passage of the Dardanelles, Allied landings

were made on the Gallipoli peninsula. The objectives of the operation were to gain control of the Dardanelles, capture Constantinople, and open up a supply route to Russia, and also, if possible, to gain Balkan allies and establish a new front. But owing very largely to mismanagement at the beginning of the expedition, the Allied troops never succeeded in breaking out of their beach-heads, and after eight months the peninsula was evacuated.

The German attempt to break the deadlock took the form of a submarine blockade designed to starve Britain into surrender by cutting off her supplies of overseas food. But though the Germans came to the point of sinking all Allied and neutral vessels in the war zone on sight, and by April 1917 were able to sink 875,000 tons of shipping in a single month, the introduction of the convoy system enabled the Allies to get the measure of the danger just in time, and to overcome it. On the surface of the oceans, meanwhile, the British navy remained in command. The matter was decided once and for all in June 1916 when the German High Seas Fleet, that prized weapon of the Kaiser's with which he had hoped to challenge Britain as a world power, met the British Grand Fleet in battle off the coast of Jutland. Though the British lost a greater number of ships than the Germans, the High Seas Fleet put back into port and did not appear in force again except to surrender.

New Weapons

The First World War saw the introduction of many new weapons as each side sought for some advantage that would enable it to break the stalemate. The Germans used poison gas for the first time at the Second Battle of Ypres in April 1915 but failed to achieve any decisive success. The tank, introduced by the British in 1916, had much greater possibilities since it gave the attackers the advantage once more over the defence. But the proper tactical use of the new weapon still had to be worked out. The first attack with massed tanks at Cambrai towards the end of 1917 achieved a spectacular break in the German lines which might have been decisive, had it not been that the Allies were taken by surprise by their success almost as much as the Germans and failed to follow it up.

For the first time in any war men fought in the air. Aviation, which had been in its infancy in 1914, made rapid strides as both sides began to discover and to exploit its military possibilities. At first the main role of the aeroplane was reconnaissance. Then, as aerial machine guns were developed, pilots began to engage in aerial combat. It was, however, only as weapons of bombardment that aircraft could find an offensive role. Air bombardment was not confined to the battlefields. The Germans had concentrated particularly on the development of large airships (called Zeppelins, after their designer), and from 1915 these were used for bombing raids on southeast England. The Zeppelin was to prove too vulnerable as a bomb-carrier, but by 1917 heavier-than-air machines had been developed for this purpose, and in the summer of that year the Germans undertook a series of daylight raids on London with Gotha bombers. The raids produced surprise and shock in Britain and the South African General Smuts, then a member of the war cabinet, was asked to submit a report and recommendations. The report was prophetic. It read in part:

Air power can be used as an independent means of war operations. Nobody that witnessed the attack on London on the 11th of July (1917) could have any doubt on that point....As far as can at present be foreseen, there is absolutely no limit to the scale of its future, independent war use. And the day may not be far off when aerial operations with their devastation of enemy lands and destruction of industrial and populous centres on a vast scale may become the principal operations of war, to which the older forms of military operations may become secondary and subordinate.

Before the end of the war Allied raids had been carried out on towns in the Ruhr and the Rhine provinces, but plans for an assault on Berlin by an armada of four-engined bombers were forestalled by the Armistice.

The Defeat of Germany

As the war proceeded, more and more countries were drawn in. Japan had declared war on the Central Powers in August 1914, and towards the end of the year the Allies declared war on Turkey. Italy, though a member of the Triple Alliance, had not committed herself on the outbreak of war; but in 1915 she was bribed with promises of territory in the post-war settlement to throw in her lot with the Allies. In the Balkans, Montenegro (1914), Rumania (1916), and Greece (1917) came in on the Allied side, Bulgaria (1915) on the side of the Central Powers.

The decisive intervention, however, was that of the United States. Eventually this more than compensated for the weakening of the Eastern Front by the Russian Revolution of March 1917 and its complete collapse when, after the Bolshevik revolution in November, the Bolshevik government made peace with the Central Powers. The American President, Woodrow Wilson, had tried hard to keep his country out of war and to act as a mediator between the Allies and the Central Powers. But Germany's announcement in January 1917 of her intention to engage in unrestricted submarine warfare, and the sinking of several American ships thereafter, made it impossible for the United States to remain neutral any longer, and on April 6th she declared war on Germany.

It was to be over a year, however, before United States troops appeared in any number in Europe, and in the meantime the Germans made one more desperate attempt to defeat the Allies on the Western Front before American help could become effective. In March 1918 they launched a series of massive offensives which drove the Allies back towards Paris almost as far as in the desperate days of 1914. But the Allied line held: by July the German offensive had spent its force, and the Allies were going over to the attack. In August the Allies, strengthened by the fresh American divisions, began their counter-offensive along the entire Western Front. As the attack gathered strength and speed, Germany's home front began to crumble. Mutinies broke out in her fleet. On November 9th the Kaiser abdicated and fled to neutral Holland. There was nothing left for Germany to do except to seek peace. An armistice was signed, and on November 11th, 1918, the guns at last fell silent.

Canada and the First World War

Britain's declaration of war in 1914 had automatically committed her whole Empire to a state of war with Germany; nevertheless, it lay entirely within Canada's hands to determine the form and scale of her own participation in the war effort. In spite of the divisions and controversies with which the question of this participation was to embitter the country's national life, Canada's contribution both on the fighting front and on the economic front was in fact a remarkable one for any country of her size. Beginning the war with a mere 3,000 men under arms, she recruited no fewer than 660,000 men into her armed forces during the four years that followed. Of these more than 424,000 served overseas and over 60,000 lost their lives. Early in the war, at the Second Battle of Ypres in April 1915, the First Canadian Division won lasting fame when it stood firm and saved the day under the shock and horror of the first German gas attack. In the ensuing years Canadian troops were often used as the spearhead of offensives on the Western Front, and the capture of Vimy Ridge by the Canadian Army Corps in April 1917 was one of the outstandingly successful exploits in the long and bloody stalemate. Canadians also showed a particular aptitude for the new aerial warfare, and by the late stages of the war they made up well over a quarter of the airmen in Britain's Royal Flying Corps.

But for full-scale war in the 20th century, manpower, courage, and military skills are not enough. Without the backing of industrial strength they may all prove vain. Here too Canada made a full contribution. Her mines and forests provided the materials for the manufacture of armaments, ships, and aircraft. Food from her farms and munitions and weapons from her factories poured across the Atlantic in growing volume. By the end of the war one out of every three shells supplied to the British forces was manufactured in Canada.

However, in spite of the contributions of Canada and the other British Dominions to the war effort, they were at first given no part in the strategic planning or the policy-making. Sir Robert Borden, the Canadian Prime Minister, complained that his government knew no more about the conduct of the war than could be gleaned from the newspapers. It was largely as the result of Borden's representations that the Dominion Prime Ministers were eventually taken into the confidence of the British government in 1917 and given seats in an Imperial War Cabinet where they shared responsibility for planning the conduct of the war.

Both the size of Canada's war effort and the fact that her Prime Minister at length sat in the Imperial War Cabinet on terms of complete equality with the British ministers were factors that helped to carry Canada swiftly along the remainder of the road to complete national sovereignty and independence. The British government had proposed that there should be a single British delegation to the peace conference, and that Borden should have a place on it as the representative of all the Dominions. But it would have been absurd to admit a delegation from some small European or South American nation that had declared war on Germany but had otherwise taken no active part, and yet at the same time to deny Canada and the other Dominions the right to separate delegations of their own. Borden was therefore able to insist that Canada send her own delegation to Paris and that she sign the peace treaty independently in her own right. As a result Canada also had independent status as a member of the League of Nations. Whereas before the war the international relations of the Dominions had all been under the ultimate control of Britain, now Canada

and the others each spoke for itself in the councils of the nations. The last remaining tokens of Canada's subordination to Britain in the Imperial organization were about to disappear.

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. The alliance between Germany and Austria-Hungary was the first stage in the building of the two rival blocs before the First World War. Was Austria-Hungary acting against her own best long-term interests when she allied herself with the strongest power on the Continent?
2. The period before the First World War is often referred to as the "international anarchy". Was it any more anarchical than any other period of modern history - including the present?
3. During the war President Wilson referred to the balance of power as "the great game now for ever discredited". Why was he so contemptuous of it? Do you think he was right? Have we got rid of the balance-of-power system in today's world?

CHAPTER 4

THE NEW WORLD ORDER

A. THE PEACE SETTLEMENTS

When the First World War ended in 1918, the world had entered a new age. Though people were anxious for stability and for a return to a remembered pattern of life which in America was wistfully called "normalcy", it soon became clear that many of the old standards of normality had vanished for ever. Nowhere was this more evident than in Eastern and Central Europe. Over much of this region the whole social and economic framework of ordered living had simply collapsed. Though the world war was over, there was continuing violence as various groups with nationalist ambitions battled one another over the corpses of defunct empires, often looting and pillaging and terrorizing as they went. Starvation and disease were even more terrible scourges. In some places the peasants struggled to stay alive on a diet of grass and acorns. Typhus and dysentery and other diseases took an enormous toll. Even in Germany, still subject to the Allied blockade even after the Armistice, people were dying in their thousands of starvation, malnutrition, and disease.

The cost of the war, both in lives and in material resources, had been staggering. About 10 million men had perished on the battlefields, and probably an equal number of men, women, and children had died of hunger, exposure, and disease. The material cost was impossible to assess with any accuracy: one estimate put it at about \$330 billion. Even the victors among the European combatants were impoverished, debt-ridden, and exhausted.

Nevertheless, wherever people were able to raise their eyes above their immediate circumstances, the uppermost feeling was one of enormous relief that the ordeal was at last over. New hopes were abroad, even though beneath them there ran currents of anxiety about the problems - all the more menacing for being still only dimly discerned - of life in a new and unfamiliar world. Some of this newness and unfamiliarity was the result of the more positive effects of the war. Under the pressure of military demands, technology and invention had progressed at an accelerated rate. The internal combustion engine had undergone rapid development to a point where it was already revolutionizing the world's way of life. Great strides had been made in such fields as aeronautics and communications. The war had also forced the pace of social development. One of its notable results in this respect was the adoption of woman suffrage in a great many countries in the war's immediate aftermath. The women who had played such an indispensable part in the war effort in factories and in hospitals, in offices and on farms, could no longer be denied the right to vote. Britain (to a limited extent) and Canada both granted the franchise to women in 1918. In the United States the Nineteenth Amendment to the Constitution, guaranteeing women the right to vote, became law in 1920.

But of all the positive results of the First World War by far the most significant was the recognition that war itself could no longer be accepted or

condoned as a method of settling disputes between nations. Up to 1914 war had been regarded by all the powers as a legitimate, if extreme and exceptional, instrument of policy. Though it was not an enterprise to be undertaken lightly, no power felt bound to reject it because of its intrinsic evils if it offered a convenient and promising method of attaining some desired end. The famous English jurist, A.V. Dicey, was not thought to be voicing an outrageous opinion when he declared: "In every part of the world where British interests are at stake I am in favour of advancing those interests even at the cost of war." But now there was a strong feeling that war had become so evil in its earth-shaking violence that it could no longer be tolerated or condoned for any purposes whatsoever. People sensed that something like a critical point had been reached: somehow civilized nations had to find a way to put an end to war altogether, before war put an end to civilization.

The Task of the Peace-Makers

The representatives of the victorious powers who assembled in Paris on January 18th, 1919, to draw up the peace settlements set themselves three main tasks. The most urgent of these was the redrawing of the political map of Europe and the Middle East. Although in this process all the defeated powers lost territory, the rearrangement of national frontiers was not primarily a penal measure but rather an attempt to stabilize the areas concerned. However, since the defeated powers, and Germany in particular, were held to have been responsible for the war, the Allied statesmen set themselves the further task of determining not only the reparations that the Central Powers would be required to make for the losses and damage suffered by the Allies, but also the limitations that should be imposed upon them to ensure that they would never again represent a threat to the peace of Europe or of the world. Here again, since it was Germany that had sustained the main burden of the Central Powers' war effort, it was Germany that was the main object of concern. Unfortunately it was difficult to make a clear distinction - even assuming that Germany was guilty as charged - between a claim for just reparations and a legitimate concern for security on the one hand and, on the other hand, a desire for revenge and a determination to undermine Germany's capacity as an industrial and commercial rival in the years to come. The terms of the final settlement certainly owed something to the latter motives.

The third task that faced the statesmen in Paris was that of devising an international organization "to afford mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike". It was in these words that the League of Nations was first foreshadowed in the last of the Fourteen Points submitted by President Wilson to the United States Congress in January 1918 as the conditions of an acceptable peace settlement. These Fourteen Points had been accepted by both the Allies and Germany - though with reservations on the part of the Allies - as the basis on which the Armistice was concluded. When President Wilson arrived in Paris for the peace conference, he made the drafting of the Covenant of the League of Nations his first concern; and when the first and most important of the peace treaties was drawn up (the Treaty of Versailles signed by the Allies and Germany), it was at Wilson's insistence, and over the objections of the other principal Allied statesmen, that the Covenant of the League was written into it as an integral

part.* Wilson rightly feared that if he did not take this precaution, the League would not be taken very seriously by the other powers. By insisting that the Covenant be written into the treaty he made sure that the treaty as a whole could not be implemented without the formation of the League.

The Wilsonian Principles

The League of Nations was designed as the embodiment of one of the chief principles by which Wilson was determined that the peace settlement should be governed. This was the principle of collective security. Briefly, it meant that instead of a system by which each state tried to assure its own security by particular alliances and agreements with other states, there was now to be an organization through which all states undertook to collaborate, in accordance with standing procedures, to deal collectively with any threat to peace wherever it occurred. Closely bound up with this conception was the principle of open diplomacy set forth in the first of the Fourteen Points. There was a widespread belief that one of the causes of the outbreak of general war in 1914 had been the secrecy with which states had surrounded their diplomatic negotiations and international agreements. If no state could be quite sure what other states were committed to by their treaties and alliances and understandings, then clearly the possibility of war due to political miscalculation was high. To reduce this possibility Wilson was determined that there should be no more secret diplomacy or private international understandings.

No fewer than eight of the Fourteen Points contained specific territorial provisions to be observed in the peace settlement. The principle underlying these provisions was the principle of self-determination. It was not spelt out explicitly in the Fourteen Points, but a statement of it was given by Wilson in a speech on July 4th, 1918, in which he called for "the settlement of every question, whether of territory or sovereignty, of economic arrangement or of political relationship, upon the basis of the free acceptance of that settlement by the people immediately concerned".

The other conditions set forth in Wilson's Fourteen Points as the basis of a just and durable peace were the freedom of the seas, the lowering of economic barriers to trade, the reduction of armaments, and the full consideration of the interests of colonial populations in the adjustment of colonial claims between the powers. The first three were intended as safeguards of peace, the fourth as a measure of simple human justice.

President Wilson, as can be seen, brought to Paris a high-minded idealism and a determination to seek a settlement that would accord with abstract prin-

* There were five peace treaties altogether, one with each of the defeated powers. They were as follows: the Treaty of Versailles with Germany, signed June 28th, 1919; the Treaty of St. Germain with Austria, signed September 10th, 1919; the Treaty of Neuilly with Bulgaria, signed November 27th, 1919; the Treaty of Trianon with Hungary, signed June 4th, 1920; and the Treaty of Sèvres with Turkey, signed August 20th, 1920 (not ratified - replaced by the Treaty of Lausanne, 1923).

ciples of justice and equity. His weakness was that he sometimes lacked (as he himself admitted later) a knowledge of the political realities of the situations to which his principles had to be applied. The French Prime Minister, Georges Clemenceau, was a complete contrast - cynical, witty, shrewd, irascible, and utterly without illusions. Whereas Wilson was devoted to principles, the single object of Clemenceau's unswerving devotion was France. As far as the peace settlements were concerned, he was intent on two things only: reparation and revenge for the past and security for the future. He complained that while even the Almighty had been content with ten commandments, Wilson had to have fourteen.

Somewhere between the two in temperament and outlook was the third of the principal figures at the Paris conference - the British Prime Minister, David Lloyd George. Though his own inclinations were towards a moderate settlement, he had just won a general election at home by aligning himself with a mood of vindictive passion that was sweeping Britain and expressing itself in demands that the Kaiser should be hanged and Germany made to pay the whole cost of the war. He was therefore in part the victim of his own electioneering. When, in addition to everything else, we remember that the peace conference was held in the capital city of a country on whose territory the most terrible war in history had raged for four years, a city which had itself been under the menace of capture and at times under actual bombardment, it is not difficult to understand why the settlements that were eventually made showed some falling away from the high Wilsonian principles.

The Territorial Settlements

Yet, as a matter of fact, Europe's new frontiers did conform very closely to the Wilsonian principles. Only at one point were the territorial provisions of the Fourteen Points clearly and obviously flouted. This was in connection with Italy's frontiers where Point 9 called for a readjustment "along clearly recognizable lines of nationality". As part of the price of her entry into the war on the Allied side Italy had been promised certain territories of the Austro-Hungarian Empire adjacent to her northeastern frontier. Though in the event she did not get all that she hoped for, the cession of the South Tyrol gave her a region with an almost purely Germanic population, while in Istria she took over a territory inhabited largely by Yugoslavs. These were among the few instances in which large minorities were placed under alien rule despite the fact that there was a fairly clear ethnographic frontier which would have made it quite easy to unite these minorities with their racial kinsfolk.

In most other regions the peace-makers were hampered by the fact that, in a continent in which the various racial elements were as crowded together and as intermingled as in Europe, it was quite impossible to draw practicable national frontiers in such a way that no minorities of one race were included in territories ruled by another. It was also considered unthinkable that Germany should actually gain any territory as a result of the war. It was therefore a triumph for the principle of self-determination that the new European frontiers left only about three per cent of Europe's population under alien rule. The question that remained was not so much whether the principle could have been even more closely implemented, as whether it was always the best guide to a workable and lasting settlement.

Apart from the return of Alsace-Lorraine to France there were no great transfers of territory in Western Europe. A small border district of Germany went to Belgium, and northern Schleswig was handed over to Denmark after a plebiscite. To compensate France for the destruction of her coal mines during the war, she was given possession of the coal mines of the Saar basin. The Saar itself was to remain for fifteen years under international administration, after which period a plebiscite was to decide whether it was to continue under international administration or to go to France or Germany. (It went to Germany.)

The Germans did not find their new western frontiers intolerable. What they did resent bitterly, and what they never accepted as final, was the surrender to Poland of West Prussia, Posen, and part of Upper Silesia. The Fourteen Points, which the Germans had accepted, stipulated that the new Poland was to have "a free and secure access to the sea", and the two regions transferred to her for this purpose (West Prussia and Posen) both had Polish majorities. But they also contained many Germans; and what made the transfer a particularly bitter pill for Germany to swallow was that she was now cut off from her East Prussian province by a strip of Polish territory. A further grievance was the fact that Upper Silesia had been partitioned between Poland and Germany after a plebiscite over the whole region had declared in favour of German rule.

When they came to the task of redrawing the political map of Central and Eastern Europe, the statesmen of the victorious powers were confronted by the fact that the subject races of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire had already taken matters into their own hands. During the last days of the war, as the deepening shadows of disaster lengthened over the Central Powers, Austria-Hungary had simply come apart at the seams. First the Czechoslovaks and then the Yugoslavs (Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes) proclaimed their independence. The Poles, Rumanians, and Ruthenes within the imperial frontiers likewise claimed the right of self-determination. Austria and Hungary themselves had parted company a few days after the Armistice when, following the abdication of the Emperor, separate republics were proclaimed. Thus at many points the territorial provisions of the treaties with Austria and Hungary simply recognized a fait accompli. Though some people in the Allied nations, with an apprehensive eye on the rising tide of Russian Bolshevism, would have preferred to see a strong Austria still established in southeastern Europe, there was no way of reconstituting the former Austrian state except by force; and that was something that none of the Allies would have been willing to supply for such a purpose, even if they had not been committed to the principle of self-determination.

In the event there was constituted from former Austrian and Hungarian territories the entirely new state of Czechoslovakia, while other provinces of the now defunct empire were united with pre-war Serbia and Montenegro to form Yugoslavia. Austria ceded Galicia to Poland; Hungary gave up Transylvania and some smaller territories to Rumania. Italy, as we have seen, also profited. Of the once-great empire there remained only the two small separate republics with populations of 6 or 7 million each. In defiance of the principle of self-determination Austria was forbidden to unite with Germany except by permission of the Council of the League of Nations.

New states had also come into existence in northern Europe. In their advance to the east the German armies had occupied Russian Poland, and in 1916 the



Germans announced the formation of an independent Polish state, though they continued to keep it under their own close control. After the revolution in Russia almost all the borderland provinces in the west inhabited by non-Russians had seized the opportunity to proclaim their independence. When the Bolshevik government made peace with Germany by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in March 1918, it was forced to accept the loss of these territories, which in the region of the Baltic comprised Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. They remained under German domination until with the final Allied victory the German forces were withdrawn. Polish independence was an Allied commitment and had been recognized by the Russians, although by means of a war with Russia Poland managed to obtain considerably more territory in the east than had been allocated to her. But Russia was loath to lose her entire Baltic coastline also and fought hard to re-establish herself there before she recognized the independence of the Baltic states in 1920. Meanwhile another Russian border province to the south, Bessarabia, which had proclaimed its independence as the Moldavian Republic in 1917, had announced its union with Rumania.

Disarmament and Reparations

The territorial clauses of the Versailles Treaty deprived Germany of over 25,000 square miles and 6 million inhabitants, together with a very large part of her resources of coal, iron ore, zinc, lead, and potash. In addition, she had to hand over all her overseas colonies to the Allies to be administered as "mandates" of the League of Nations. Besides this industrial and economic weakening, she was also stripped militarily to a point where she was no longer capable of any aggressive military action: she was obliged to reduce her army to a force of 100,000 long-term volunteers (conscription was forbidden) and her navy to a mere handful of small surface ships, and she was prohibited from having any kind of an air force. The left bank of the Rhine and the right bank to a depth of over thirty miles were to be demilitarized, and the Rhineland together with the bridgeheads at Cologne, Coblenz, and Mainz was to be occupied by Allied troops for a period of fifteen years. Provided the terms of the treaty were observed, however, Cologne and its zone were to be evacuated after only five years and Coblenz after ten.

No section of the Versailles treaty caused more controversy and dissension than the one that dealt with reparations. One of the conditions made by the Allies during the armistice negotiations was that Germany should make compensation "for all damages done to the civilian population of the Allies and their property by the invasion by Germany of Allied territory by land, by sea, and from the air". But now that the moment of reckoning had come, neither the French nor the British were disposed to be content merely with payment for the damage to civilian property. France wanted not only reparation but revenge: she would have been glad to see Germany so crushed that she would never rise again. In Britain there was a popular clamour that Germany should be made to pay the full cost of the war "to the very last farthing". Lloyd George, as we have seen, had won the general election of December 1918 by pandering to this vindictiveness. One of his ministers seeking re-election had promised: "We will get everything out of her (Germany) that you can squeeze out of a lemon and a bit more....I will squeeze her until you can hear the pips squeak."

Of course, quite apart from the fact - of which Wilson reminded his colleagues - that a demand for anything beyond compensation for civilian loss and damage would now be a breach of faith, the total cost of the war was far beyond Germany's or any other country's capacity to pay. Just how much Germany could pay was a question on which there was wide disagreement. The economist J.M. Keynes suggested a figure of \$10 billion, but some of the more extreme estimates ran as high as \$120 billion. Eventually it was decided that to the reparations for civilian loss and damage there should be added - despite the pre-Armistice agreement - the cost of war pensions in the Allied countries and the Belgian war debt. The task of determining the amount and working out a scheme of payments was entrusted to a reparations commission. In the meantime Germany was to begin paying immediately a sum of \$5 billion in gold and in kind. Much of this payment was made in ships to replace Allied losses at sea, coal, livestock, and machinery.*

In 1921 the reparations commission announced the total that Germany would be required to pay as \$33 billion. The Germans were aghast at the prospect of having to pay this enormous sum and were soon in difficulties with their payments. The British, realizing that to ruin Germany was to impair the prosperity of the whole continent, proposed a cancellation of all war debts and reparations claims, but neither France, her debtor, nor the United States, her chief creditor, would agree. At the beginning of 1923, after a German default on payments, France and Belgium sent armies to occupy the industrial Ruhr district. This high-handed action, however, proved no answer to the reparations problem, and in 1924 an international committee produced a new and more workable schedule of payments known as the Dawes plan. But the whole idea of reparations was really a failure, because the United States and the Allies had to pump far more money into Germany to restore her economy than they were ever able to get out in reparations. What the demand for reparations did do was to produce a rankling sense of grievance in Germany on which Hitler was able to play effectively in seeking support for his proposal to overthrow the whole Versailles treaty. Even before Hitler came to power and repudiated the reparations clauses, however, payments had been brought virtually to an end by the onset of the world depression.

An Appraisal

There was much in the peace treaties that, with the advantages of hindsight, few people today would attempt to defend. In favour of the treaties it can be said that they did represent a genuine attempt to permit people, in Europe at least, to exercise their right of self-determination; and that some of the least justifiable measures proposed, such as the transference of the Rhineland to France or of Dalmatia to Italy, were rejected. Though there were large German and Magyar minorities in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia, and Magyar and Bul-

* The disarmament and reparations sections of the treaties with Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria ran along much the same lines as those of the Treaty of Versailles. Austria was permitted an army of 30,000 men, Hungary 35,000 and Bulgaria 20,000. Reparations were exacted from all three. Austria and Hungary, no longer having any seaports, were required to surrender all their ships.

garian minorities in Rumania, the only alternative in most instances would have been to reverse the situation and leave large foreign minorities in Germany, Austria, and Hungary. Faced with the choice, it is not surprising that the statesmen in Paris decided to give the benefit of the situation to the new or victorious nations rather than to the defeated powers. They did, however, take the precaution of requiring the new nations and others to sign treaties guaranteeing the rights of the minorities within their borders.

Critics of the principle of self-determination point out that, when insisted upon too rigidly, the principle is apt to result in political, economic, or strategic absurdities. And without doubt the emphasis given to the principle since 1919 has greatly intensified the spirit of nationalism throughout the world. But the grounds on which the Versailles treaty was most justifiably criticized were the unexampled harshness of the disarmament and reparations requirements and the fact that the representatives of the defeated powers were given no chance to discuss any of the peace terms with the Allied statesmen before being required to sign. It was in everybody's interest that the German people should come to accept the new republic that had replaced the monarchy; but the Allies, instead of strengthening the republican government's standing and dignity in the eyes of its own people by treating it with respect and consideration, seemed bent on discrediting it by multiplying its difficulties and humiliating it at every turn. Such justifications as could be found were unimportant when set alongside the practical unwisdom of trying to keep a proud, energetic, gifted, and recently powerful people in a state of permanent and humiliating subjection. In its regard for the wishes of peoples as well as of rulers and in its measures to safeguard the rights of minorities, the peace settlement of 1919 represented a great advance on similar settlements in the past. But the treaty-makers at Paris forgot something that earlier statesmen had generally remembered: that even the defeated have legitimate rights and interests.

B. THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Whatever the defects and shortcomings of the peace treaties, they were all redeemed in many people's eyes by the great hope enshrined in the document that constituted Part I of each separate treaty - the Covenant of the League of Nations. The protagonists of the League were determined that the world should not be allowed to revert to what they called the "international anarchy" that had prevailed before the war. In its place they hoped to foster the rule of law in international affairs. Not that the League could hope to function as any kind of world government: no major nation was yet ready for that or for the surrender of sovereignty that it would involve. International law would still be precariously dependent upon the readiness of each sovereign state voluntarily to accept it, to abide by it, and to help to enforce it. What the League did was - on the assumption that there existed a strong and widespread desire for the rule of law - to provide a framework and organization within which that desire could be harnessed, given expression, and made effective.

The League of Nations, which came into existence on January 10th, 1920, when ratifications of the Versailles treaty were exchanged, consisted, at its first meeting ten months later, of an assemblage of twenty-eight Allied and fourteen neutral nations. Later the total was to increase to about sixty. There were two particularly notable omissions from the membership roll at the first meeting.

One was Germany, who at this stage was not permitted to join the League. The other was the United States, where President Wilson's Republican enemies, who now dominated Congress, took their chance to discredit the President by repudiating the League with which he was so closely identified.

The Assembly and the Council

The organization of the League of Nations was sketched out in the first seven Articles of the Covenant. The Assembly was to be the forum in which the delegates of all the member states met together. Here every state, great or small, was to be allowed a single vote and not more than three representatives. The Assembly was empowered to deal with "any matter within the sphere of action of the League or affecting the peace of the world". The Assembly, however, was an unwieldy body and could not conveniently be convoked more than once a year. Most of the business of the League, therefore, was transacted by a smaller body called the Council consisting at first of eight members: later, when the membership of the League increased, the number of Council seats was raised to fourteen. Four of these seats (five after the admission of Germany in 1926) were occupied permanently by representatives of the Great Powers - Britain, France, Italy, and Japan - for it was recognized that unless the Great Powers could agree to take concerted action on matters of world concern, the League could never hope to function effectively. The other seats were held by other member nations chosen by the Assembly for limited terms. The Council's terms of reference were exactly the same as the Assembly's - "any matter within the sphere of action of the League or affecting the peace of the world".

The working relationship between the Council and the Assembly was not spelt out in the Covenant, but the Council, which adopted the custom of meeting four times a year and could be called into session at any time, was conceived as an executive body to which international problems would normally be referred in the first instance, and which would exercise leadership in the organization. Among the duties with which it was specifically charged were the devising of means to check or counter particular cases of aggression against members, mediation in disputes between members (though this duty might devolve upon the Assembly), and the formulation of measures to be taken by members when any one of their number refused to carry out a decision of the League or resorted to war in defiance of its obligations. Thus the Council was responsible for preparing plans and measures to meet specific situations or emergencies, but final responsibility for carrying out these measures rested with the sovereign member states represented in the Assembly. All decisions, whether in the Assembly or in the Council, had to be unanimous, with the exception that when a dispute between members of the League was under discussion, only the unanimous agreement of those members who were not party to the dispute was required.

The Council and the Assembly were served by a permanent Secretariat, recruited internationally, which performed the function of an international civil service, preparing business for the Council and the Assembly, gathering information, and providing the machinery for implementing the League's decisions. The seat of the League was established at Geneva in Switzerland.

The World Court and the I.L.O.

Political disputes between members of the League, as we have seen, were generally referred for settlement in the first instance to the Council. Some disputes between nations, however, are legal rather than political in nature: they may, for example, be disputes about points of international law, the interpretation of treaties, or other such matters. Under Article 14 of the Covenant the Council was directed to formulate plans for the establishment of a Permanent Court of International Justice to provide a ruling in such matters, and the scheme was adopted by the Assembly of the League at its first meeting. An earlier attempt to set up such a body, undertaken at the Hague Conferences in 1899 and 1907, had resulted only in a Court of Arbitration (the Hague Tribunal). The new "World Court", also established at the Hague, was to be a court of law; it was to consist of eleven (later fifteen) judges from different nations elected by the League for a term of nine years, and could render both judicial decisions and advisory opinions.

Closely related to the League, but deriving its existence from a different part of the Treaty of Versailles (Part XIII), was the International Labour Organization, also with headquarters in Geneva. The League expressly recognized that it was not empowered to interfere in the internal affairs of any member state. At the same time it could not ignore the fact that satisfactory living and working conditions in all states were essential to the maintenance of peace and stability and - here the threat of Bolshevism was very much in mind - the avoidance of revolution and civil war. The task of the I.L.O., which is the only international organization established under the Versailles treaty that still survives today under its original charter, was therefore to foster in all states the progress of social reform and an improvement in the conditions of labour. Its system of organization closely resembled that of the League. The General Conference, in which all member states were represented, met once a year. A Governing Body corresponded to the League Council, and the International Labour Office to the Secretariat. The Governing Body consisted of forty members representing government, employers, and employees in the proportion 2:1:1 respectively, and also included representatives of the world's eight leading industrial states. Like the World Court, the I.L.O. accepted as members nations that were not members of the League.

The Problem of Security

The first and by far the most important of the League's tasks was the prevention of war. The League was formed, as the opening words of the preamble to the Covenant put it, "in order to promote international co-operation and to achieve international peace and security". The attack on the problem of war was made from several different directions. As a measure designed to put an end to secret diplomacy, Article 18 of the Covenant required members of the League to deposit at Geneva copies of all international engagements into which they entered. Article 19 empowered the Assembly to call attention to treaties that had become inapplicable or might constitute a danger to peace, and to advise the states concerned to reconsider them. Much reliance was placed upon the provision for revising treaties by those who felt that the Treaty of Versailles itself would soon be found to stand in need of revision.

Open treaties, however, could never be more than a part of the answer. The men who drew up the Covenant recognized that even when the League was constituted occasions of war would arise among its members. The League therefore required an undertaking from its members that they would not go to war without first submitting the matter in dispute either to arbitration or judicial settlement or else to enquiry by the Council; and further, that they would wait at least three months after the award by the arbitrators or judicial decision or the report of the Council before resorting to arms. It was hoped that the enforced delay, giving time not only for sober reflection and second thoughts but also for concerted action by other powers, might cause an intending peace-breaker to desist. Should any member of the League resort to war without first seeking a settlement through this procedure, the other members undertook to sever all trade and financial relations with the offending nation and to subject it to a total boycott. But members, whether disputants or others, did not bind themselves to comply with decisions or recommendations of the Council, and there was no definite provision for dealing with disputants who, after going through the prescribed procedure, did not comply.

It was this lack of any firm commitment on the part of the members to deal forcefully and resolutely with aggression or with breaches of the Covenant that deprived the League of a means of enforcing its decisions, and was to prove its chief and fatal weakness. Its members allowed themselves to be committed to economic sanctions: they refused to be committed to military action. Both at the peace conference in Paris and in the meetings of the League in 1920 the Canadian delegates had protested against Article 10 of the Covenant, which read:

The members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members of the League.

This, the Canadians complained, was a commitment to armed intervention. They pursued their point at subsequent meetings of the League Assembly until in 1923 a resolution was introduced into the Assembly that each member state should be allowed to decide for itself "in what degree the member is bound to assure the execution of this obligation by the employment of its military forces". Though the resolution was opposed by Persia and so could not be adopted, it was regarded henceforth by most members as the approved interpretation of Article 10.

Supplementing the Covenant

In 1924 an attempt was made to remedy the weakness in the League's machinery for settling disputes by a series of proposals known as the Geneva Protocol. The Covenant as it stood did not absolutely forbid war; it still left war as a legitimate resort if the League's machinery for settlement failed. Under the new proposals war was to be ruled out absolutely as illegal except when waged in self-defence against aggression or on behalf of the League against a recalcitrant state. The test of aggression was to be the refusal of a state to submit its dispute to compulsory arbitration, and any such refusal was to be followed by the application of sanctions. But Canada and the other Dominions voiced strong objection to committing themselves to any such arrangement on the ground that it might involve them in the application of sanctions, including possibly military action, in some far-away dispute in which no interest of their own was at stake.

"We live in a fireproof house, far from inflammable materials," said M. Dandurand for Canada. The Geneva Protocol was therefore rejected. The nations had yet to learn that the very essence of collective security is the readiness of each nation to regard aggression against any other member of the collective system as an attack on itself.

Since the hopes of a general security system seemed to be fading, nations began to look once more to regional arrangements. One of the obvious threats to security was the continuing tension between France and Germany. France was obsessed by fears of German resurgence, while Germany resented the position of inferiority to which she was consigned and which had been emphasized by the French occupation of the Ruhr in 1923-24. This tension was eased in 1925 when, as a result of a conference at Locarno in Switzerland, France, Germany, Belgium, Britain, and Italy mutually guaranteed the Franco-German and Belgo-German frontiers. Germany also undertook not to revise her eastern frontiers by force, and France concluded agreements with Poland and Czechoslovakia for mutual assistance in case of attack by Germany.

The changed atmosphere in world affairs resulting from the Locarno treaties was marked by the admission of Germany to the League of Nations in 1926 with a permanent seat on the Council, and by the signature two years later of the Pact of Paris (the Kellogg-Briand Pact) by almost every state in the world. By this pact nations agreed to renounce war as an instrument of national policy and to seek the settlement of disputes or conflicts only by pacific means. But no provision was made for any kind of action in the event that any of the signatories broke its word. The pact was therefore little more than the expression of a pious hope and had no discernible effect on the course of events.

Disarmament

With the failure of the League to provide security there was linked its failure to achieve any degree of general disarmament. Unless it could rely on the League for security, no nation was going to part with the weapons with which it might provide some kind of security for itself. The League, however, was committed by Article 8 of the Covenant to an attempt to achieve a general limitation of armaments, and in 1925, in the improved atmosphere brought about by the Locarno treaties, a preparatory commission was appointed. But by the time the Disarmament Conference assembled in 1932 the omens were already bad. The economic depression had produced a feeling of insecurity and uncertainty about the future; Japan had invaded Manchuria in the previous year; and in Germany the Nazis, who proclaimed their intention of tearing up the Versailles treaty, held 230 seats in a Reichstag of 584, while the leader of the party, Adolf Hitler, had secured 13 million votes in the presidential election as against Hindenburg's 19 million. Germany withdrew from the conference in 1933 after Hitler had become Chancellor, and though the conference met again in the following year, it was now clear that nothing could come of it.

It was only on the naval side that any effective agreement to limit armaments was reached in the years between the two world wars. At a conference arranged by the United States in Washington in 1921-22 a ten-year naval building "holiday" was established, during which no new capital ships were to be built. At the same

time the strength in capital ships of the United States, Great Britain, Japan, France, and Italy was fixed in the proportion 5: 5: 3: 1.67: 1.67 respectively. The arrangements were extended at another conference held in London in 1930, but when a third conference was held five years later Japan withdrew and Italy dissociated herself from the outcome. In the rising international tension limitations on arms ran contrary to the trend of the times.


Mandates

The territorial dispositions which the Allied powers had to make at the end of the First World War were not confined to Europe. As part of the Versailles settlement Germany was obliged to surrender all her colonies in Africa and the Pacific. Besides these, the Arab territories detached from the Ottoman Empire by the British campaigns in Mesopotamia and Palestine and the revolts of the desert tribesmen also awaited disposal by the victors. All these territories now became "mandates". The system of mandates, outlined in Article 22 of the Covenant, was an attempt to give expression to the conviction that, in the Covenant's own words, "the well-being and development" of peoples not yet able to govern themselves "form a sacred trust of civilization". Thus instead of allowing the victors simply to annex the territories as the spoils of war, the League entrusted the mandatory powers with the task of administering them for the benefit of the indigenous populations until such time as they might be ready for independence.

Mandates were divided into three classes. The former Arab territories of the Ottoman Empire were Class A mandates, having "reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a mandatory". On this basis Britain administered as separate mandates Palestine, Transjordan, and Iraq, while France accepted the mandates for Syria and Lebanon. A second class of mandates (Class B) consisted of territories in which direct administration by the mandatory was considered necessary for a period before there could be any question of self-government. In this class fell Germany's former colonies in Central Africa, which were distributed as mandates among Britain, France, and Belgium. Class C mandates were those territories which were too small or too sparsely populated to have any prospect of independent status and were to be administered by the mandatories as integral parts of their own territory. On this basis the Union of South Africa obtained German South-West Africa, Japan received the German islands in the North Pacific, and Australia took over Germany's South Pacific islands and northeastern New Guinea. Western Samoa went to New Zealand. All mandatory powers were accountable to the Council of the League and were required to submit annual reports on the territories entrusted to them.

The Failure of the League

The League of Nations was an ambitious experiment of a kind unlike anything that had previously been attempted. In the end it failed in all its main objectives: it provided no security for its members; it achieved no disarmament; it was unable to prevent aggression or, eventually, world war. The reasons for its failure have already been touched upon, but can be recapitulated here.



One of the handicaps under which the League laboured was that it never included all the Great Powers in its membership. The United States was never a member. Germany joined in 1926, but Russia did not become a member until 1934, and by that date Germany and Japan had already withdrawn. Italy withdrew in 1937. In the final years of the inter-war period the League was regarded, with perhaps some justification, as an instrument used by Britain and France for their own purposes. From the very beginning the League had suffered from its association with the Treaty of Versailles and from the fact that it appeared to have as one of its aims the preservation of that treaty against all change. If only one or two of the changes which Hitler was to bring about unilaterally had been made under the Covenant's provisions for treaty revision, the story of the 1930's might have been a different one.

But what fatally undermined the League was the failure of the separate sovereign states of which it was composed to carry out the intentions of the Covenant. When it came to the testing time, particular national interests outweighed the larger universal interest at almost every turn. There was no way in which the individual member states could be compelled to put the general welfare before their special interests or to carry out the League's decisions and recommendations. Members simply ignored their obligations or divested themselves of them by resigning their membership. Thus the League failed because of the disloyalty of its members to the idea for which it stood.

Yet it would be a mistake to leave the impression that the League accomplished nothing. It introduced men to the idea of a world organization for the preservation of peace and to the principle of collective security. By its very failures it made clear for future generations some of the pitfalls and difficulties that were to be encountered in attempting to implement the principle; and thus it provided the nations with valuable experience which they were able to turn to account in their next attempt to devise a system of collective security. The United Nations today, for all its imperfections, would be more imperfect still if its designers had not had this experience to draw upon. Beyond this, the League did much valuable work in the social and economic fields, checking the underworld traffic in dangerous drugs and the even more vicious traffic in human beings, organizing famine relief, caring for refugees, raising loans for countries in financial crisis, fostering educational and intellectual co-operation, and contributing to human welfare in many other ways.

During the 1920's the League did manage to achieve also successful political settlements in a number of frontier and territorial disputes between nations. But these were all of a minor character, and none of them involved a Great Power. The first real test in a case of this kind came in 1931 when Japan invaded Manchuria. In a later chapter we shall see how the League proved powerless to deter or restrain her, and how this failure was a portent of what was soon to follow.

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. "The balance of power...has manifest points of resemblance to the machinery for collective security envisaged in the Covenant of the League of Nations" (G.M. Gathorne-Hardy). Re-read Chapter 3, pages 37-8, and then discuss this statement, comparing both the objectives and the methods of operation of the two systems. Which do you think has been most successful?
2. The first of President Wilson's Fourteen Points called for "open covenants of peace openly arrived at, after which...diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view". Can diplomacy always be carried on most effectively in public conference and within earshot of the world, or is there still a place for secrecy in diplomatic negotiation?
3. Should self-determination always be an over-riding consideration in the appointment of international frontiers and the allocation of sovereignty? What are some of the drawbacks to granting the right of self-determination to every group that claims it?

CHAPTER 5DEPRESSION AND DICTATORSHIPSA. THE GREAT BOOM AND DEPRESSION

While the nations of Europe, victors and vanquished alike, were weakened and impoverished by the First World War, the United States emerged stronger and wealthier than before. She had been at war for only a year and a half out of the four and a quarter years during which the European Allies had poured out the lives and resources of their peoples in the titanic struggle, and only during the last four or five months of the war had her troops been engaged in any considerable numbers. She had prospered greatly by the sale of huge quantities of war supplies and foodstuffs to the Allies and had been able to invade many of the foreign markets of the belligerents while their own industries were geared to war production. In addition she had loaned vast sums for war purposes, so that by 1919 she was owed more than \$10 billion. The total wealth of the United States, which in 1912 had been computed at \$187 billion, increased in the space of a decade to \$312 billion.

The Roaring Twenties

Thus the future which for war-ravaged Europe was full of uncertainty and foreboding presented a very different aspect to the American people. Having surmounted a post-war depression in the early 1920's, the United States in 1924 entered upon a period of hectic prosperity and economic expansion. The spectacular growth in productivity of American industry brought about by the wartime boom had continued unabated into the post-war years. At the same time the range of manufactures to which the new production methods could be applied was growing rapidly. Automobile production and building construction, together with all their associated industries, were the pace-makers of the industrial expansion of the 1920's. But besides the automobile a huge variety of new or relatively new products were now coming into common use for the first time. Electrical appliances of all kinds were beginning to be standard items in the American home. The adoption of the telephone as an indispensable adjunct to everyday living made the profits of American Telephone and Telegraph second only to those of General Motors. Chemists were creating astonishing new materials for an endless variety of uses. Sport and entertainment became big business, particularly the movie industry whose products often catered so aptly to the mood of the times. Meanwhile the policies of the Republican administrations which held office during these years under Presidents Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover were all designed for the convenience of the businessman. The controls of the Wilsonian era were relaxed, taxes were reduced, the antitrust laws were allowed to fall into disuse, and a high protective tariff wall was erected around American business.

The phenomenal expansion of American business and industry offered the individual citizen an attractive opportunity for getting rich quickly by investing

money in the stock market. Anyone who invested \$25,000 in General Motors in 1921 was a millionaire by 1929. In the later 1920's, as the boom wore on with no apparent end in sight, the prices of stocks began to soar. Investment turned to sheer speculative gambling as the prices lost all relation even to the most optimistic forecasts of the companies' possible earnings. People used their life savings and mortgaged their houses in the hope of making a quick fortune with the money. Much of the buying of stocks was done "on margin"; that is to say, the buyer made only a down payment to the broker, in the expectation that the rest could be paid later after he had sold at a profit. At the beginning of October 1929 brokers' loans amounted to more than \$6 billion. Business leaders vied with one another in their expressions of optimism: the country, it was said, had reached "a high plateau of permanent prosperity".

The Crash of 1929

"The great bull market of 1929", writes one American historian, "can only be regarded as a case of temporary mass insanity." Sooner or later reality had to break in. A market supported so precariously by what has been called "a honeycomb of credit", and growing more vulnerable every day, needed only a wavering in public confidence to collapse it. The reckoning came in late October 1929. Already during the summer there had been warning signs. Consumer spending had dropped sharply since the previous year. In the building, steel, and automobile industries, production was declining and workmen had been laid off. But nobody paid much attention to these portents. All eyes were on the ticker-tape. Then, early in October, the stock market in New York began to slide downwards. A cold chill of fear touched thousands of speculators who had bought on margin and suddenly saw the danger of being trapped. On October 24th fear turned to panic as the market underwent a steep decline. Five days later the crash came. On one day alone over 16 million shares were sold, at a loss to the shareholders of billions of dollars.

So the United States began the descent into the worst economic depression in all her history. Millions of people lost all they had. As purchasing power vanished, prices fell and businesses failed - 28,000 of them in 1930, nearly 29,000 in 1931. By 1932 more than 4,000 banks had also failed, with a loss to depositors of more than \$2 $\frac{3}{4}$ billion. All over the country factories and mines were closing down, throwing men out of work. The number of the unemployed reached 4 million in March 1930, 8 million a year later, and by the beginning of 1933 stood close to 15 million. In the same period national income fell from \$82 billion to \$39 billion. Exports sank from \$5 $\frac{1}{4}$ billion to \$1 $\frac{1}{2}$ billion, imports from just under \$4 $\frac{1}{2}$ billion to less than \$1 $\frac{1}{2}$ billion. Every economic index told the same story - stark catastrophe.

Causes of the Great Depression

The attempt to unravel the complex causes of the depression that followed the crash revealed that there had been much amiss with the American economy underneath the superficial appearance of steadily increasing prosperity. Depression itself, of course, was nothing new. The United States had already experienced four quite serious depressions in the 20th century before 1929. Indeed it was

well recognized that the alternation of booms and depressions known as the "business cycle" had so far been the normal pattern through which capitalist economies had progressed. There have been many theories to explain the factors that initiate and determine the upward and downward swings of the business cycle. But whatever these factors may be, it is evident that in any economy that is left to regulate itself on laissez-faire principles, it will only be when things have got visibly out of balance that the mechanisms that are supposed to put them right again will come into play. Thus in a time of prosperity and rising prices all is well as long as the demand is equal to the output. But it is just at such times that manufacturers become optimistic, each of them hoping to increase his share of the market. They therefore feel encouraged to go on expanding their production until the stage of over-production is reached. At that point prices fall and production is cut back; and if the situation is general throughout the nation's business, or in a number of its key industries, a period of economic depression will begin.

Before the crash of 1929 there were several indications that more goods were being produced in the United States than could be sold. Business inventories had more than trebled from \$500 million in 1928 to \$1,800 million in 1929. In some of the key industries, as we have seen, production was already declining. The increase in consumer spending in 1928-29 was only one-fifth of what it had been in the previous year. One reason for the falling-off of consumption in relation to production as a period of prosperity lengthens is that the high rates of interest available cause people to increase the proportion of their incomes that goes into savings. Now savings are normally invested in securities or deposited in banks where they are available to finance economic expansion. So long as they are used for this purpose they continue to circulate, eventually finishing up once more as part of somebody's income. But if there are not enough investment opportunities - if, that is to say, business is not in a position to expand sufficiently to take up the supply of savings - then savings cease to circulate. Instead they are hoarded, just as effectively as if they were being kept in somebody's mattress. The removal of this money from circulation means a general decline in income, leading to a decline in consumer spending, leading in turn to a decline in prices...and so into the spiral of contraction.

But it was not only the general prosperity of the 1920's that led to the increase in saving. Economists point also to the uneven distribution of income in the United States at this period. In spite of the prosperity, wages lagged well behind profits and dividends, so that purchasing power did not increase in proportion to production. Farmers did not share in the boom at all. Farm prices had fallen precipitously by 44 per cent in 1921 with the loss of the foreign markets for which production had been expanded during the war years, and while industry forged ahead, agriculture never fully recovered. Thus during the boom years while the rich were getting richer, the gap between rich and poor was increasing. Twenty-four thousand families at the top of the income scale were getting among them three times as much as the six million families at the bottom; in other words, the average income of the richest families was 630 times that of the poorest. And because rich people save a far larger proportion of their incomes than poor people, this situation greatly aggravated the imbalance that brought prosperity to an end.

There is no doubt that the policies pursued by the successive Republican administrations during the 1920's contributed to the severity of the depression. One result of these policies was the growth of trusts and monopolies. By the end of the twelve years of Republican government no less than one-half of all American business was controlled by just two hundred companies. Under these conditions competition, which is supposed to be the very essence of the free-enterprise system, ceased to play its proper part in regulating economic activity. Instead of finding their own level in relation to demand, monopolist prices were artificially fixed. When demand fell off, the large corporations, instead of allowing prices to fall and maintaining production, preferred to maintain prices and cut production, with the result that workers became unemployed.

Since the huge volume of goods poured out by American industry was far beyond the capacity of the home market to absorb, the only other place where it could have been disposed of was in foreign markets. But the policy of the United States government had also the effect of reducing the purchasing power of foreign countries. For in 1922 the United States had adopted a high protective tariff which prevented other countries from selling their manufactures in the United States and so from earning the dollars which might have been used to purchase American goods. This short-sighted economic nationalism was yet another contributory cause of the conditions which plunged the United States into the Great Depression.

The Depression in Canada

In Canada many of the economic conditions experienced by the United States during the 1920's had been duplicated. The crash on Wall Street was echoed by similar occurrences on the Toronto and Montreal stock exchanges, with much the same consequences. Canada's economy was a particularly vulnerable one in that it was dependent upon the processing and export of a few primary resources, principally wheat, pulp and paper, and non-ferrous metals, which the country produced in enormous quantities. In the booming 1920's production of these resources had been stepped up as though the market for them were literally endless. Canada's small internal market, of course, absorbed only a fraction of the output: exporting had thus become her very life. More than 40 per cent of her exports went to the United States; and even her exports to Europe were paid for to a very large extent with borrowed American dollars. The prices, however, were determined by world conditions entirely beyond Canada's control. Now, with the United States' economic collapse, the consequent cessation of her loans to Europe, and the attempts by all countries to fend off the worst effects of the depression by a retreat into economic nationalism, Canada's export markets disappeared. Between 1929 and 1932 her revenue from foreign trade fell by nearly 70 per cent. All parts of the country staggered under the force of the economic tempest, but none more than the prairie provinces where the economy was dominated by a single commodity, namely wheat. From \$1.60 a bushel in 1929 the price of wheat fell in 1932 to 38 cents, which was less than the cost of production.

Though the distress and destitution were less uniform in their impact in regions which were not dependent, as the prairies were, on a single product, it was among the unemployed industrial workers, in Canada as elsewhere, that the

depression produced its most demoralizing effects. By the end of 1932 Canada had nearly 600,000 unemployed. Nowhere was the sense of utter hopelessness and despair more oppressive than among those who, with nothing between themselves and complete destitution except the labour of their hands, were now unable to find work. The experience of queuing for weeks on end at factory gates on the slenderest chance of being taken on, of hanging around aimlessly at home or in the streets when even that chance was gone, of drifting across the country in the desperate hope that things might be better somewhere else, of living for months on public charity, of remaining idle while seeing one's family deprived of everything except a bare subsistence - this was the worst anguish. Beyond all the terrible statistics, it was in its soul-destroying effects on human beings that the real cost of the Great Depression had ultimately to be counted.

The Depression Spreads

The depression spread like a plague, affecting almost every country in the world except Russia. One of the earliest responses of the United States government to the crisis was the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930 which, over the protests of many of the country's leading economists, raised import duties to the highest level in American history. Other countries promptly retaliated: even Britain reversed her long tradition of free trade and adopted a protective tariff. By any means available, by quotas and quantitative restrictions on imports, by currency controls and bilateral agreements, each country strove to create for itself a little island of economic security, though it meant damming the channels of international commerce and destroying the very concept of an international "market". For Britain, not only an exporting nation but one of the world's great carrying nations as well, the decline in international trade was calamitous. Apart from the groups of unemployed men clustered on the street corners of the industrial and mining towns of northern Britain, one of the saddest sights to British eyes was the long lines of idle ships rusting at their moorings in river estuaries.

In Germany things were even worse. It was less than half-a-dozen years since the country had emerged from an earlier crisis brought about when France and Belgium, taking as an excuse Germany's default on her reparations payments, had occupied her chief industrial centre, the Ruhr. The state almost of undeclared war that had ensued had resulted in a runaway inflation that had reduced the German currency to worthlessness. As a result the middle classes had been almost wiped out, but a handful of big industrialists, among whom were some of the men who were later to finance Hitler's Third Reich, had been able to extend their control over a large part of German industry. The post-war republic, which in any case had never commanded the whole-hearted support of the German people, had become more deeply discredited than ever in their eyes: their repudiation of it ten years later was due in no small measure to the experiences of 1923-24.

Nevertheless the situation in Germany had begun a remarkable improvement in 1924 with drastic measures to achieve currency stabilization, the adoption of the Dawes plan for reparations payments, and the ending of the Ruhr occupation. The improvement in the international atmosphere was carried forward in the fol-

lowing year by the Locarno Pact and the admission of Germany to the League of Nations. In the next four or five years Germany actually enjoyed a period of considerable prosperity. The recovery, however, was made possible only by huge foreign loans, mostly from the United States. With the onset of the depression in 1929 and the consequent drying up of this source of funds, Germany too was plunged into a slump. It was the same story as elsewhere: falling wages and prices, shrinking trade, bankrupt businesses, failing banks, and the ultimate misery of all depressions - large-scale unemployment. By 1932 over 6 million Germans were out of work.

Austria was another sufferer. The fragmentation of the Austro-Hungarian Empire by the peace treaties had raised tariff barriers all over a great region of Southeastern Europe which had formerly functioned as a single, integrated economic unit, with the great city of Vienna as its commercial, financial, and administrative centre. The problem of survival as a small rump state, cut off from all the resources and industries and the rich agricultural provinces which had formerly sustained her, had embittered Austria's politics by producing extremisms of both Right and Left but had not come within sight of any permanent solution. To many Austrians union with their German kinsfolk to the north seemed the obvious answer, but this step was forbidden by the peace treaties. In 1931, as the depression moved towards its nadir, the German Foreign Minister announced the conclusion of an agreement for a customs union between Germany and Austria. The announcement aroused strong protests, particularly from France who viewed the proposed customs union as a prelude to political union. It was eventually agreed to submit the matter to the Council of the League of Nations, but even before the Council had announced its decision, diplomatic pressure had led to the abandonment of the plan. Austria's problems had to await a more drastic and more painful solution.

In 1933, with no easing of the economic situation yet in sight, a World Economic Conference was convened in London. There were three problems that needed urgent consideration: the huge volume of war debts still owed to the United States, currency stabilization, and tariffs. But the United States refused to discuss any compromise on the matter of war debts, and the conference therefore took up the question of currency stabilization. This was a matter of some urgency, since the devaluing of their currencies was one means by which nations had attempted to stimulate their export trade. Any hopes of success in this sphere, however, were ruined by a sudden change of mind on the part of the American government. On May 16th President Roosevelt had stated: "The Conference must establish order in place of the present chaos by a stabilization of currencies." Five weeks later the American delegation at the conference in London announced that "the American government at Washington finds that measures of temporary stabilization would now be untimely." The conference dragged on for another month, but ended without any solid achievement.

A New Deal for Americans

The worldwide disaster of the depression strengthened the ranks of the opponents of capitalist democracy. There were those who felt that what the depression demonstrated was the necessity of putting an end to capitalism itself.

Catastrophes of this kind, they affirmed, were bound to happen so long as economic capital remained in private hands, economic decisions of national importance were taken by private individuals, and the desire for profit remained the mainspring of the whole system. How, they asked, was it possible to justify a system under which, in order to keep up prices, mountains of wheat were burned, coffee was dumped into rivers, milk was poured down drains, and hogs were slaughtered and buried, while millions of people the world over went hungry or actually starved? The ranks of the Left - the socialists and communists - gained many new recruits during the depression years.

Others reacted differently and moved to the political Right. The root of the trouble, they argued, was that democracy was not a strong or decisive enough form of government to take charge of events in a crisis and impose order and direction upon them. Democracy was slow-moving and divisive and irresolute. What was needed was a strong, authoritarian government that could see what needed to be done for the country's good and could do it, without going through all the time-wasting and doubt-creating democratic processes. Strong leadership was the answer, leadership that had the courage of its own convictions and could make the people follow.

It was fortunate for the United States at this point that her democratic processes brought to the fore a man who was able to give the country the strong leadership that it needed without seriously imperilling its democratic institutions. When Franklin Delano Roosevelt was sworn in as President early in 1933, the fortunes of the United States were at their lowest ebb. Coming into office after a campaign in which he had pledged himself to "a new deal for the American people", Roosevelt launched the United States on a program which had the three-fold aim of Relief, Recovery, and Reform. The first necessity was to alleviate the immediate needs of destitute people for food and shelter. Funds were made available to the states by the federal government in the form of loans for relief purposes, and agencies such as the Federal Emergency Relief Administration were set up to administer them. Wherever possible, relief was administered by the provision of work for the unemployed, and further agencies such as the Civilian Conservation Corps and the Public Works Administration were formed for this purpose.

Under the heading of recovery came those aspects of the New Deal designed to cure the conditions brought about by the depression. The chief agency entrusted with this part of the program was the National Recovery Administration (NRA) which set itself to establish minimum wage and price levels and codes of fair competition in industry and to ensure to workers the right of collective bargaining. In order to raise farm prices, steps were taken by means of an Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA) to control and limit farm production. Both the NRA and the AAA were declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 1935 and 1936, but a number of the ends which they sought to achieve were secured by subsequent legislation and became part of the permanent reforms of the New Deal era. The Wagner Act of 1935 protected the rights of labour unions, and set up a National Labour Relations Board to see that the provisions of the Act were carried out. Minimum wages and maximum hours were established by the Fair Labour Standards Act of 1938. Another reform measure passed during the first Roosevelt administration was a comprehensive Social Security Act (1935) providing

for old-age pensions, unemployment insurance, and benefit payments to the blind and to needy children, and making funds available for public welfare work. In another sphere altogether, the government sought to prevent a recurrence of the disasters of 1929-33 by extending its control over banks and banking, the supply of currency, the marketing of securities, and the practices of stock exchanges.

The public construction projects undertaken by the Roosevelt administration included many that were designed to carry forward long-range plans for the development of the country's natural resources - in particular, hydro-electric power. One of the widest-ranging of these schemes was instituted in the Tennessee River basin, where immense hydro-electric development was integrated with plans for land and forest conservation, flood control, the improvement of navigation, the manufacture of fertilizers, and many other projects in a design to harness all available resources in the service of the social and economic welfare of the inhabitants. The operations of the Tennessee Valley Authority were intended to provide a demonstration of the benefits of comprehensive regional planning, while at the same time providing a yardstick by which the performances of the private utility companies could be measured.

The entry of the government into direct competition with private business was bitterly resented and attacked by big business interests. Indeed there was hardly any aspect of the New Deal that was not denounced and reviled by those who stood to gain by the absence of economic regulation. Labour and welfare legislation was branded as socialism, though government responsibility in these fields had long been recognized in most advanced countries and the New Deal did no more than bring the United States abreast of the 20th century. For a majority of Americans, however, the New Deal meant a restoration of their faith in democratic government. At all events, whether they liked it or not, one fact was now clear to nearly everybody. The precedents had been set, and in the greatest stronghold of capitalism government had established its right to intervene for the common good in any phase of the economic life of the country. There could be no going back to the old, unregulated capitalism. Laissez-faire was dead: it had died on October 29th, 1929.

B. THE RISE OF THE DICTATORS

The Rise of Nazism

In the United States, thanks to the country's long and firmly established tradition of democracy, democratic government weathered the depression. But in Germany things took a different course. Here democracy was a frail plant of barely a dozen years' growth and the Germans, still inexperienced in its ways, were more than doubtful about its ability to see them successfully through a crisis. In times of distress and bewilderment people quickly hark back to the well-tried and the familiar. Thus in the anxious years of the mid-1920's, the German people had almost instinctively turned to a representative of the old imperial order, the wartime Commander-in-Chief of the German armies, Field Marshal von Hindenburg, and had called him out of retirement to the presidency of the republic. For the well-tried and the familiar, in the Germans' political experience, was autocracy.

For the Germans the depression was a psychological as well as an economic cataclysm. After the few brief years of hectic prosperity, when it had looked as if things might mend, they were back where they had started. Once again starvation was ravaging the land. Their grievances over their eastern frontier and their enforced disarmament were still without redress. A terrible despair and hopelessness overwhelmed the population. The future was mere emptiness. Germany seemed doomed, without hope of escape, to eternal poverty, eternal humiliation, eternal inferiority among the nations of the world.

In this pit of despair and hopelessness many people turned to communism. But there was another gospel being offered - and one that perhaps made a stronger appeal to the strongly nationalist German temperament. Its apostle was Adolf Hitler, an Austrian house-painter who had served in the German army in the First World War with the rank of corporal. After the war Hitler, disillusioned by Germany's humiliation, had banded himself with a number of like-minded ex-service-men in Munich to form a political party called the National Socialist German Workers' Party - the Nazi party, for short. Hitler and his friends maintained that Germany had not been defeated on the battlefield but had been stabbed in the back by her own Jews and socialists, who had lacked the will to carry on the fight. Three of the main points in the Nazi program were: the union of all people of German race in a single state; the overthrow of the treaties of Versailles and St. Germain; and the acquisition of territory in Western Russia and the Russian border states for the settlement of an enlarged German population. The Nazi creed embraced nationalism, militarism, authoritarianism, anti-communism, anti-Semitism, and a mystical faith in the world-conquering mission of the "pure" Nordic race, of which the Germans were the leading representatives.

After an abortive attempt at a coup d'état in Bavaria in 1923, the Nazi party entered federal politics in May 1924, and in that turbulent period won the unexpected success of 32 seats. As prosperity returned, however, support diminished, until by 1929 its numbers in the Reichstag stood at 12. Economic depression and the financial support of a number of big industrialists, who saw in Nazism the best bulwark against communism, gave the party its chance. The Nazis now held out to the electorate the promise of a cure for the country's economic ills and an end to unemployment. In an election in 1930 their numbers in the Reichstag jumped to 107. Two years later they stood at 230. Though the Nazis did not have an absolute majority, they were by now far the largest party, and in view of the inability of the other parties to form a government, Hindenburg could not refuse when a group of industrialists urged him to offer the chancellorship to Hitler. On January 30th, 1933, Hitler took office.

Hitler's government, a coalition of Nazis and Nationalists, still lacked a majority, and Hindenburg agreed to dissolve the Reichstag and call a new election for March. Just before polling day the Reichstag building was destroyed by fire and the word was put about that the communists were responsible. In the last free election of the inter-war republic, the Nazis won 288 seats - still less than a majority. But the Reichstag fire was used as an excuse to outlaw the Communist party, and with the support of the Nationalists and some others an Enabling Act was passed on March 23rd giving Hitler dictatorial powers. Constitutional government in Germany thus came to an end: out of economic depression Adolf Hitler's Third Reich was born.

The Nazi tyranny proved to be as barbarous and oppressive as any that the world has ever experienced. One of its first steps was to silence opposition by dissolving all other political parties. The elected governments of both the states and the municipalities were replaced by appointed Nazi officials. Government was mainly by edict, the Reichstag no longer having any function except that of an occasional rubber stamp. Any opposition to or criticism of the Nazi government was rigorously suppressed. A dreaded secret police, the Gestapo, watched for any slightest sign of deviation from the paths of Nazi orthodoxy, and in dealing with offenders made free use of secret arrest, secret imprisonment in the dreaded concentration camps, torture, and summary execution. The normal judicial processes, like the legislative ones, were dispensed with. In Nazi society the individual had no other role than that of service to the state, the state being represented by the Nazi party and ultimately by the Führer (Leader), in whom all authority was concentrated. Absolute obedience to the state and absolute loyalty to the Führer were the two cardinal virtues.

Without doubt the vilest and most brutal part of the Nazi program was the attempt deliberately and methodically to destroy the Jews, whom the Nazis held responsible for all Germany's troubles. They were driven from their jobs, deprived of their property and of all civil rights, herded into ghettos, beaten up on the streets, tortured, and murdered. The luckier ones were those who were expelled from the country or who managed to escape. For the rest there waited eventually the "final solution" of wholesale extermination in the concentration camps.

Fascism in Italy

Hitler's Third Reich was not the first dictatorship of its kind to spring up in Europe after the First World War. Many of the features of Nazism were borrowed from a regime that had already existed in Italy for a decade.

The peace treaties of 1919 left Italy with a strong sense of grievance. Though she had chosen the winning side and had sacrificed some 650,000 dead, she had not come in for what she felt was her fair share of the spoils - certainly not for all that she had been promised as the price of her belligerency. Dalmatia had been denied her and she had acquired none of the former German colonies in Africa or of the Turkish lands in the Near East. Her representations on these matters in Paris had been brushed aside by the other Allies. And soon she was beset by post-war troubles, by food and fuel shortages, by inflation and high prices, by high taxes, and by unemployment. The same compound of national frustration and humiliation and economic hardship that was later to give the Nazis their chance in Germany prevailed in Italy; and in the one case as in the other many people turned to communism for the remedy.

While the middle classes feared a revolution of the Left, they saw much less to fear in a revolution of the Right. This was well understood by a former socialist journalist named Benito Mussolini, who had discovered at the beginning of the war that nationalism was still a far more powerful force than socialist internationalism. In 1919 Mussolini founded in Milan an anti-communist party which, taking as its symbol the fascis - the axe and bundle of rods carried by

the ancient Roman lictors - went by the title of Fascist. Like Hitler, who at this same time was organizing his Nazis in Munich, Mussolini found much of his support among disillusioned ex-servicemen and communist-fearing businessmen and industrialists. Though the Fascists held only a handful of seats in Parliament, their blackshirted "action squads" roamed through all the large towns battling the communists and beating up, terrorizing, and even murdering political opponents. The weak and ineffective governments of the day were quite unable, and made no attempt, to control the situation or to maintain order. When on October 28th, 1922, some thousands of Fascists carried out their so-called "march on Rome", the government resigned and Mussolini was summoned by the King to form a cabinet. He was given dictatorial power for fourteen months to restore order and to introduce reforms; but once supreme power was in his hands he quickly took the necessary steps to see that it stayed there.

Theoretically, Italy remained a constitutional monarchy. In fact, however, Il Duce (the Leader, as Mussolini was styled) gathered into his hands all the powers of an absolute autocrat. Electoral laws were designed to ensure a large Fascist majority in Parliament, and then were revised again in 1928 so that from that time on, until the Chamber of Deputies was abolished ten years later, voters were allowed only to say yes or no to a single, Fascist-approved list of candidates. All the apparatus of a police state was deployed to suppress opposition. The press was rigorously censored, freedom of speech and of assembly disappeared, and education was brought completely under Fascist control. Trade unions as such were abolished, and the authority of the state was extended over the country's economy by organizing employers and workers alike in each branch of the economy into "syndicates" and confederating the syndicates on a national scale. There were at first thirteen such confederations - one for employers and one for employees in each of six major sectors of the economy, and one for the liberal professions and the arts - the whole organization being under the authority of a Ministry of Corporations. In 1934 the structure of the "corporative state" was completed by the formation of twenty-two "corporations", in each of which the employers and employees of one particular branch of economic activity were represented together. By such means every aspect of the nation's life, including its intellectual and artistic life, was brought under state control. "The Fascist conception of the state," Mussolini declared, "is all-embracing. Outside it no human or material values can exist." And again: "The state is the highest and most powerful form of personality...the only true expression of the individual."

Fascism in Italy was not without its positive achievements. It brought the country industrial progress and development, economic improvement, administrative efficiency, and considerable advances in social welfare. But it killed individual liberty and, having originated in violence, reverted all too easily to its origins in the search for an answer to the grim problems of the 1930's. Soon Mussolini was to declare: "War alone brings up to their highest tension all human energies and puts the stamp of nobility on the peoples who have the courage to meet it.... I do not believe in perpetual peace."

Reconstruction in the Soviet Union

There was one major country that was not greatly affected by the Great Depression. The Soviet Union had economic troubles in plenty, but they were not

brought about by the malfunctioning of the capitalist system: they were the growing pains of an economic system that purported to be the inevitable successor to capitalism, as foreseen in Marxist theory.

For the first three years after the Revolution of 1917, the new Bolshevik republic had to fight for its very existence. Anti-Bolshevik forces rallied to the counter-attack. Allied expeditionary forces were landed to support them at Murmansk, Archangel, and Vladivostock, in the hope of establishing a regime that would bring Russia back into the war and discharge the other obligations assumed by the Tsarist government. In 1918 and 1919 White (anti-Bolshevik) armies assailed the Red republic from the Arctic and Baltic regions, the Ukraine, the Caucasus, and Siberia, while nationalist armies in territories freed by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk resisted attempts by both sides to reconquer them. During all this confused campaigning the Red Army, organized by Trotsky as Commissar for War, steadily increased in strength and fighting efficiency. By 1920 the anti-Bolshevik forces were defeated.

It was during this period, when Soviet Russia was still fighting for her life amid the wreckage of three years of disastrous war with the Central Powers, that the Bolshevik leaders under Lenin had to set about the task of laying the foundations of the new state and the new society. The problem before them was one of fantastic proportions. They were determined to transform the Russian Soviet state through its own efforts into a first-class industrial power. The materials they had to work with were an economy already ruined by war and a labour force consisting mainly of unskilled and illiterate peasants; and the atmosphere in which they worked was one of distrust and hostility on the part of almost all the other nations. There was also still a great deal of latent opposition within Russia itself.

One of the party's first tasks was the consolidation of its own power. The constitution promulgated in 1918 provided for a system of soviets beginning at the local level and culminating in the All-Russian (later All-Union) Congress of Soviets. This body elected the Council of People's Commissars. But though this machinery was ostensibly designed to allow the will of the people to prevail, it was in fact controlled entirely by the Communist (Bolshevik) party, whose first secretary and political bureau were the real government of the country. No other parties were permitted, the press was strictly censored, and a secret police was organized to suppress all opposition.

The first attempts at creating a communist state produced unrelieved chaos. Industry, already largely in ruins, was nationalized and turned over to the control of the workers, in whose inexperienced hands it broke down completely. The nationalization of the land was also proclaimed, but the peasants were reluctant to give up what they had seized for themselves; and they resisted still more stubbornly when they were ordered to turn over their surplus produce to feed the cities and the armies, since barter had now largely replaced the use of money and there was no prospect of receiving industrial goods in return for their grain. To make matters worse a terrible famine, caused partly by crop failures and partly by the intransigence of the peasants, occurred in the year 1921.

At this point Lenin had the sagacity to see that at least a partial and tem-

porary reversal of policy was necessary. A New Economic Policy (NEP) was introduced which permitted the peasant to retain ownership of his land, to buy or lease more land, to hire labour, and to sell his produce privately after paying over part of it as tax. Though large-scale industry remained in the hands of the state, private enterprise in other fields was encouraged, and individuals were allowed to own retail businesses and small industries. A money economy was re-introduced, efforts were made to stabilize the currency, and measures were taken to attract foreign capital and foreign experts and technicians. The NEP had the desired effect: by 1927 industrial and agricultural production had returned to the pre-war level.

Lenin died in 1924, and a struggle for the leadership of the party developed between Stalin and Trotsky. Trotsky believed that the party should concern itself with promoting a worldwide communist revolution - the purpose for which the Third International had been founded in 1919: Stalin maintained that the immediate task was the establishment of a strong and vigorous socialist state in Russia. Stalin eventually emerged the victor in the struggle and Trotsky was forced into exile.

By 1928 the Soviet leaders were ready to make a renewed attempt to establish a socialist economy and the first of the Five-Year Plans was introduced. The plan was a detailed blueprint, complete with quotas and schedules, for the attainment of stated industrial goals within the five-year period. This first plan concentrated the nation's efforts on the development of heavy industry, power, and transportation. Private businesses were brought to an end. Since new investment could only come from production itself, the manufacture of consumer goods almost ceased. In order to increase agricultural production and to release the necessary labour force for industry, peasant-owned farms were replaced by state farms and collectives. The first type (the sovkhos) was run on the lines of a factory by hired employees: in the second type (the kolkhoz) the peasants pooled their land and livestock and equipment and ran the farm as a co-operative. Both types of farm were designed to get the best possible use out of land and machinery and to benefit from the economic advantages of mass production, the division of labour, and centralized planning. But, as before, the peasants stubbornly resisted the attempt to deny them the ownership of the land and its products. The fiercest resistance came from the well-to-do peasant proprietors called kulaks. Rather than suffer enforced collectivization, they burnt their crops and slaughtered their livestock, before being deported to Siberia as slave-labour in their hundreds of thousands. The agricultural destruction was followed by a famine in which millions more perished of starvation. The kulaks as a class were simply wiped out, and it is estimated that agriculture in Russia did not recover fully for two decades.

In spite of these horrors and tragedies the industrial goals of the first Five-Year Plan were attained in nearly a year less than the allotted time, and a second Five-Year Plan went into effect immediately in 1933. The Russian people were told that in this plan there would be a greater share of productive capacity allotted to consumer goods to ease the daunting austerity of their living standards, but in fact heavy industry and the construction of industrial plant were again the main concern.

Further Five-Year Plans followed. They were brilliantly successful in enabling the Soviet Union to achieve her aim of rapid industrialization; but the cost was fearful. For years upon end the people had to undergo the deprivation and hardship of living at a bare subsistence level. Labour discipline was maintained by the harshest methods, and there were ruthless punishments for any who failed to keep up the killing pace. In political life terrorism and persecution were the order of the day. The dreaded secret police, the NKVD (before 1934 the GPU), were everywhere, and anyone suspected of opposition to, or merely of disagreement with, the regime was likely to disappear without trace. Besides the routine "liquidations" unnoticed by the outside world, there was in the 1930's a series of spectacular public treason trials or "purges", in which scores of prominent Bolshevik leaders, army officers, and government officials, charged with plotting against the state with foreign powers and Trotskyists, were condemned and executed, in many cases after abjectly confessing to the crimes of which they were accused.

What was the meaning of these astonishing proceedings? And what role would this enigmatic power play in the world when she began to turn her attention outwards from her own immediate problems? The rest of the world watched with apprehension, and wondered, and speculated.

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. What do you understand by "economic nationalism"? How is it connected with political nationalism? What are some of the principal forms that it takes? Trace as far as you can its effects on the world economy in general.
2. What do you think are the chief lessons to be learnt from the experience of the Great Depression? Do you think that the world today shows any signs of having learnt them?
3. Are there any conditions under which dictatorship might be a desirable form of government? If so, say what they are and why they make dictatorship desirable. If not, explain why not.

CHAPTER 6

THE TRIUMPH AND DOWNFALL OF THE AXIS AGGRESSORS

A. THE FAILURE OF THE DEMOCRACIES

The years between the two world wars fall into three fairly well defined periods. The first period, from the Paris peace conference to the Locarno Pact, was the period of settlement, during which the attempt was made to shape a new world order. The second, from the Locarno Pact to the onset of the Great Depression, has been called the period of fulfilment. During these few years the world enjoyed an interlude of comparative stability and increasing prosperity, so that for a while it looked as if the post-war settlement might prove to have been the starting point of a new and brighter era in the affairs of men. The blasting of these hopes by the depression ushered in the third period, the period of collapse. During the 1930's militaristic regimes in Japan, Germany, and Italy attempted to solve their countries' problems and redress their grievances by military aggression. Through timidity and short-sighted self-centredness the other powers refrained from any resolute measures to stop them until it was too late. By the time Britain, the Commonwealth, and France eventually made a stand in 1939, the price of resistance to aggression was a second world war.

Japan Takes the Warpath

As we saw earlier, it was Japan that first put to a decisive test the effectiveness of the League of Nations as a peace-keeping agency. In sixty years of industrialism Japan's population had almost doubled: by the 1920's its density in relation to the cultivable area of the country was the highest in the world. To feed this large population Japan depended on the export of manufactured goods, for which most of the raw materials had to be imported. The worldwide depression struck this overseas trade a devastating blow. The American Smoot-Hawley tariff had the effect of excluding Japan's textiles from one of her best markets. Meanwhile in her other principal market, China, there were nationalist demands for a protective tariff and widespread anti-Japanese boycotts. While the politicians cast about without success for an answer to Japan's problems, the military leaders, who held themselves responsible only to the Emperor and not to the cabinet or the Diet (parliament), initiated a simple solution of their own: foreign conquest. It was one for which the Japanese people seemed ready.

Manchuria was the obvious starting point. Strategically, it was important for Japan to deny the province to both China and the Soviet Union and to secure it as a base for her own expansionist program. Economically, Manchuria offered a sheltered market, a source of much-needed raw materials, and a possible field for colonization. It was a region, moreover, which Japan had long marked out for exploitation and in which she had already acquired special rights and interests, including control of the South Manchurian Railway and the right to

maintain troops for the railway's defence. Japan's ambitions, however, were clearly imperilled both by the new spirit of nationalism in China fostered by the Kuomintang under its Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek, and by the communist influences that had firmly established themselves in China during the 1920's. Thus the Japanese militarists did not find it hard to make a convincing case for the drastic course of action they proposed to pursue.

In September 1931, following an alleged act of sabotage on the South Manchurian Railway (possibly staged by the Japanese themselves), Japanese troops began the occupation of all Manchuria. Such an action was not without precedents. The establishment of rights and interests in foreign territory, followed by military occupation or outright annexation in defence of those interests, had been an imperialistic gambit frequently employed by all the Great Powers in pre-war days. But in Japan's case it constituted a violation of her undertakings, not only under the Covenant of the League, but also under the Pact of Paris and a Nine-Power Treaty of 1922 by which she had joined in guaranteeing China's territorial integrity. Upon the nations responsible for upholding these covenants lay the duty of taking action to restrain Japan.

China lodged an appeal with the League within a few days of the incident at Mukden, and the League despatched a commission of enquiry to Manchuria. It was a year and a half, however, before the League published its report, and long before this Japan had occupied the whole of Manchuria and had organized it as a puppet state under the name of Manchukuo. The League report strongly condemned Japan's action but proposed a settlement which, while recognizing China's sovereignty over Manchuria, would have given Japan a wide measure of control. The Japanese, however, wanted outright recognition of the new regime in Manchuria and would be satisfied with nothing less. When the report was adopted by the League Assembly, Japan immediately announced her withdrawal from the League.

The pathetic excuse for the League's inaction was that, since there had been no formal declaration of war, Japan was not at war with China but was engaged merely in a "police action". But no juggling with words could conceal the fact that if the plain intention of the Covenant was to be fulfilled, the other League members would have to recognize their obligation under Article 16 to subject Japan to economic sanctions as a preliminary step to military action if necessary. The real trouble was that, now that it had come to the point, no nation wanted to become involved in a far-away quarrel in which no interest of its own was obviously at stake. Britain, the only other League member with wide interests in the Pacific, was not prepared to take action alone. The United States was not a League member, but she did have an obligation to China under the Nine-Power Treaty; however, she too was unwilling to go beyond verbal reproof. In the upshot nothing whatever was done to deter or restrain Japan.

Japan's ambitions were not satisfied by the conquest of Manchuria. Though she signed an armistice with China in May 1933, she kept up a steady pressure in her attempt to extend her control over more of China and succeeded in detaching some of the northern provinces from Chiang's government in Nanking. The success in Manchuria had confirmed the ascendancy of Japan's military leaders over the civil government, and it was obviously only a matter of time before the war was resumed. However, this prospect did induce a collaboration

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between the Chinese Nationalists and Communists, so that when the Japanese renewed the war with a full-scale attack in 1937, they confronted a China more closely united than ever before. Though it was becoming increasingly clear that Japan's imperialist ambitions were not limited to China but extended to the whole of Eastern Asia and the Western Pacific, the other powers still refused to act. Japan was therefore able to extend her conquests in Eastern China until, with the outbreak of war between Japan and the United States in 1941, the struggle in China became merged with the much wider conflict of the Second World War.

The Italian Conquest of Ethiopia

The failure of the League of Nations to oppose Japanese aggression with anything more lethal than words was noted with satisfaction by the Italian dictator Mussolini, for by 1933 Mussolini was planning an imperialistic adventure of his own. The intended victim, the independent kingdom of Ethiopia (Abyssinia), situated between Italy's African colonies of Eritrea and Italian Somaliland, had frustrated an Italian attempt at conquest a generation earlier by a great victory at Adowa in 1896. Now the determination to avenge that humiliating memory gave added momentum to Italy's desire for overseas territory and military accomplishment. Ethiopia must be conquered by Italian arms.

A border incident in a disputed area between Ethiopia and Italian Somaliland in December 1934 was made the pretext for an Italian military build-up in East Africa and for increasing pressure on Ethiopia. The expected invasion was launched in the following October. On this occasion the League lost no time in declaring Italy to be the aggressor, but the mild economic sanctions imposed on Italy were very far from amounting to the "severance of all trade or financial relations" and the total boycott prescribed by Article 16 of the Covenant, and proved wholly useless as an attempt to divert Mussolini from his chosen course. The truth was that, while Britain and France wanted to appear loyal to the League, neither of them desired to see Italy humiliated and alienated. Indeed at this very time France was seeking a closer relationship with Italy in opposition to Germany, who had recently announced her plan to rearm. In the French view Article 16 of the Covenant had one proper use only - to prevent German resurgence. Britain, perennially anxious for the security of her Mediterranean lifeline to the East, was determined to avoid any step which might provoke Mussolini to a declaration of war - a war in which she might have to represent the League by herself. Thus the decisive measures which could have paralyzed the Italian war effort, such as an embargo on oil shipments and the closure of the Suez Canal to Italian ships, were ruled out. Mussolini had threatened war as a retaliation for any such measures, and though he might have been bluffing, no power wanted to take the risk of finding out.

Such as it was, therefore, Mussolini was able to have the "glory" of a military victory. The primitive weapons of the Ethiopian tribesmen were no match for bombers, tanks, and poison gas, and by the summer of 1936 the whole country was in Italian hands. The League thereupon abandoned its sanctions, and with them all pretence of being a peace-keeping organization. From now on the nations would have to revert to being the guardians of their own interests. Collective security had proved a mirage.

Germany Repudiates the Versailles Treaty

It was convenient for Italy that, while she was engaged in aggression in Ethiopia, Britain and France had to reckon with dangers much nearer home. Hitler had come to power in Germany in 1933 with the announced intention of repudiating the Versailles treaty, and he lost little time in setting about the task. The first clauses to go obviously had to be those which provided for Germany's disarmament, for armed might was to be the key to the succeeding steps. Moreover, Germany's sense of grievance over her enforced disarmament was not without some justification. When she had been stripped of her military forces after the war, it had been expressly stated that the purpose was "to render possible the initiation of a general limitation of the armaments of all nations"; but of this general disarmament there had been no sign. To the Germans it seemed evident that they were to be kept in a position of permanent inferiority.

German rearmament began secretly soon after Hitler's advent to power, but the secret quickly became an open one. Nevertheless consternation greeted Hitler's announcement on March 16th, 1935, that conscription would be reintroduced and that the peace-time strength of the German army would be established at about 500,000 men. The announcement brought a reprimand from the League Council and a flurry of diplomatic activity. Representatives of Britain, France, and Italy hastily met in conference at Stresa to adopt a common policy in face of the new development. At this point Italy's interests still seemed bound up with those of the democracies in opposition to Germany, for Hitler had made it clear that an early item on his program was an Anschluss (union) with Austria, and Mussolini had no liking for the thought of the common frontier with Germany which would thus be created. Italy's own side of the Austrian frontier was peopled by the South Tyrolese, a Germanic people bitterly resentful of Italian rule, and the Nazis had long proclaimed that the incorporation of all German peoples within the borders of the German state was one of their main objectives. Already in 1934 Austrian Nazis, with German connivance and support, had made an abortive attempt at a coup d'état in Vienna, in the course of which the Austrian Chancellor, Dr. Dollfuss, had been murdered. Mussolini on that occasion had shown his concern by rushing troops to the Brenner Pass on the Italo-Austrian frontier. Now at Stresa the three conferring powers formally reaffirmed their support for the independence and integrity of Austria.

Germany's rearmament also spurred France and the Soviet Union to bring negotiations already in progress to a quick conclusion in a treaty for mutual assistance. To this was added a Soviet undertaking to go to Czechoslovakia's aid in the event of attack, provided France did so too. Thus in place of the defunct collective security system a traditional balance of power took shape once more in Europe.

The Franco-Soviet Pact stirred Hitler's anger: now an attack by Germany on either member would involve her once again in a war on two fronts. Clearly, if Hitler was going to pursue his long-cherished ambitions in the east, he would have to provide Germany with a strong defensive system in the west. He therefore denounced the Locarno Pact, charging groundlessly that the Franco-Russian agreement had already violated it, and then proceeded to violate it himself in March 1936 by sending German troops into the demilitarized Rhineland.

This was a critical event in the history of Europe in the inter-war years, for, as Hitler himself admitted later, if the German forces advancing into the Rhineland had met any determined military opposition, they would have had to beat an ignominious retreat. But boldness won the day. Britain was preoccupied with the dangers in the Mediterranean created by Mussolini's war in Ethiopia, and France was unwilling to act alone. Hitler's clear breach of his treaty obligations was allowed to pass, and he could now go on to discard Germany's other obligations with increasing confidence in his ability to get away with it.

The Spanish Civil War

In view of the similarity between Fascism and Nazism a close alliance between Italy and Germany seemed a natural development. It had all the more to recommend it to the two dictators themselves after each had discovered, through the course of events just described, how useful the other could be in furthering his own ambitions. The chief obstacle to such an alliance thus far had been German designs on Austria. In July 1936 this obstacle seemed to be cleared away when Germany formally undertook to respect the sovereign independence of Austria and to refrain from interference in her affairs. Three months later the existence of a Rome-Berlin "Axis", signifying the solidarity of the two dictatorships, was proclaimed. The two of them also signed a pact with Japan directed against communism (the Anti-Comintern Pact). To bring herself into line with her new partners Italy withdrew from the League of Nations.

The first practical expression of German-Italian solidarity came in Spain. Here the growth of republicanism and socialism had led in 1931 to the rejection of the monarchy and the adoption of a republican constitution. The following years were troubled and chaotic ones for Spain. The tolerance, willingness to compromise, and spirit of give-and-take which are essential to democratic government were conspicuously lacking from the Spanish political scene, and the moderate republican elements became increasingly ineffective under pressure from extremists of both the Right and the Left. In an election in February 1936, after a period of conservative government, victory went to a Popular Front in which all the liberal and radical forces - democratic republicans, socialists, communists, syndicalists and anarchists - were ranged against the conservative parties representing the interests of the Church, the great land-owners, and the army. The next few months saw increasing terrorism and lawlessness as civil order began to crumble before the violence of political passions. Finally, in July, an army general named Francisco Franco led an insurrection against the government. For the next thirty-two months a bitter and savage civil war raged between the loyalist forces of the republic and Franco's rebel armies. Eventually the rebels prevailed and Franco became dictator of Spain.

Though the Spanish civil war was an internal struggle, there was a danger that if other powers attempted to intervene it would become an international war. Britain and France were particularly anxious to prevent such a development, and on August 1st, therefore, the French Prime Minister, M. Léon Blum, called for "the rapid adoption and immediate observance of an agreed arrangement for non-intervention in Spain". By the end of the month all the European powers

had signed a non-intervention agreement and a committee had been set up in London to ensure its observance. From the very first, however, the agreement was broken by Italy and Germany who sent troops and war material to help Franco. The Axis powers saw important strategic advantages to be gained by the establishment of a third fascist state on France's frontiers, and in the event of a European war they could expect to benefit greatly by the dominance of a friendly power over the Western Mediterranean. The Soviet Union for her part, anxious to prevent a victory of the Right, sent advisers and equipment to the Spanish government. But the reasons for intervention were not all ideological or strategic: the totalitarian powers also seized the opportunity to use Spain as a military training ground for testing the weapons and equipment which they were amassing against the possibility of a much greater conflict.

The Rape of Austria

With the remilitarization and refortification of the Rhineland Hitler had discarded the last of the limitations placed on German armament by the Treaty of Versailles. Reparations had long been a dead issue. Now therefore there remained only the territorial provisions of the treaty for Hitler's attention.

Austria was to be the first victim. Not only did it contain the largest body of Germans outside the Reich, but there was also a substantial minority of Austrians in favour of an Anschluss. And so, despite his promise of 1936 to keep his hands off Austria, Hitler summoned the Austrian Chancellor, Dr. Schuschnigg, to a meeting in February 1938 and browbeat him into appointing a Nazi as Minister of the Interior and removing most of the restrictions on Nazi activities in Austria. Within a week Nazi agitations and riots had been staged all over Austria to demand union with Germany. On the ground that the government was thwarting the will of the people and could no longer maintain order, and also in order to head off a proposed plebiscite, Hitler demanded the resignation of Schuschnigg (March 11th). German troops were already massing on the Austrian frontier, and in order to prevent bloodshed Schuschnigg complied. Next day the German troops occupied Austria without meeting any resistance, and the country was incorporated into the German Reich.

These events revived Italian anxieties about the Tyrolese frontier, and a fulsome telegram which Hitler sent to Mussolini to thank him for acquiescing in the Anschluss showed that the possible Italian reaction had been much on the German dictator's mind. Italy and Britain made another attempt at this point to come to friendlier terms through a treaty liquidating Anglo-Italian differences in the Mediterranean and the Red Sea. Mussolini was conscious of the fact that Italy was very much the junior partner in the Axis, and he saw that she had little to gain by a general European war. He hankered instead after the dignity and influence that might accrue to himself and to Italy as a member of a new Concert of Europe in which the Big Four would settle the affairs of the Continent between them, and it therefore served his purpose well to keep a foot in both camps.

The Betrayal of Czechoslovakia

The German annexation of Austria meant that western Czechoslovakia was

now surrounded by German territory as by a pair of jaws. Hardly had Austria passed under German control before the jaws began to close on their prey. Czechoslovakia held a key position in the French-Russian-Czech defensive alliance. Her mountainous western frontier was a formidable natural defence line; she had a first-class army; and she was within easy bomber range of every part of Germany. She was also an obstacle squarely in the path of the eastward drive by which Hitler had planned to acquire the Ukraine and other East European lands as Lebensraum (living space) and a source of food supply for a greatly enlarged German nation. In addition, she had a large German minority numbering some $3\frac{1}{4}$ million people. For all these reasons Czechoslovakia was marked down as the next Nazi victim.

The Germans in Czechoslovakia inhabited the Sudetenland, a mountainous border district around the country's western perimeter. By April 1938 the leader of the Sudeten German Party, Konrad Henlein, was demanding complete autonomy for the German areas, liberty for the Sudeten Germans to profess German nationality and ideology, and a fundamental reorientation of Czech foreign policy. Meanwhile the German press circulated propaganda stories about alleged Czech maltreatment of the Sudeten minority. Although this minority, like most minorities, did have some legitimate grievances, it was far better treated than any other in Europe. Its treatment by the Czechs, however, was not the point at issue; it was only a pretext. And Henlein was only a tool of the Nazis, taking his orders from Berlin.

As the summer advanced, the German pressure on Czechoslovakia and the Nazi-inspired Sudeten agitation built up towards a climax. France was bound by treaty to come to Czechoslovakia's aid in the event of attack; and if France acted, the Soviet Union too was pledged to give assistance. Britain had no formal commitment to Czechoslovakia outside the now generally disregarded League Covenant, but she could not afford to see France defeated by Germany. Europe was now apparently moving ineluctably towards war.

In mid-September, in a final bid to save the peace, the British Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, flew to Germany to confer with Hitler and learnt that only the transfer to Germany of all the German-inhabited areas of Czechoslovakia could prevent a German invasion. The British and French governments therefore decided to urge Czechoslovakia to yield to Hitler's demands: in return she was to receive an international guarantee of her reduced frontiers. Though the Czechs were willing to fight, it was made clear to them that they could expect no assistance in this course; consequently, they had no choice but to give way. However, when Chamberlain visited Hitler a second time on September 22nd, he found that the dictator's terms had stiffened to a degree that made it impossible to consider their acceptance, and that Poland and Hungary were also staking claims on Czechoslovakia with Hitler's backing.

Hitler had named October 1st as the deadline for meeting his terms, and preparations for the seemingly inevitable war were rushed ahead in Britain and France. On September 28th, however, Hitler agreed to a Four-Power meeting at Munich as a final attempt to reach a negotiated settlement. In that city, whose name as a result has become a byword in history, the representatives of Britain, France, Germany, and Italy met on the following day and reached a settlement that gave Hitler virtually everything that he had asked for, his only

concession being that he would take it in five stages spread over ten days rather than in a single step on October 1st. Britain and France undertook to guarantee the new frontiers. Czechoslovakia herself was not represented at the Munich conference, and when confronted with the settlement had no choice but to submit.

German troops crossed the Czechoslovakian frontier on October 1st. Immediately afterwards Polish troops occupied the Czechoslovakian district of Teschen and Hungary annexed a broad strip of Slovakia. Hitler declared that the Sudetenland was his "last territorial claim on Europe", but it was barely six months since he had denied having any designs at all on the integrity of Czechoslovakia, and nobody any longer gave any credit to such statements. The scepticism was soon shown to be justified. The truncated remains of Czechoslovakia no longer had any power of resistance to Nazi bullying and browbeating, and in March 1939 the whole country, with the exception of the extreme eastern region which went to Hungary, was occupied by German forces and made a German protectorate.

The Outbreak of the Second World War

The Nazi seizure of Czechoslovakia made two things plain at last to the watching world. One was that Hitler's ambitions were not limited to territories inhabited by Germans, as he had recently declared, but extended to lands occupied by non-Germans as well. The second was that there was no possibility of appeasing Hitler by simply giving him what he wanted; that merely whetted his appetite for more. He would have to be resisted, and resistance, it was now clear to almost everybody, must mean war. In dealing with a man like Hitler, the conditions necessary for successful diplomacy simply did not exist.

Within a few days of the annihilation of Czechoslovakia the direction of Hitler's next thrust was already becoming apparent in the peremptory demands made to Poland for the cession of Danzig to Germany and for the right to construct an extra-territorial road and railway across the strip of Polish territory between Germany and East Prussia known as the Polish Corridor. The loss of this territory after the First World war constituted a grievance to which Germany had never reconciled herself. The Poles replied to the German demands by submitting alternative proposals, and Britain and France moved quickly to make their intentions plain to Hitler by assuring Poland of "all the support in their power" in the event of aggression against her. Hitler treated the Polish reply as an outright rejection of his demands and promptly denounced the German-Polish non-aggression agreement of 1934.

By the Treaty of Versailles Danzig had been made a free city within the Polish customs area, but its population was solidly German and was completely under Nazi domination. Throughout the summer of 1939 German troops infiltrated the city in growing numbers, while the tension was heightened by a mounting German propaganda campaign and frequent "incidents" on the Danzig-Polish border - the familiar preliminaries to Nazi aggression. As the outlook for peace steadily deteriorated, Britain and France tried to secure Russian support for a stand against Hitler. But Stalin, who had been ready to fight for Czechoslovakia if France had given the lead, was now suspicious of Western intentions. He had

taken the betrayal of Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union's exclusion from the Munich conference at which it was arranged, as an indication that Britain's and France's real aim was to turn German aggression eastwards; and he doubted that they would really go to war for Poland. They had refused, moreover, to concede to the Soviet Union the right to secure strategic positions in Poland and the Baltic states as a precaution against a war with Germany. Motivated by his suspicions of Britain and France, Stalin decided to turn the tables on them. On August 21st the world was staggered by the announcement that Germany and the Soviet Union were about to sign a non-aggression pact. When the pact was signed two days later, it contained a secret agreement for the partition of Poland and for a free hand for the Soviet Union in Finland and the Baltic states.

German troops were now moving up to the Polish frontiers, and the propaganda campaign, including a stream of accusations of Polish atrocities against German citizens, reached its strident peak. On August 25th Britain and Poland signed a pact of mutual assistance. Everywhere war preparations were rushed to completion. There was a flurry of last-minute appeals from eminent persons and desperate final attempts at negotiation. Hitler's conception of negotiation, however, was a flat demand for the acceptance of all his terms without discussion. This time there was no Munich, and on September 1st the German army and air force launched their attack on Poland. Britain and France despatched ultimatums to Germany and, receiving no reply, declared war two days later. Following Britain's lead all the independent countries of the Commonwealth except Eire also declared war on Germany.

B. THE SECOND WORLD WAR

The Second World War, which raged for six tumultuous years, was the most far-flung and devastating conflict that the world had yet seen. It was far more truly a world war than the 1914-18 war, and yet in many of its aspects it was simply a continuation of that war after an uneasy truce of two decades. For Germany and her enemies to the east it was another round in the struggle between German and Slav that had precipitated the First World War. For France it was another attempt to subdue the menace on her eastern frontier. For Britain it was a necessity imposed by her continuing concern to prevent Europe from falling under the domination of a single power. But in the most general terms, the Second World War was a conflict between satisfied nations anxious to preserve the status quo and dissatisfied ones determined to change it.

In its military aspects the Second World War differed vastly from the First. In 1914 defence had been superior to offence: now the reverse was true. The combination of tanks and armoured vehicles and tactical aircraft gave the attacking forces a firepower and speed of movement that enabled them to overwhelm or outflank static defences. No longer did armies confront one another for months or years in trenches, mowing down attacking forces in droves with machine guns: the Second World War was a war of manoeuvre and movement. It was also the first war in which the potentialities of air power began to be fully realized. The dive bomber and the fighter bomber dominated the battlefield; the heavy bomber could provide a weight and range of bombardment greater than any artillery; photographic air reconnaissance supplied intelligence of a kind never before obtainable; transport aircraft, gliders, and parachutes

made it possible to drop forces behind enemy lines and to supply them over any terrain and any distance. At sea the battleship squadron was replaced by the carrier task force: decisive naval battles were fought in which the surface forces never made contact with one another. But perhaps the most far-reaching innovation of all was the realization of the possibilities foreseen by General Smuts in the memorandum quoted on page 41. By a process of "escalation" the immunity from attack which by humane convention had generally been accorded to noncombatants was discarded. The destruction of morale by the wholesale massacre of civilians was now accepted as a legitimate usage of war; and cities remote from any battle area were subjected to saturation bombing designed to reduce whole areas - not war factories merely, but residential districts with the schools, hospitals, churches, and everything else they contained - to rubble.

In the new warfare the scientist and the inventor played a role of the first importance. New kinds of weapons were introduced - magnetic mines that lay on the sea-bed and so could not be swept by ordinary methods, bombs that could penetrate reinforced concrete fortifications, and dozens of others. Radio direction-finding (radar) made it possible to detect and plot the position of aircraft and ships long before they were in sight. Sonar enabled surface ships to detect and track submarines. By the end of the war jet engines were beginning to replace piston engines in aircraft, and the Germans were using rocket-propelled missiles. And all the while in the most closely guarded secrecy the work went on whose results were to be dramatically revealed to the world at Hiroshima on August 6th, 1945.

From the atomic laboratory to the fighting front Canada shared in the labours and sacrifices of the Second World War. Being now a fully independent nation, she was not committed by Britain's declaration of war in 1939, as she had been in 1914, but issued her own declaration of war on September 10th. In the following six years over 1,086,000 Canadians (including women) wore uniform, of whom nearly 42,000 lost their lives. Canadian troops fought in Sicily and Italy, but the Canadian army's principal operation was the liberation of Northern France and the Low Countries after the invasion of Europe in 1944. The navy found its chief role in the ceaseless Battle of the Atlantic. Canadian air squadrons fought in many different theatres and took a prominent part in the air assault on Germany. A vital part of Canada's contribution to victory was the creation of a huge aircrew training organization under the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan, which produced a total of more than 131,500 aircrew members for the Allied air forces. As in the First World War, food, supplies, and equipment moved eastwards across the Atlantic in ever-growing volume. Yet it took time for Canada's contribution to be organized and to become effective, and meanwhile Europe had still to face her darkest hour.

Nazism over Europe

Hitler's opening blitzkrieg (lightning war) against Poland was almost a textbook demonstration of the new mobile, mechanized warfare. After the destruction of most of the Polish air force on the ground, armoured divisions with overwhelming air support swept across Poland from the north, the west, and the south, swiftly overpowering all resistance. The Poles fought with

reckless courage, but to no avail; within less than a month Poland was crushed. Meanwhile Russian forces invaded Poland from the east and occupied the eastern part of the country, as previously agreed. The Russians also secured bases in the Baltic states, but the Finns refused them any concessions and there was a hard-fought Russo-Finnish "winter war" before the Russians obtained the strategic Finnish border areas they desired. With the return of summer in 1940 the Soviet Union strengthened her western defences still further by annexing Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania outright.

On the Western Front things remained quiet during the first winter of the war. A British Expeditionary Force crossed to France and took up a position on the frontier of neutral Belgium. The French manned their heavily fortified Maginot Line along the German border, trusting that it rendered them impregnable. Hitler nursed the hope that the annihilation of Poland would persuade Britain and France of the futility of continuing the war.

With the return of spring and the frustration of this hope, Hitler saw that he would have to defeat the Western democracies. The first step was to take possession of the North Sea coast. On April 9th, 1940, German forces invaded Denmark and Norway simultaneously. Denmark was occupied without a fight. The Norwegians resisted fiercely but were soon overwhelmed. Even before the Norwegian campaign had ended, the Germans had struck again. On May 10th the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg were invaded without warning or declaration of war as German armies pushed through towards France, and the world was treated to another display of ruthless but brilliant blitzkrieg tactics. First the Netherlands and then Belgium surrendered. The British army, separated from the main French armies to the south of them, fell back on the Channel port of Dunkirk, from where they were rescued by one of the strangest operations in the history of warfare. A motley fleet of nearly a thousand craft of every conceivable type - destroyers, mine-sweepers, trawlers, tugs, private yachts, motor launches, ferry-boats, lifeboats, pleasure steamers, anything at all that could make its way across the Channel - set out from England for Dunkirk and in six days of miraculously calm weather (May 28th - June 4th) completed the evacuation of 215,000 British troops and 120,000 French. Besides the deliverance of Dunkirk the British had another cause for thankfulness. In the hour of their greatest peril they had found a leader equal to the occasion. On the day that the Germans invaded the Low Countries Winston Churchill had succeeded Neville Chamberlain as Prime Minister of Britain.

Meanwhile the Germans drove down through France, crushing all resistance, and on June 10th Mussolini deemed it safe to declare war on Britain and France. A week later the aged Marshal Pétain, now head of the French government, asked for an armistice. By the terms of the armistice, signed on June 22nd, the entire north of France and the west coast - approximately three-fifths of the country - were subjected to a German occupation. The remainder, Unoccupied France, was governed by an authoritarian French regime which made its capital at Vichy.

If Hitler was to finish off the war, there was no doubt as to what his next stroke must be. Soon the signs of an impending invasion of Britain were evident along the French coast. Before the Germans could invade Britain, however, their air force would have to gain control of the skies over southern England.

The Battle of Britain opened in earnest on August 8th. All through August and September and into October the full weight of the German air force was flung against Britain in an all-out attempt to wear down the Royal Air Force's fighter defence and pave the way for invasion. But though the R.A.F.'s resources were stretched almost to the breaking point, the defence held. By October the German air force had had enough and the danger of invasion was over. Heavy air raids continued throughout the winter, mainly by night, against London and other large cities, causing much suffering to the civilian population and considerable material damage. But Hitler had missed his chance. Britain remained free, and the spirit of resistance was kept alive in Europe.

The End of American Isolationism

Through all these months of high drama in the land and air war, a grim, unceasing, and vitally important battle was being fought day after day on and under the cold grey waters of the Atlantic Ocean. As in the First World War, Britain had to look to America for the supplies and foodstuffs which would enable her to carry on the fight, and from the very first day of the war German submarines began the attempt to cut her Atlantic lifeline and starve her into surrender.

Throughout the inter-war years the United States had been chiefly concerned to avoid any entanglement or commitment that would involve her again in a European war. President Roosevelt had been well enough aware of the folly of attempting to return to isolationism and had advocated a policy of firm opposition to the dictators, but he had not been able to carry Congress with him. In 1935, the year in which Italy invaded Ethiopia, he had proposed an embargo on the shipment of war materials to aggressors. Instead, Congress had passed a series of Neutrality Acts between 1935 and 1937 forbidding the sale of war materials to any belligerent nation, without distinction between aggressor and victim, and enacting other restrictions designed to prevent the kind of incidents at sea that had brought the United States into the First World War.

However, though the United States did not want to get into the war, she did want to see Hitler beaten, and in November 1939 Roosevelt was able to secure an amendment to the Neutrality Acts which made it possible for the Allies to buy war materials in the United States. After the fall of France, Americans awoke to the peril of their situation, and neutrality, except in the formal sense, was laid aside. Fifty over-age destroyers, badly needed for convoy duty, were transferred to the British and Canadian navies in return for the lease of bases in Newfoundland and the West Indies. In March 1941 the United States Congress passed the Lend-Lease Act authorizing the sale, transfer, exchange, or lease of any defence article to any country "whose defence the President deems vital to the defence of the United States". The growing unity of Britain and the United States in face of the Axis was made unmistakably clear by the meeting of Churchill and Roosevelt in August 1941 to draw up the common statement of peace aims that came to be known as the Atlantic Charter.

Yet though Britain now had a bountiful source of supply, the food and

the oil and the weapons still had to be transported across 3,000 miles of submarine-infested ocean. For the first three years of the war Allied ships were lost faster than they could be replaced. In the climactic month of November 1942, almost a year after the United States herself had become a belligerent, over 700,000 tons of shipping were sunk by U-boats alone and another 100,000 tons from other causes. In Winston Churchill's view, it was in the Battle of the Atlantic that the Allies came closest to losing the war. In the spring of 1943, however, the tide of battle in the war against the U-boats turned spectacularly. New detection devices, new weapons, and new tactics enabled the Allied air and naval forces to gain the upper hand. Total Allied shipping losses in the Atlantic fell from over 530,000 tons in March to 28,000 tons in June, while in the single month of May as many as 40 U-boats were sunk. The German submarine service did not give up the fight: it too adopted new devices and new tactics, and it continued to be a menace to Allied shipping until the end of the war. But it was no longer a mortal threat to Britain's survival.

The War Spreads

Having abandoned his plans for the invasion of Britain, Hitler began to look once more to the east. The war was lasting longer than he had expected and it was necessary to assure Germany of a new food supply to offset the effect of Britain's naval blockade. Furthermore, the original Nazi program of conquest in the east still awaited fulfilment. During the winter of 1940-41, therefore, Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria were pressed into partnership with the Axis. Greece and Yugoslavia were invaded and occupied by German forces. Now that almost all Western and Central Europe were under the Nazi heel, the Soviet-German non-aggression pact had served its turn for Hitler. The time to deal with Russia was at hand.

On June 22nd, 1941, on a 2,000-mile front from the White Sea to the Black Sea, the whole weight of the huge Nazi war machine was launched against Russia. The panzers swept eastwards, and by October German armies were besieging Leningrad and Moscow on a battle line that ran south to the Crimea. Winter enabled the Russians to counter-attack and regain some ground, but in the summer of 1942 the Germans reopened their offensive in the south, reaching and penetrating Stalingrad and driving deep into the Caucasus.

With the German attack on the Soviet Union, Britain and the Commonwealth were no longer alone in their struggle against Nazi Germany. Six months later they were joined by another ally of vast potential strength. American opposition to Japanese expansion in the Pacific had been steadily stiffening, particularly after Japan had taken advantage of the fall of France to extend her control to Indo-China. Japan therefore decided that the time had come at last to eliminate the Western powers altogether from East Asia and the Pacific. On December 7th, 1941, the Japanese made a surprise air attack on the American naval base at Pearl Harbor in Hawaii, following it up immediately with attacks on other American and British bases. Germany and Italy, who had formed an alliance with Japan in 1940, declared war on the United States a few days later. With that declaration the dictators ranged against themselves a combination of powers which they could not hope to defeat.



"At this very moment," wrote Churchill, "I knew the United States was in the war up to the neck and in to the death. So we had won after all ... There was no more doubt about the end."

Before that end, however, there were to be many disasters and an enormous cost had to be paid. The Japanese rapidly took possession of Guam, Wake Island, and Hong Kong. Early in 1942, they completed their conquest of Malaya, the Philippines, the Netherlands East Indies, and Burma, and soon they were threatening India. Thailand had earlier been brought under their control. From the Bay of Bengal to the Aleutian Islands, Japan was supreme.


In the latter half of 1942 the fortunes of the Allies reached their lowest ebb. In the Atlantic the toll taken by the U-boats was climbing steeply to insupportable levels; in Russia the Germans were at the gates of Stalingrad; and in North Africa British and Commonwealth forces which had twice pressed forward from Egypt into Libya had been driven back by General Rommel's Afrika Korps and now stood at El Alamein, barely 80 miles from Alexandria.

The Turn of the Tide

But now the tide of war was at the turn. At Stalingrad the German Sixth Army met its doom. When it surrendered in February 1943 only 90,000 men out of 22 divisions had survived the Russian onslaught and the Russian winter. Soon the Russians would begin the westward drive that would carry them with increasing momentum, through some of the most enormous and terrible battles in all history, to Berlin and beyond. In North Africa Rommel's forces were attacked at El Alamein by General Montgomery's Eighth Army in October 1942 and driven back in an unbroken retreat all the way to Tunisia, where they were trapped against Anglo-American forces that had landed in Morocco and Algeria and forced to surrender. With North Africa cleared of Axis forces, the Allies invaded first Sicily (July 1943) and then the Italian mainland, events which forced Mussolini to resign and brought about an Italian capitulation. German armies, however, continued to hold a line in Italy until the end of the war.

While Germany's armies fought their desperate battles in Russia and Africa and Italy, their homeland endured a mounting onslaught from the air, which reduced city after city to blackened rubble and is estimated to have killed more than half a million civilians by the war's end. (German air raids on Britain throughout the war killed about 60,000 people.) But bombing alone could not end the war, and meanwhile plans went forward in Britain for an invasion of the Continent to complement the massive Russian drive from the east.

On June 6th, 1944, the greatest seaborne invasion in the history of warfare crossed the English Channel and landed on French soil in Normandy. The American, British, and Canadian armies under General Eisenhower's command still had nearly a year of costly and sometimes desperate fighting ahead of them, but early in February 1945 they crossed the German frontier, and on April 25th, at Torgau on the River Elbe, American troops made contact with advance units of the Russian armies advancing from the east. Berlin surrendered a week later. Both dictators were now dead. Mussolini, who had been rescued by German paratroops after the Italian surrender in 1943, had been caught by Italian partisans as he tried to escape into Switzerland and shot without trial on April 26th. Hitler died by his own hand on April 30th while the Russian armies were already fighting in the streets of Berlin. On May 7th German envoys signed the instrument of Germany's unconditional surrender at General Eisenhower's headquarters at Reims. Hostilities ceased at midnight on the following day. The long nightmare of Nazism was at an end.



Victory over Japan

In the Far East the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, as the Japanese grandiloquently called their newly won empire, had reached its widest extent in the spring of 1942. The turning point in Allied fortunes came in June when, in a four-day naval and air battle off Midway Island, the Americans won a decisive victory. The destruction of four large Japanese aircraft carriers in the battle dramatically altered the whole balance of naval power in the Pacific.

After Midway the Americans were able to plan their own offensive. Their strategy was to fight their way northwestwards through the Pacific islands to bases from which they could bomb and eventually invade the Japanese homeland. The advance took the form of two separate thrusts: one, starting with the capture of Guadalcanal in the Solomons in February 1943, proceeded by way of northern New Guinea to the Philippines and Okinawa; the other took a more northerly route from the Gilbert Islands, through the Marshall and Marianas Islands to Iwo Jima, which was captured in March 1945. Far away to the west, meanwhile, the British Fourteenth Army, having repulsed a Japanese incursion into northeastern India in early 1943, liberated Burma by a southward advance which brought it to Rangoon in May 1945.

In the spring and early summer of 1945 American air raids on Japan, which had been increasing in intensity as the surface forces pressed closer and closer to their goal, came to a climax in an air offensive which virtually destroyed whole cities and killed hundreds of thousands of Japanese citizens. This was the "softening-up" process for the expected invasion. But there was to be no invasion. In July the Allied scientists who had been working throughout the war to devise a bomb which would utilize the tremendous energy released by the fission of atoms successfully tested the first atomic weapon in New Mexico. The first operational atomic bomb was dropped on the Japanese city of Hiroshima, destroying 60 per cent of it and killing between 70 and 80 thousand people outright. Three days later a second atomic bomb was dropped on Nagasaki. Shattered and demoralized by this terrible experience the Japanese had no alternative but to surrender. The story that had begun with an explosion on a Manchurian railway fourteen years earlier ended with the thunderous proclamation that the Atomic Age had begun.

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Were the aggressions of Japan, Italy, and Germany in the 1930's essentially different from such earlier imperialistic ventures as the United States' Mexican War, Britain's Boer War, or France's annexation of Morocco?
2. The Second World War is sometimes represented as an inevitable struggle between two incompatible political and social systems (that is, as an ideological war). What facts might be cited to suggest that the war did not really spring from ideological differences but, underneath these differences, was simply an old-fashioned power struggle?
3. Was the Second World War, as it developed, just another war on a larger scale than ever before, or were there some features - as some people maintain - that made it a new kind of phenomenon entirely?

CHAPTER 7

THE RENEWED SEARCH FOR WORLD ORDER

A. THE POST-WAR SETTLEMENT

The tasks and problems that confronted the nations of the world after the Second World War were even vaster and more complex than the ones they had faced after the First. For one thing, a very much larger part of the world had been directly involved; consequently the devastation and slaughter had been considerably greater. About 15 million fighting men had died: the number of civilian dead was probably larger still. Huge tracts of land in Eastern Europe were nothing but scorched earth, and scores of towns and cities in Europe and Japan had been largely reduced to blackened rubble.

The world that emerged from this frenzy of carnage and devastation had changed in more fundamental ways, however, than can be measured by the statistics of death and destruction. One thing that was now quite clear was that Europe was no longer its political centre of gravity. In the post-war world there were only two first-class powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, and Europe was only one of the areas in which they pursued their respective interests. Unhappily, as we shall see, the war-time alliance between these two great powers gave way to bitter antagonism in the aftermath, and it was their rivalry as the champions of two competing creeds that dominated the international scene.

Yet if there were only two first-class powers, there was a great proliferation of smaller ones. The forces of nationalism, greatly strengthened by the emphasis on self-determination after the First World War, were now at their most intense in those regions which had formerly been the colonial territories of European powers and which now found in the exhaustion of Europe the opportunity to assert their independence. Never in all the world's history has there been such a sudden multiplication in the number of sovereign independent states, many of them culturally backward and economically undeveloped, but all of them eager to claim within the shortest time possible the inheritance of the Industrial Revolution.

And overshadowing all this headlong change was the fact that this divided and problem-ridden world now had its hands on a new form of power capable, if wrongly used, of destroying civilization altogether and perhaps even life itself. In any major war of the future no corner of the world would be out of range of total destruction.

Germany

After the surrender of Germany in 1945 there was no general peace conference to reshape and reorganize Europe as there had been in 1919. In their war-time conferences the leaders of the three principal Allied powers,

President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Marshal Stalin, had shown that they intended to keep the settlement of the post-war world as far as possible in their own hands. These conferences had also revealed fundamental differences on the question of what to do with Germany - differences which emerged clearly at a meeting held at Yalta in the Crimea in February 1945. That Germany should be disarmed and demilitarized was easily agreed. But there agreement stopped. Stalin was in favour of the permanent dismemberment of Germany into a number of small states: he proposed further that she should be deprived of 80 per cent of her industry and should pay \$20 billion in reparations. Churchill was willing at this stage to see Germany partitioned (at an earlier conference at Tehran he had suggested dividing her into two), but he was not prepared to see her fragmented, for he still maintained the traditional British concern for a balance of power in Europe. In the matter of reparations, he was opposed to treating Germany so harshly as to impoverish her and to make her a liability to the Western powers. The experience with reparations after the First World War had shown that nobody was likely to benefit from an economically ruined Germany.

The long-term questions concerning the post-war treatment of Germany, however, were left undecided at Yalta. The immediate plan was to subject her to a military occupation, and for this purpose occupation zones - one for each of the Allied great powers - had been delimited. Each zone was to be governed by the commander-in-chief of the occupying power, but in order to achieve uniform administration throughout Germany the commanders-in-chief were together to constitute an Allied Control Council in which supreme authority for Germany as a whole was to be vested. Berlin, though situated in the Russian occupation zone, was not to form part of that zone but was also to be divided up into sectors for occupation purposes and placed under the control of an inter-Allied authority. Originally it had been intended that there should be only three occupying powers - the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union - but at Yalta it was agreed that France should make a fourth, and a zone was carved out for her from the American and British zones.

By the time the next conference of Allied leaders was held at Potsdam in July 1945, Germany had surrendered and the occupation plans had already begun to come into operation. Roosevelt had died in April and the United States was represented at Potsdam by her new President, Harry S. Truman. Churchill was succeeded as Prime Minister during the course of the conference itself by Clement Attlee when the results of the British general election were announced. At Potsdam no more was said about partitioning Germany, but the Allied powers still found themselves at odds on the reparations question. In order to destroy Germany's armaments industry and military potential, reparations were to be exacted in large part by dismantling Germany's heavy industrial plant and shipping it out to the Allied countries. But while the Russians wanted to take the maximum possible amount, the British were still unwilling to see the German economy reduced to the point where it could not contribute to, but would rather impede, the general economic recovery of Europe. It was, however, agreed that Germany was to be treated as a single economic unit and that economic plans, including those for reducing Germany's industrial potential, were to be co-ordinated over the country as a whole and administered jointly by the occupying powers.

In the political sphere, Nazism was to be rooted out and German political recovery was to be guided along democratic lines and "directed towards the decentralization of the political structure and the development of local responsibility". Thus for the time being there was no attempt to establish a central German government; and as time went on and the German policies of the Soviet Union and the Western Allies became increasingly divergent, even four-power collaboration proved unattainable. Plans for treating Germany as an economic unit and for establishing a uniform administration that would pave the way for a unified democratic German state came to nothing as the Russians proceeded to treat their own zone as a closed communist preserve, ransacking it for reparations and diverting to their own uses the food supplies with which this mainly agricultural region had formerly fed the cities of western Germany. As a counter to Russian non-cooperation, the United States and Britain merged their own two zones for economic purposes at the beginning of 1947. In the following year the French zone was added to the merger and plans were made for summoning a constituent assembly with the object of setting up a federal German government for the three zones, which together made up West Germany. About the same time the three Western powers brought about a dramatic improvement in the economic state of West Germany by introducing a new currency for their zones and their sectors of Berlin.

The Russian reaction to these initiatives was to blockade the Western sectors of Berlin by cutting their surface communications with West Germany in an attempt to force the Western powers to abandon their position in the city and their plans for a unified West Germany. This attempt was foiled by an air lift by which, using air transport alone, the Western powers kept the 2½ million people of West Berlin fed and supplied for nearly a year. Meanwhile they went ahead with their plans with the result that in May 1949 the Federal German Republic came into existence, giving West Germany full internal self-government though the occupying powers still retained certain important controls. Recognizing that their blockade had failed, the Russians lifted it, and a few months later they constituted their own zone (East Germany) a puppet communist state called the German Democratic Republic.

Thus Germany was effectively partitioned, contrary to Western designs, and as the partition line hardened with the years the goal of a Germany unified by free elections seemed to recede further and further from the realm of possibility. In 1955 full sovereign independence was restored to West Germany by the Western powers. The Russians, for their part, recognized East Germany as a sovereign state but continued to keep the same grip on it as on all their satellites. More than twenty years after the war there is still no prospect of a peace treaty with a unified Germany.

Peace Treaties with German Allies

While the matter of a German peace treaty was deferred indefinitely at the Potsdam conference in 1945, a council of the Foreign Ministers of the Allied great powers was formed and was instructed to draft treaties for Germany's European allies - Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Finland. The draft treaties were submitted in the summer of 1946 to a conference of the twenty-one nations that had been at war with the Axis powers, but the final decisions



remained in the hands of the Big Four (France now being included once again in this category). The treaties were signed in Paris on February 10th, 1947. Italy lost some small border areas to France, the Dodecanese Islands to Greece, and almost the whole of the Istrian peninsula, together with some islands in the Adriatic, to Yugoslavia. The area round Trieste was made a Free Territory, but the original arrangement in this region did not work well and in 1954 the city of Trieste and the coastal strip around it were handed over to Italian control, while the larger southern portion of the Free Territory went to Yugoslavia. Italy also had to give up her African colonies.

The other territorial changes affected by the peace treaties were not very great. Rumania ceded the Southern Dobruja to Bulgaria, and Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina to the Soviet Union, but received Transylvania back from Hungary. Finland, who had joined Germany in making war on Russia, lost her Arctic region of Petsamo as well as the territory already surrendered after the Russo-Finnish War of 1939-40. All five of the Axis allies had to pay reparations, chiefly to the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia.

The peace treaty with Austria took much longer to arrive at. It had been agreed in wartime conferences that Austria should be re-established as a free and independent state and, since she had been more of a victim of Nazi aggression than a willing participant in it, it was decided at Potsdam that she should be treated leniently. Nevertheless she was divided into zones and subjected, like Germany, to four-power military occupation for denazification purposes. A provisional government was set up in 1945 and in the following year the Allied Control Council handed over to it a large measure of authority. The only impediment to an early peace treaty and full independence for Austria was obstruction undertaken by the Russians so that they could prolong their occupation of their zone and continue to exploit it for the sake of reparations. In 1955, however, fearing that the Western zones of Austria might, like West Germany, be incorporated into a Western alliance, the Russians desisted from their obstructionist policies and Austria obtained a peace treaty, as a condition of which she undertook to remain permanently neutral.

The Russian and Polish Frontiers

The main territorial change in Europe resulting from the war was the westward advancement of the Russian frontier. This frontier had been a permanent cause of concern to the Soviet Union, and the part which the Eastern European nations had played in facilitating Hitler's invasion in 1941 seemed to show that her anxiety about it was not altogether ill-founded. The war provided opportunities for advancing it westward along its whole length from the Gulf of Finland to the Black Sea. In the north Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, annexed by Russia in 1940, were of course retained. A further acquisition in the Baltic region was the northern part of East Prussia. The United States and Britain promised at Potsdam that they would support the Russian annexation in East Prussia but stipulated that it must be subject to confirmation by the final German peace treaty. The Soviet Union, however, proceeded without delay to incorporate the region into her own territory.

In the south the Soviet Union acquired Transcarpathian Ruthenia by a

treaty with the restored Czechoslovakia in 1945, and Bessarabia by the peace treaty with Rumania. Between the Baltic and the Balkans, however, lay Poland, and here there were complications. When Poland was constituted after the First World War, a commission under Lord Curzon had delineated the ethnographic frontier separating Poland from Russia. This was known as the Curzon Line. Poland, however, had not accepted this frontier but had invaded Russia and had won herself a frontier much farther to the east (Treaty of Riga, March 1921). This settlement had been reversed in 1939 when, in her partition of Poland with Germany, the Soviet Union had reoccupied the territory east of the Curzon Line. Now Britain had gone to war in defence of a free and independent Poland, but at the same time both Churchill and Roosevelt regarded the Russian claim to eastern Poland, up to the Curzon Line, as reasonable and just. A statement issued after the Yalta Conference contained the following paragraph:

The three heads of government consider that the eastern frontier of Poland should follow the Curzon Line... They recognize that Poland must receive substantial accessions of territory in the North and West... and that the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should await the peace conference.

"Accessions of territory in the North and West" meant, of course, German territory. Specifically, it meant, as the Allied leaders had agreed among themselves, the southern part of East Prussia, and eastern Germany as far as the line of the rivers Oder and Neisse. Though Churchill and Roosevelt had second thoughts about the Neisse frontier, by the time the Allied leaders met again at Potsdam the Russians had placed the whole area up to the Neisse under Polish administration, thus excluding it from the German occupation regime. President Truman and Mr. Attlee felt that they had no choice but to recognize the Oder-Neisse line as the de facto frontier "pending the final delimitation of Poland's western frontier" by a German peace treaty. The Poles meanwhile proceeded to strengthen their grip on the region by expelling the German population from the east to the west of the Oder-Neisse and importing Polish settlers.

The Japanese Settlement

One of President Roosevelt's concerns at Yalta in February 1945 had been to arrange with Stalin for Russian participation in the war against Japan once the war in Europe was over. He was particularly anxious that the United States should defeat Japan without British help, because he was determined that neither Britain nor any of the other European powers should have a chance to regain her former imperialist position in the Pacific. Not only did he feel that America's role in history, in the Pacific as elsewhere, had been free from any taint of imperialism, but he was also apparently convinced that the Soviet Union too was innocent of imperialist ambitions and could be better trusted than Britain not to aggrandize herself in the Pacific - and this in spite of the fact that Stalin's price for intervention was the Kurile Islands, Southern Sakhalin, the restoration of all the rights Russia had lost in Manchuria through her defeat by Japan in 1905, and the maintenance of the position she had obtained in Outer Mongolia. Although the larger of these concessions would have to be made at the expense of the Allied power China

rather than of the enemy Japan, Roosevelt accepted the conditions and undertook to put the matter right with Chiang Kai-shek. Stalin kept his word by declaring war on Japan on August 8th, 1945, three months to the day after the German capitulation in Europe; but the first atom bomb had been dropped two days before and within a week Japan had surrendered.

For six years after her surrender Japan was subjected to an American military occupation under General Douglas MacArthur, during which time the Japanese polity and Japanese society were reconstructed along democratic lines, and steps were taken to break up the large industrial and financial trusts. The Emperor remained as a constitutional monarch deprived of all executive power, but during the occupation the government itself was only an instrument for carrying out the Supreme Commander's orders. A peace treaty was signed at San Francisco in September 1951 with 48 non-communist nations. By the terms of the treaty Japan gave up her claims to all territory outside her home islands, including Korea, Formosa, Southern Sakhalin, the Kuriles, the Ryukus, and all her other Pacific islands. In addition she undertook to negotiate reparations agreements with the countries she had invaded. Separate peace treaties with the Soviet Union and Nationalist China were signed later.

B. THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION

Though the League of Nations had failed in its primary tasks, it was recognized, even while the war was in progress, that some kind of international organization would be a necessity in the post-war world, and that only by worldwide co-operation was there any possibility of the world's finding its way through the thronging difficulties and problems that loomed ahead. The League itself was still formally in existence, but there could be no thought of trying to revive it: its record of failure and betrayal would have been a handicap impossible to overcome. What was needed was a new start altogether.

In October 1943, at a meeting in Moscow, the Foreign Ministers of the United States, Britain, the Soviet Union, and China signed a declaration in which they agreed to the establishment of an international organization for the maintenance of peace and security. The next step was taken at a conference at Dumbarton Oaks in Washington D.C. a year later, where representatives of the same Big Four drew up proposals for circulation to all powers at war with the Axis. At Yalta the Allied leaders arranged that another conference should meet at San Francisco in April (1945) to draw up the Charter of the United Nations Organization. The conference duly assembled, and after two months' work the Charter had been completed and was signed by the representatives of fifty nations. With the ratification of the Charter by the United States, Britain, the Soviet Union, China, France, and a majority of the other signatories in October, the United Nations Organization came into existence. At its first session in London in 1946 the Assembly accepted the invitation extended to the organization by the United States to make its home in that country. The headquarters buildings in New York were completed in 1952.

The Security Council and the General Assembly

The general structure of the United Nations Organization resembles that

of the old League. As before, there is a Council (called the Security Council) and a General Assembly. In its organization and procedure the Security Council, like its older counterpart, reflects the assumption that there can only be effective action for maintaining international peace and security if all the great powers are in agreement. Britain, China, France, the Soviet Union, and the United States have therefore been given permanent seats on the Security Council and no motion or resolution can be carried if any one of them votes against it. Thus each permanent member of the Security Council has a veto power; that is, the power to prohibit any of the Council's proposed actions. Besides the five permanent members, however, there are also ten* non-permanent members of the Security Council elected by the General Assembly for two-year terms. And here the new organization is more realistic than the old League. A decision or resolution of the Security Council does not have to have a unanimous vote in order to be carried. It needs only nine* votes in favour, including the votes (or at least the abstentions) of all the permanent members. Thus it is not possible for one or two small powers to frustrate the whole work of the Council.

The Security Council was designed to be a more powerful body than the old League Council. It is specifically charged with the maintenance of peace and security and, according to the Charter, is the body to which any situation endangering peace must be referred. It is empowered to investigate any such situation and, if necessary, to order a settlement. If the disputing powers do not comply, the Security Council may call on members to impose economic or diplomatic sanctions or to furnish troops for a military intervention. (Unlike the League Covenant, the Charter does not prescribe particular measures for a given situation, and thus it leaves the Security Council's hands entirely free.) All signatories of the Charter undertake to submit their disputes for some form of peaceful settlement and bind themselves to carry out the decisions of the Security Council.

The organ of the United Nations in which all members are represented is the General Assembly. Each member may send five delegates to the Assembly but has only one vote. Here again the voting system is different from that of the old League. A vote of the General Assembly does not have to be unanimous: on all important questions a two-thirds majority is required; others can be settled by a simple majority.

As originally conceived, the Assembly was to be a purely deliberative body, the executive power having been placed in the hands of the Security Council. The Assembly could discuss any matter within the scope of the Charter, except a dispute that was under consideration by the Security Council, but though it could make recommendations, and in this way bring the force of world opinion to bear, it was not expected to make decisions, and it could not bind its members to act. In the course of time and events, however, its role has changed and it has taken on responsibilities and powers which it was not originally intended to have. This has happened because of the impotence at times of the Security Council. So long as its five permanent members are in agreement, the Council,

*Before 1965 there were six non-permanent members, and seven votes in all were needed to carry a resolution.

with its authority to impose settlements in disputes and to order military action, is a powerful body. What was not clearly foreseen under the conditions of wartime alliance and comradeship was the development of a fundamental antagonism and divergence of aims between the Soviet Union and the Western powers which has meant that in almost every dispute they have found themselves taking opposite sides. The result has been that in a great many of the important matters that have come up before the Security Council for settlement, the Council has been paralyzed by the fact that the permanent members have not been in unanimous agreement. Whereas it was intended that the use of the veto should be an exceptional procedure, it has in fact been a frequent one. And since a split along ideological lines leaves the Soviet representative in a minority of one among the permanent members, it has fallen to him in the vast majority of disagreements to pronounce the veto.

Because of these difficulties a resolution called "Uniting for Peace" was adopted by the General Assembly in November 1950, just after the outbreak of the Korean War. The resolution provided that if the Security Council should fail to exercise its responsibility for dealing with threats to peace, the Assembly could be called into special session to recommend collective measures, including the use of armed force, which it could then call upon its members to implement. Such recommendations have come to have almost the force of decisions committing the United Nations to action. But the members are not in fact pledged to obey the Assembly, whereas they are pledged to obey the Security Council; and since this extension of the Assembly's powers has not been enacted in an amendment to the Charter, its legality can still be challenged.

Other Organs of the United Nations

Besides the Security Council two other councils were provided for in the Charter. One, the Trusteeship Council, corresponds to the Mandates Commission of the League and took over responsibility for those former League mandates that had not yet attained independence. The second, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), consisting of 27 (originally 18) non-permanent members, directs and coordinates all the many activities of the United Nations in the field of human welfare. It makes recommendations to the Assembly, supervises the specialized agencies, and sets up commissions to examine specific problems such as human rights or the traffic in narcotic drugs, or the problems of specific areas such as Latin America or the Far East. Another body, the International Court of Justice, is the direct successor to the "World Court" set up by the League.

The Secretariat of the United Nations performs much the same functions as did that of the League, the chief difference being the increased importance attaching to the role of the Secretary-General. This increase, again, is partly due to the inability of the Security Council to perform its functions as planned: it also owes much to the qualities of the successive holders of the office. The result has been that the office of Secretary-General of the United Nations has become one of the most important and influential diplomatic posts in the world today, and its holder undertakes on behalf of the United Nations many delicate diplomatic tasks and missions in which his impartiality, and the fact that he enjoys the confidence of many governments on equal terms, give

him a particular advantage.

Because of the very general and wide-ranging nature of its activities, the functions of ECOSOC are mainly advisory. The practical work for the most part is undertaken by the specialized agencies, of which there is a great variety. The International Labour Organization continues to concern itself with the improvement of labour conditions throughout the world. The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization is active in combating illiteracy, promoting education in backward countries, and fostering scientific and cultural exchanges. The Food and Agriculture Organization endeavours to raise standards of nutrition and to improve agricultural methods. The World Health Organization undertakes the battle against disease, endemic and epidemic, raises standards of hygiene, and conducts research. The main methods by which all these agencies operate are research, publication, advice, and technical assistance. Other agencies, of which we shall hear later, have specifically economic functions, while yet others are engaged in working out international standards and practices in the fields of transport and communications.

Weaknesses of the United Nations

Although both the Security Council and the Assembly may recommend military measures for dealing with a dispute, the United Nations is hampered by the fact that it has no forces permanently at its disposal for carrying out such measures. Though it was planned that members should set aside certain contingents of their own national armed forces which should be permanently available for United Nations military operations, the plan has never been put into operation; and consequently at each crisis at which the United Nations wishes to undertake military measures, it is dependent on the willingness of its members to supply troops for the particular purpose in hand.

An even more serious weakness of the United Nations is the fact that the Security Council can so easily be deadlocked by irresponsible use of the veto. Yet it does not follow that matters could be improved by abolishing the veto power. The existing arrangements were adopted because it was felt that no major power would allow itself to be coerced by the United Nations, and this would still be true even if the veto were abolished. A deadlock in the Security Council, in other words, is simply a reflection of a deadlock in the world at large, and the latter could probably not be resolved simply by overruling a Great Power in the Security Council.

There are, at the same time, dangers in the attempt to get round the difficulty by permitting the Assembly to assume responsibilities which it was originally intended that the Security Council should undertake. Since each member has only one vote in the Assembly, the vote of the newest and smallest state is exactly equivalent to the vote, say, of the United States or the Soviet Union. Now that so many new small states are being admitted, some of them with populations of less than a million, it is conceivable that a group of states representing only a very small part of the world could win a vote in the Assembly.

The United Nations made a better start than the League in that all the major powers (except the defeated ones) were in it at the beginning. Since that beginning, however, there has arisen a new power that holds under its sway one-fifth of the world's population and is capable of rivalling in the not very distant future both the United States and the Soviet Union. This is Communist China. China was indeed recognized as a great power at the end of the war and was given a permanent seat on the Security Council, but at that time the government of China was the Nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek. In the civil war which raged from 1946 to 1949 the Chinese communists gained control of the whole of mainland China, and Chiang and his remaining followers were driven to take refuge on the island of Formosa (Taiwan). Since Chiang's government still claims to be the rightful government of China and is supported in its claim by the United States, a situation has come about in which one of the permanent seats in the Security Council is held by a delegate who, formally at least, represents only a small group of refugees on a small island.

The corollary of this is that a country containing one-fifth of the world's population is not represented in the United Nations at all. The question whether Communist China should be admitted to membership of the United Nations is still being hotly argued. Those who oppose her membership maintain that it would be a mockery of the ideal for which the United Nations stands to admit a state that has practised and supported aggression in various parts of Asia. Others, however, point out that the admission of a state to membership of the United Nations does not imply approval either of its ideology or of its actions, and that there are other UN members that have practised and supported aggression in recent years. The point is - so it is argued - that if the United Nations is to preserve peace, it cannot afford to leave outside the scope of its activities the largest nation in the world, no matter how strongly some states may disapprove of it. Certainly it is hard to see how there can be any meaningful disarmament while one of the world's atomic powers remains absent from the negotiations.

C. THE UNITED NATIONS AS A PEACE-KEEPING AGENCY

The main purpose and function of the United Nations is to preserve peace and security - "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war", as the opening words of the Charter put it. The United Nations, however, is an organization of sovereign independent nations, and no mere feat of organization can ensure peace, particularly where the Great Powers are concerned. As Mr. Lester Pearson has said, "the idea that the UN can ever impose a solution, can ever force either action or retreat, on a Great Power is one of the really dangerous illusions." Nevertheless, before particular disputes have reached the stage of a showdown, the will to peace of the rest of the world, focused and brought to bear through the United Nations, can help to determine the decisions of the Great Powers. It can also be effective in preventing or subduing outbreaks of violence between lesser powers; and since such outbreaks, if unchecked, might well lead to a direct confrontation of the major powers, the United Nations does play an essential peace-keeping role in the world.

Israel and the Arab States

One of the earliest and most difficult situations that the United Nations was called upon to handle was the dispute between the Arabs and the Jews in Palestine. Britain had received Palestine as a mandate after the First World War, since when there had been a steady influx of Jews intent on making a national home for themselves, and growing disorder and violence as the indigenous Arabs protested the incursion. After the Second World War the British authorities attempted to prevent further immigration while they sought a solution to the problem, but the Jews continued to smuggle in shiploads of refugees. The situation was so difficult to control that in 1947 Britain asked the United Nations to deal with the matter. The Assembly sent a committee to Palestine to investigate and in the light of the subsequent report recommended that Palestine be partitioned between Arabs and Jews.

Britain had already announced her intention of relinquishing her mandate, and on May 14th, 1948, the last British troops were withdrawn. On that same day the State of Israel was proclaimed. Immediately Arab forces from the neighbouring states of Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, and Jordan launched an attack upon the new state. The United Nations sent Count Folke Bernadotte to Palestine as a mediator and the Security Council repeatedly called upon the belligerents to cease hostilities. Though Bernadotte was assassinated by Jewish terrorists, the work of mediation was carried on by Dr. Ralph Bunche until armistice agreements were signed by Israel and the Arab states in 1949. The United Nations then took upon itself the tasks of supervising the armistice and caring for nearly a million refugees who had fled from their homes in Palestine. As a result of the war the Israelis had managed to extend their borders considerably beyond those allotted to them by the United Nations' partition.

The 1949 truce did nothing to allay the hostility between the Arabs and the Israelis. The Arabs still vowed that they would crush Israel. In 1956 the war flared up again with an Israeli invasion of Egypt. At the same time Britain and France sent troops into Egypt in an attempt to re-establish their control of the Suez Canal, which President Nasser of Egypt had nationalized a few months earlier. Britain and France used the veto to prevent the Security Council from taking action, but a resolution of the General Assembly called for a cease-fire and the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Egyptian soil. On the same day Mr. Lester Pearson of Canada recommended that the Secretary-General be asked to organize a United Nations Emergency Force to maintain order in Egypt while the invading forces withdrew. By these means the open warfare was brought to an end. The United Nations Emergency Force remained to police the Egyptian-Israeli frontier after the invading troops had been withdrawn, but the unabated hostility between Israel and her neighbours constitutes a continuing threat to the peace and stability of the Middle East.

Indonesia

In 1947, about the time when the United Nations was beginning its attempt to reach a settlement in Palestine, the attention of the Security Council was drawn to an outbreak of hostilities between the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia, which had been granted independence under the Dutch crown. With

the aid of a United Nations Committee of Good Offices a truce was arranged in January 1948. Fighting broke out again at the end of the year, but the efforts of the United Nations led to a second truce and a conference at the Hague at which, in accordance with a United Nations recommendation, it was agreed to transfer sovereignty over Indonesia to the Republic of Indonesia. The Netherlands retained Western New Guinea until 1962, when the United Nations supervised the peaceful transfer of this territory too to Indonesia.

The Korean War

The one full-scale war that has been fought under United Nations auspices was the Korean War of 1950-53. After the Second World War the former Japanese territory of Korea had been occupied by Russian troops in the north and American troops in the south. It had been agreed among the Allies at a war-time conference that a unified, free, and democratic Korea should be established, but in the event the Soviet Union refused to co-operate either with the Americans or with a United Nations Commission which arrived at the beginning of 1948 to arrange for a National Constituent Assembly. By the time the American and Russian forces were withdrawn in 1948-49 there was a communist People's Democratic Republic of Korea in the north and an American-sponsored Republic of Korea in the south, both claiming sovereignty over the whole country.

In June 1950 North Korean armies invaded South Korea. The Security Council immediately ordered an end to the fighting and the withdrawal of the North Korean forces; but since the North Koreans proceeded with their invasion, the Security Council passed a resolution recommending United Nations members to send troops to help South Korea. Normally the Russian representative on the Security Council would have vetoed such a recommendation, but it happened that at this point the Russians were boycotting the United Nations and consequently the resolution was able to pass. Sixteen nations sent troops to Korea, though the vast majority came from the United States. At first the United Nations forces were nearly thrust out of the country: then, after regaining the south, they pushed on into North Korea in an attempt to unify the whole country. As they approached the Chinese border at the Yalu River, however, Chinese troops entered the country and drove them back to the partition line on the 38th parallel. In 1953, after two years of negotiating, a truce was signed, but attempts to reach a permanent settlement failed because of the communists' refusal to consent to free elections as a means of unifying the country. Korea, therefore, still remains divided. While the Korean War was the first occasion on which a world organization had successfully used armed force to protect a country against aggression, it was predominantly an American operation carried out on American initiative and mainly with American forces, and by virtue of that very fact it perhaps showed up the weakness of the collective security system rather than its strength.

UN Dissension over Peace-Keeping Operations

Following the precedent set by the despatch of the United Nations Emergency Force to the Middle East at the time of the Suez crisis, United

Nations troops have been sent on two more recent occasions to restore and keep the peace in areas where warfare had broken out. The first of these occasions was the civil war that erupted in the Congo after the ending of the Belgian colonial regime in 1960. The United Nations force, sent in the first instance at the request of Premier Lumumba, built up to a total of about 20,000 men and carried out its peace-keeping mission in the Congo for four years before it was finally withdrawn. The second occasion was an outbreak of war in Cyprus between Turkish and Greek Cypriots over proposals by the President, Archbishop Makarios, to change the constitution. A United Nations peace-keeping force (which included a Canadian contingent) arrived in the island in March 1964 to try to enforce a cease-fire, while a United Nations mediator attempted to arrange a settlement. At the beginning of 1966 the force is still in Cyprus upholding an uneasy truce.

While the peace-keeping military operations of the United Nations may be said to have been modest successes, in that without them the violence which they were designed to check would probably have been more widespread than it was, they have imposed an unforeseen strain upon the structure of the organization itself. Because of the opposition of the Soviet Union, France, and a number of other nations to the despatch of troops to the Middle East and the Congo, the resolutions authorizing these operations were passed in the Assembly in order to avoid the veto. The objecting nations therefore refused to pay their United Nations assessments (of which the costs of the peace-keeping forces were a large part) arguing that the maintenance of peace and security had been specifically made a responsibility of the Security Council and that the Assembly had no authority to assess costs for this purpose upon its members. By 1963 this refusal had brought the United Nations into severe financial difficulties, and at the 1964 session of the General Assembly the United States urged the enforcement of Article 19 of the Charter, which stipulated that members whose assessments were more than two years in arrears should lose their vote in the Assembly. The whole of the 1964 session was vitiated by the effort to avoid a confrontation on this issue, but the crisis passed at the beginning of the 1965 session, when the United States recognized that the majority of nations were simply not prepared to enforce Article 19.

D. ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION

While the Second World War was still in progress, the necessity for making plans for reconstructing devastated nations, restoring war-shattered economies, and re-establishing world trade was evident. There were still vivid memories of the economic troubles that the nations had undergone after the First World War - of the ruinous inflations that had occurred in the defeated and devastated countries where industrial production had broken down or been severely curtailed, of the post-war depressions that had afflicted the victorious nations, and of the disastrous economic nationalism to which these experiences had led. In order to avoid similar calamities on this occasion and to make plans for restoring world trade, an International Monetary Conference was held at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, in July 1944.

IMF, IBRD, and GATT

The conference, which was attended by representatives of forty-four nations, set up an International Monetary Fund (IMF) to implement a plan of international co-operation for the purposes of stabilizing exchange rates among the world's currencies, devising orderly exchange arrangements, and eliminating foreign exchange restrictions. The fund consisted of a pool of gold and currency from which member nations could purchase the currencies of other countries in order to make international payments. At its beginning the fund had a pool of \$8,800 million, one-third of this being contributed by the United States and the rest by the other member states according to a formula based on their pre-war trade figures.

The IMF does not grant long-term loans: its concern is exclusively with the balance of payments in the short term. For the vital purpose of combating depression and unemployment by making money available for investment through international loans, the Bretton Woods conference set up the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) with an initial capital of over \$9 billion contributed by the members. The bank not only lends money from its own funds: it also arranges loans between member nations and guarantees private international loans. Every member of the bank must also be a member of the IMF. By reason of its wealth the United States is the mainstay of both institutions, both of which came into operation in 1946 and became specialized agencies of the United Nations in the following year.

The purpose of the IMF and the IBRD was to facilitate the exchange and flow of money between nations so as to raise the level of economic activity throughout the world. Memories of the economic nationalism of the inter-war years were a reminder of the necessity of facilitating also the flow of goods by the reduction of tariffs. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) signed at Geneva in 1947 by twenty-three nations was a multilateral trade agreement for reducing tariffs, clearing away quantitative restrictions on trade, and putting an end to discriminatory practices. Article 1 of the agreement states:

With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in connection with importation or exportation or imposed on the international transfer of payments for imports and exports...any advantage, favour, privilege, or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties.

At its first three meetings between 1947 and 1951 GATT established tariff rates on some 60,000 items of world trade. The effectiveness of GATT has to some extent been curtailed, however, by the large number of exceptions to its general principles that have been made in particular cases.

The Marshall Plan

The organizations so far described were designed as permanent additions

to the world's economic machinery and have increased since their foundation both in membership and in the scale of their operations. In the immediate aftermath of the war, however, there was need also for short-term programs to provide an initial impetus for countries struggling to restore their economies. The need was made all the more urgent, from the Western viewpoint, as the pattern of post-war international relationships hardened into the cold war between the Western democracies and the communist world, for prosperity was felt to be the surest defence against the worldwide spread of communism. The dismal story of the 1920's and 1930's had shown how communism thrives amid conditions of material want and economic wretchedness. The struggle against poverty and want and hunger was therefore a political as well as an economic battle.

By 1947 it was by no means certain that the struggle would be won in Western Europe. Recovery was slow and uncertain: want and hunger were still rife: communist parties were showing great strength in France and Italy. In June of that year, however, General George C. Marshall, the United States Secretary of State, announced that the United States was willing to contribute directly to the economic recovery of the countries of Europe if they themselves would determine in detail their own needs and make arrangements among themselves for mutual assistance. Seizing the opportunity thus offered, sixteen Western European nations sent representatives to a meeting in Paris to draft a European Recovery Program (ERP) for implementing the Marshall Plan. Early in 1948 the United States Congress passed the Foreign Assistance Act authorizing an initial appropriation of \$5.3 billion for Marshall Aid and setting up the Economic Co-operation Administration (ECA) to administer it. The participating European nations on their side instituted the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) to fulfil their part in the undertaking.

Marshall Aid was offered to the Soviet Union and the other communist states on exactly the same terms as to all other countries, but the Soviet Union hotly denounced the plan as a scheme for subjecting Europe to American control and would neither have anything to do with it herself nor allow her satellites to participate in it. Instead she organized, early in 1949, a Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (COMECON) in an attempt to foster closer economic relations and do away with trade barriers among the countries in the communist sphere, and also to integrate their economies by means of industrial collaboration. The planning, however, was imposed from Moscow rather than being worked out co-operatively among the members of the Council.

During the four years before the Marshall Plan came to an end on December 31st, 1951, the United States gave about \$12 billion in food, fuel, machinery, and other forms of aid to Europe. These years were the turning point in Europe's post-war economic fortunes, and the spectacular economic recovery which they produced was accompanied by a sharp decline in communist influence in Western Europe. Thus in both its aims the Marshall Plan was a resounding success. More than any other single measure it brought the nations of Europe out of the immediate aftermath of war into a world in which they could begin to look ahead to new goals and new horizons.

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Compare the attitude of the Western powers to the task of peace-making in 1945 with their attitude in 1919. Had they learnt anything from the former occasion?
2. The disarmament clauses of the Treaty of Versailles had caused great resentment in Germany. After the Second World War, however, there was a noticeable lack of enthusiasm for rearmament among the German people even when it was eventually permitted and, in fact, urged upon them. What reasons can you suggest for the change of attitude?
3. Examine the role of the five permanent members of the Security Council in the United Nations and compare it with the role of the other members. Has either group made a surrender of national sovereignty? Does the structure of the organization imply that "might is right"?
4. Should Communist China be admitted as a member of the United Nations if she is willing to join? If so, should she replace Nationalist China as a permanent member of the Security Council? Are there any other nations which, in your opinion, should have a permanent seat on the Security Council?
5. Should the system of voting in the United Nations Assembly be "weighted" so that each nation has a number of votes proportional to the size of its population?

CHAPTER 8THE COLD WARA. A WORLD DIVIDED

Many people during the Second World War hoped that with the defeat of the Axis powers the enemies of a peaceful and democratic world order would at last be overcome and that the world would then be able to settle down to the stable, orderly existence of which, it was felt, it had been robbed by a clique of aggressive dictators. Wartime camaraderie, and admiration and gratitude for the magnificent military achievements of the Soviet Union, induced a kind of wilful blindness to the more sinister and dangerous features of Russian communism. Even President Roosevelt seems to have believed that Stalin was a peace-loving, democratically minded ruler who wanted nothing more for his country than her just due and reasonable security.

Those with longer memories and clearer vision were not so readily deceived by the notion that the wartime unity of purpose between the Soviet Union and the West was anything but a matter of circumstance and expedience. The two needed each other's help to overthrow the Axis: it was unwise to assume that their common interest went much further. Winston Churchill acknowledged quite bluntly the nature of the wartime alliance. "If Hitler were to invade Hell," he remarked, "I would at least make a favourable reference to the Devil in the House of Commons."

Churchill's own suspicion of the Soviet Union was deep-seated and of long standing. So was the Soviet Union's suspicion of the West. Russians remembered that British and French and American forces had been sent to Russia to fight the Bolshevik revolutionaries in 1918-19; that the Western attitude to the new Russian society in the inter-war period had been largely compounded of hostility and disdain; and that Western governments had waited years before recognizing Russia's communist government. It was no secret that some powerful elements in Western society had been inclined to regard Hitler with favour as a bulwark against communism, and the suspicions aroused in the Kremlin by the Soviet Union's exclusion from the Munich conference and the betrayal of Czechoslovakia in 1938 still rankled.

Even those who did not allow their judgement to be overborne by wartime emotions and propaganda differed in their assessments of the nature of the Russian threat. Some saw the matter in ideological terms: obviously, they said, there could never be any genuine community of aim between communism and democracy. Others felt that the contest looming ahead was basically an old-fashioned power struggle, and that the ideological difference was, in a sense, simply an additional complication. But whether they set it down to the nature of communism or considered it rather as a continuation of age-old Russian imperialism under a new regime, they concurred in recognizing the threat of Russian expansion.

Russia's Satellite Empire

One region on which Russia's ambitions for expansion had centred undiminished from Tsarist times was the Balkans. It was in recognition of this that, from an early stage in the Allied planning for the reconquest of Europe, Churchill had urged the advantages of an Anglo-American strike into Southeastern Europe from the Mediterranean. Churchill knew that the post-war shape of Europe would depend to a very great extent on who would be found in occupation of Southeastern and Central Europe when the Axis eventually surrendered. Stalin knew it too, and when the matter was raised at a conference of Allied leaders at Tehran late in 1943, he urged the Americans and the British to concentrate all their efforts and resources on the cross-Channel invasion of France. Already at this stage the preliminary manoeuvring in the cold war was under way.

In the event it was the Russians who "liberated" and overran Eastern Europe. Greece alone was preserved from falling into the Russian orbit. At a meeting in Moscow in October 1944 Churchill had made a bargain with Stalin which gave Britain paramount influence in Greece and equal influence in Yugoslavia in return for Russian predominance in Rumania and Bulgaria. The British forces that landed in Greece in the wake of the German retreat were able to put down an attempt by local communists to seize control; and though it took a bitter three-year civil war (1946-49) before the communists were finally suppressed, Greece remained in the Western camp. Yugoslavia, whose Partisan (guerrilla) forces had been assisted by British missions during the war and had played a leading part in the liberation of their own country, became a communist state under the Partisan leader Tito, but relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union were broken off in 1948 and Tito remained neutral in the conflict which was now developing between East and West.

Elsewhere in Eastern and Southeastern Europe, however, Moscow imposed an iron control. Poland, the traditional bone of contention between Russia and the Central European powers, was now also the cause of bitter dissension among the former wartime Allies. Throughout the war the Western Allies had recognized a Polish government-in-exile in London, but in 1944 the Russians sponsored a communist Committee of National Liberation (the Lublin Committee) which they installed as the government of Poland as the Germans retreated. At Yalta Churchill and Roosevelt secured an agreement from Stalin that the Lublin government "be reorganized on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad". To Churchill and Roosevelt this meant a government genuinely representative of all sections of Polish political opinion; but when the composition of the new provisional government was announced in June 1945, it was evident that to the Russians it meant simply the Lublin government with a small number of token additions from the London Poles and other groups. Unable to change the situation, the Western powers transferred their recognition to the government in Warsaw and pressed for the free elections in Poland that Stalin had promised. But the elections, held in January 1947, were neither free nor democratic, and it was no surprise when it was announced that the communists had received 89.8 per cent of the vote. The non-communists were soon ousted from the government, and the conversion of Poland into a Russian satellite was completed in 1952 with the adoption of a constitution modelled on the Soviet Union's.

Bulgaria, Rumania, and Hungary were also quickly transformed into satellites of the Soviet Union. With Russian troops in occupation local communists had little difficulty in dominating provisional governments, ousting political rivals, controlling elections to confirm their power, and introducing Soviet-type constitutions. In Czechoslovakia a coalition government survived until 1948, when the communists were able to seize complete control by a coup d'état. In the election which followed, the ballot contained only a single list of communist candidates. Thus Czechoslovakia too became a People's Republic and a Soviet satellite.

By such means the battle lines were drawn for the cold war in Europe. The western frontier of the Russian satellite empire became a barrier cutting off almost all contact between the West and the communist populations of Eastern Europe. "From Stettin in the Baltic, to Trieste in the Adriatic," said Churchill in March 1946, "an Iron Curtain has descended across the continent." With the conversion of East Germany into a Russian satellite state, the Iron Curtain was pushed still farther to the west. Germany was indeed to remain one of the focal points of that far-ranging struggle between the West and the communist world which came to be called the cold war. In the Allied Control Council one deadlock followed another, until in March 1948 the Russians withdrew their representative from the Council altogether. In meeting after meeting the Council of Foreign Ministers failed to make any progress towards agreement on a peace treaty for Germany. Though the idea of a permanent partition of Germany had been dropped at the Potsdam conference, the division into occupation zones had achieved a de facto partition, and the problem now was one of reunifying the Russian and the Western zones.

The West Reacts

The Western powers had been on the whole slow to recognize the nature of the struggle that was developing between themselves and the communist world. By 1947, however, the tightening of the communist grip on Eastern Europe, the attempted encroachments elsewhere, and the intransigence of the Russians in every kind of international negotiation or conference from the Security Council of the United Nations to the Allied Kommandatura in Berlin began to form part of a single ominous picture. In that year, therefore, in a policy statement that came to be known as the Truman Doctrine, President Truman committed the United States to resistance to further communist expansion in Europe or the Eastern Mediterranean. The occasion of his statement was an appeal from Britain for help against the communist rebels in Greece. Britain had been supplying military and economic aid to Greece ever since the country had been liberated from the Nazis, but in 1946 the Greek communists had begun guerrilla operations which, with help from neighbouring Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria, soon developed into a full-scale civil war. In February 1947 the British government informed Washington that it could no longer sustain this burden alone. President Truman's response was prompt. In a message to Congress in March he requested \$400 million to supply military and economic aid both to Greece and to Turkey, who was also at this time being subjected to Russian pressures. At the same time he announced that henceforth it would be American policy "to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures". Congress granted the President's request, and with the American aid the Greek communists were finally defeated by 1949.



The promulgation of the Truman Doctrine marked the beginning of an acute phase in the cold war. It was followed almost at once by the announcement of the Marshall Plan. The Russian reply to these Western initiatives was Cominform, an organization designed to replace the Communist International (Comintern), which had been dissolved during the war. The members of Cominform were the Soviet Union, her European satellites, and the communist parties in France and Italy, and its purpose was to spread and reinforce communist influence and to enable the Soviet Union to rivet her control more tightly upon her satellites. It was not able, however, to prevent President Tito of

Yugoslavia from pursuing an independent line, and in 1948 Yugoslavia was expelled from Cominform for deviations from Soviet policy and doctrine.

The years 1948-49 were the climactic period of this phase of the cold war. The communist coup in Czechoslovakia and the Berlin blockade in 1948 provided clear and unmistakable evidence of the nature of the antagonist with whom the West had to deal. After the failure of the blockade to achieve its purpose, the two sides entered a period of hostile co-existence during which their attention was centred mainly on the task of consolidating their strength within their own spheres.

The Defence of Western Europe

Now that the Western nations, under American leadership, were committed to the prosecution of the cold war, it was time for them to look to their military dispositions. In March 1948 Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg signed the Brussels Treaty, by which they bound themselves to a fifty-year alliance against armed attack in Europe. But while such an alliance provided insurance in the event of a revival of German militarism, the power of the Soviet Union could only be resisted with American aid. In April 1949, therefore, the five nations of the Brussels Treaty, together with the United States, Canada, Italy, Portugal, Norway, Denmark, and Iceland, signed a treaty in Washington creating a mutual security organization to be known as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The treaty pledges each member nation of NATO to regard an aggression against any other member as an attack on all of them. Provision was also made, largely at Canadian insistence, for economic collaboration, but little has been done on these lines and NATO remains almost exclusively a military alliance. The chief policy-making body for the organization is the North Atlantic Council on which each member is represented by an ambassador. Each member nation assigns certain of its armed forces to NATO which deploys them in four regional commands - Northern Europe, Southern Europe, Central Europe, and Mediterranean. Turkey and Greece, though not Atlantic powers, joined the organization in 1952.

NATO was denounced by the Soviet Union as a violation of the United Nations Charter and, inevitably, as an instrument of aggression. Its formation did mean that the Western powers had to embark on extensive rearmament programs to provide the organization with the strength to fulfil its function. But the aspect that was perhaps of most immediate concern was that it raised the question of West German rearmament, for it was plain that effective West European defence required German participation. But though it was also plain that a rapidly reviving West Germany could not be kept permanently disarmed, the Western European nations, and particularly France, were uneasy at the thought of a rearmed Germany. The best safeguard, it was felt, was to link the plans for German rearmament with another project that was now coming to the fore - that of a federated Europe. The restoration of full sovereignty to West Germany and the initiation of her rearmament were to take place concurrently with the formation of a European Defence Community (EDC), whose forces were to consist of a supra-national army in which the contributions of the participating nations would be so thoroughly integrated that they would no longer be separable as national contingents. Thus not only would European unity be enhanced, but no

nation whose forces were wholly committed to EDC would have a national army. A treaty establishing EDC was signed in 1952 by France, Italy, West Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. Britain, however, was not yet prepared to move so far in the direction of European federation; and without British participation France feared that EDC would be dominated by Germany. The French National Assembly therefore refused to ratify the treaty, and the scheme had to be discarded.

Following the failure of the plans for EDC, conferences took place in London and Paris between the six EDC nations, the United States, Britain, and Canada. The result was Western European Union (WEU), a defensive alliance of the seven Western European nations, backed by the Northern American powers, in which the military forces, though interdependent, retained their national identities. This multi-national force was put under the direction of the Brussels Treaty Council, and formed the military and air contribution of the member nations to NATO. The Council was enlarged to include both West Germany and Italy, and West Germany was also admitted to NATO in May 1955, a few days after her restoration to full sovereign independence.

The Problem of German Reunification

Throughout the long-drawn-out process by which West Germany regained her independence and the right to rearm, the Russians never ceased to accuse the Western powers of reviving German militarism for their own purposes and to warn that such developments must inevitably have the effect of postponing German reunification and a German peace treaty. All negotiations on these matters had so far broken down because the West was adamant in its insistence that German unification could only be considered on the basis of genuinely free elections, while the communists, realizing that the 18 million people of East Germany would be overwhelmingly outvoted by the 48 million of West Germany, would obviously never consent to any resolution of the problem that would put the whole of Germany in the Western camp. Early in 1952, shortly before the signing of the contract for the restoration of West Germany's sovereignty and of the EDC treaty, the Russians proposed negotiations for the establishment of a unified but neutralized Germany. But in America a presidential election campaign was getting under way, and the general mood was in favour of a tougher policy towards the Soviet Union; consequently, the Russian proposals came to nothing. With the signing of the German contract and the EDC treaty the Russians took the opportunity to emphasize their divisive effect by creating a three-miles-wide no-man's-land along the whole length of the western frontier of the German Democratic Republic.

In January 1955, while the ratification of the agreements for German sovereignty and membership of NATO was being awaited, the Russians warned again that "ratification would perpetuate the partition of Germany for years" and renewed their offer to discuss the possibility of a neutral Germany unified by "free elections". But while Russian policy appeared to be becoming more flexible and compliant, American policy directed by Eisenhower's Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, had become more rigid and unyielding. The Americans were determined to have West Germany within NATO and now insisted that the restoration of West German sovereignty must precede further negotiations on the

German question. Balked in their attempt to prevent the incorporation of West Germany in NATO, the nations of the communist bloc signed a military alliance, the Warsaw Pact, including in it the German Democratic Republic (East Germany). The incorporation of the two Germanys into rival military alliances created a formidable new obstacle to German reunification.

The Cold War in the Far East

The cold war was not confined to Europe. Being, in one aspect at least, a conflict not between two nations but between two different conceptions of the nature of human society, it was worldwide in its scope. Outside Europe, by far the most significant development was the communization of China, the largest nation in the world. By virtue of the Soviet Union's last-minute declaration of war on Japan, Russian troops had occupied Manchuria in the closing days of the Second World War. After their withdrawal a few months later, the Chinese communists, whose wartime alliance with the Nationalists had already fallen apart, quickly took control. The communist armies then moved south against the Nationalist forces of Chiang Kai-shek. After three years of civil war the Nationalist capital, Nanking, fell in 1949, and Chiang's government and army withdrew to the island of Formosa, leaving the communists under Mao Tse-tung in control of China. In the following year China signed a treaty of alliance with the Soviet Union.

The conflict in the Far East was a "cold" war only in the sense that the Great Powers - among which Communist China had now to be reckoned - managed to avoid the kind of outright confrontation on the battlefield that would have constituted open war between them. Throughout the post-war period, however, there was in fact constant "hot" war in Southeast Asia. The moving forces in many of these struggles were nationalism and anti-colonialism. The easy Japanese conquest of the Western colonial empires during the Second World War had seriously damaged Western prestige, and once the Japanese had left, the peoples of Southeast Asia had no intention of submitting once more to Western colonial rule.

This was a situation which the communists made the most of, by identifying themselves with local independence movements. In Indo-China an independence movement called Viet Minh, under the communist wartime resistance leader Ho Chi Minh, began a war at the end of 1946 to drive the French out of Vietnam. The French attempted to win over the anti-communist nationalists by setting up a state of Vietnam under the puppet emperor Bao Dai, but after a war that dragged on for nearly eight years they suffered a disastrous defeat at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, and a truce agreement was signed in Geneva. Vietnam was partitioned at the 17th parallel, the northern part going to the Viet Minh and the southern part to the non-communist nationalists. Laos and Cambodia secured recognition as independent kingdoms. It was arranged that elections should be held throughout both North Vietnam and South Vietnam in 1956 under the supervision of a Control Commission constituted by Canada, India, and Poland, for the purpose of unifying the country; but when the time came, the President of South Vietnam, Ngo Dinh Diem, refused to co-operate and the elections have never been held. The Geneva Conference also discussed Korea, where, as we have seen, another hot war had been raging and where another partition line divided

a communist North from a non-communist South, but here again the provisions made for elections to unify the country have not been carried out.

In Malaya communist guerrillas launched a campaign soon after the end of the Second World War in an attempt to gain control of the country. They were, however, never very great in number, and since Britain did not adopt as intransigent an attitude as did other European powers towards colonial aspirations to independence, the communists did not manage to capture the nationalist movement. After many years of guerrilla warfare in the jungle, the communists were stamped out, and in 1957 the Federation of Malaya became a fully independent member of the Commonwealth.

The communist threat in Southeast Asia prompted the formation of a mutual defence pact designed to provide a defensive bastion against aggression in that region. Following the signature of the Japanese peace treaty, Australia and New Zealand, realizing that they could no longer look to Britain for guarantees of their security, had obtained a treaty with the United States (the ANZUS pact) as a safeguard against a revival of Japanese militarism. After the Geneva Conference, however, it was recognized that the chief threat in the Far East came from a different quarter. In September 1954, therefore, the representatives of eight nations met in Manila to sign a treaty constituting the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). The eight signatories were Australia, Britain, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, and the United States. While the treaty provides mutual guarantees of security among its members, the organization does not have forces specially allocated to it but maintains the machinery for the co-ordination of military plans and operations. However, the fact that only three Asian nations are members of the organization greatly limits its significance.

Though China has engaged in direct frontal aggression in Asia, conquering Tibet in the 1950's and invading parts of Northern India in 1962, attempts at communist expansion have more often taken the form of guerrilla activities, as in Vietnam, Laos, Burma, and Malaya. During the 1960's the principal area of activity has again been Vietnam. In 1959 a communist "national liberation front" called Viet Cong, supported by North Vietnam, began guerrilla operations in South Vietnam which have since developed into a full-scale war. The United States sent military aid to South Vietnam, and in recent years has been drawn into closer and more extensive involvement until now (1966) she has nearly a quarter of a million troops and a considerable air force engaged in the war against the Viet Cong. With both Communist China and the Soviet Union backing the Viet Cong, there is a serious danger that the conflict will escalate further into a war between major powers.

The Middle East

Between the regions of the world where NATO and SEATO provide their respective measures of security against communist expansion lies the Middle East, a strategic, oil-rich area of long-standing interest both to the West and to the Soviet Union. Communism, as such, has made no great headway among the Moslem states of the Middle East: the main moving force has been nationalism, abetted by the implacable hostility of the Arab states towards Israel.

Nevertheless the strategic importance of the region made it seem desirable to complete the string of defensive alliances along the periphery of the Soviet empire, and a Middle East Treaty Organization (METO or the Baghdad Pact) was established in 1955. The organization was a disappointment to its planners in that Iraq was the only Arab state that could be induced to join, and she withdrew her membership in 1959. Renamed the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), the alliance now comprises Britain, Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan.

The decision of the Arab states to remain uncommitted in the cold war enabled them to play off one side against the other as opportunity offered. President Nasser of Egypt resented the Baghdad Pact as a challenge to his own leadership in the Middle East. He also resented the West's restrictions on the sale of arms to Middle Eastern countries. In September 1955 he therefore entered into an agreement for the purchase of arms from Czechoslovakia. This step naturally alarmed Israel. It also prompted the United States to withdraw an offer of a loan to Egypt for the building of the Aswan High Dam, a project of the first importance to Egypt's economic progress. Nasser immediately retaliated by nationalizing the Suez Canal, owned by an Anglo-French company. All these events culminated in the Israeli invasion of Egypt in November 1956 and the Anglo-French intervention. These actions brought a direct threat by the Soviet Union to take action on Egypt's behalf, but were in fact called off at the behest of the United Nations and under pressure from the United States. Since Egypt eventually got the loan for the Aswan Dam from the Soviet Union, the outcome was a cold-war victory for the communists.

B. THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE

While many of the events that have been described held the possibility of developments that could precipitate a third world war, they were themselves taking place in the shadow of an even grimmer contest which made it certain that if a third world war did break out, it would mean worldwide devastation on an almost unimaginable scale, probably the destruction of all civilization - perhaps the extinction of life itself. This was the nuclear arms race.

When the Second World War ended, the United States was, of course, the sole possessor of the secret of the atomic bomb. Though it could be only a matter of time before others discovered the secret, many scientists were surprised when the Soviet Union's first atomic explosion took place only four years later. Other nations followed: Britain exploded her first atomic weapon in 1952, France in 1960, and Communist China, the fifth member of the world's "nuclear club", in 1964. Meanwhile, however, among the leaders in the nuclear arms race, the atomic bomb had already been superseded by a weapon whose destructive power was as far in advance of the atomic bomb's as the latter's was in advance of the "conventional" high-explosive bomb's. The new weapon was the hydrogen bomb, the first of which was detonated by the United States in 1952. Whereas the bomb dropped on Hiroshima had had an explosive force equal to 20,000 tons of TNT (20 kilotons), the first hydrogen weapon was equivalent to 5 million tons (5 megatons). There is in fact almost no limit to the size to which hydrogen weapons can be built: the Russians, who exploded their first hydrogen weapon in 1953, have since detonated one with

an explosive power of 60 megatons. Britain tested her first hydrogen device in 1956, and there is no doubt that at the present time China is working hard towards the same end.

While one nation after another has joined the ranks of the nuclear powers, those already in possession of the secret have continued to stockpile their nuclear weapons, so that now, if war should break out between the two major nuclear powers, each could hurl against the other thousands of megatons of destructive power. At the same time the work of improving the means of delivering the weapons to their targets has gone forward. At first it was necessary to rely on aircraft as carriers for nuclear bombs, and even today the Strategic Air Command forms a vital part of the United States' nuclear forces. In the missile age, however, aircraft are comparatively slow and very vulnerable, and both sides have now developed ballistic missiles which can deliver nuclear warheads to another continent in a matter of minutes and against which there is so far no practical or effective means of defence.

Mutual Deterrence

As a consequence of the nuclear arms race both the United States and the Soviet Union are capable of completely devastating one another and most of the rest of the world as well, if another world war should break out. Some people profess to find this state of affairs reassuring. The consequences of a nuclear war, they say, would be so obviously disastrous for everybody that no power would be insane enough to precipitate one. This is the theory known as "mutual deterrence"; and as proof that it works its advocates point to the fact that in spite of recurrent crises the major powers have in fact refrained from going to war with one another since 1945.

There are, however, a number of reasons for not relying too heavily on mutual deterrence as a means of keeping the peace. First, the fact - if it is a fact - that mutual deterrence has kept the peace for twenty or more years is of no significance if the stockpiling of nuclear weapons is serving to make war certain or highly probable at a later date. (A policy of appeasement preserved peace during the 1930's only at the cost of making war eventually unavoidable.) Secondly, a policy of mutual deterrence provides no assurance that war between the nuclear powers will not break out by accident or through miscalculation. Thirdly, the attitudes of the great nuclear powers make it fairly certain that they do not intend to let even the predictable consequences of nuclear war deter them from it if the only apparent alternative is a humiliating defeat in a matter of vital national interest. As Mr. Walter Lippmann has said: "There is a line of intolerable provocation beyond which the reactions are uncontrollable." Fourthly, now that the two major nuclear powers have such huge stockpiles of weapons, many strategists are in favour of a plan, in the event of war, for attempting to destroy the enemy's bombers and missiles on the ground before they are launched. This can only be done effectively by the power that gets its strike in first; and at times of crisis, therefore, if war seems probable, any power proposing to adopt this strategy has a strong incentive for taking the initiative in unleashing nuclear war.

Disarmament

In view of all these facts, and also because the likelihood of nuclear war becomes greater as more and more powers acquire nuclear weapons, it is clearly most urgently necessary to devise some scheme for achieving nuclear disarmament and controlling the building of nuclear weapons. But although this matter has been under almost constant consideration since the beginning of the nuclear age, there has been hardly any progress whatever in the matter.

The first measure proposed after the war was the Baruch Plan, introduced by the United States in the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission in 1946. The plan proposed the establishment of an International Atomic Development Authority to which would be entrusted "all phases of the development and use of atomic energy... control or ownership of all atomic energy activities potentially dangerous to world security... and power to control, inspect, and license all other atomic activities". The Russians, however, rejected the Baruch Plan because of its inspection requirements, and also because they feared that it would leave the United States as the sole atomic power in the world. They suggested instead the immediate abolition and prohibition of all atomic weapons. This proposal was unacceptable to the United States, since it would have robbed her of her greatest military advantage, leaving the Soviet Union, with her huge "conventional" armies, as the strongest power in the world.

In 1952 the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission on Conventional Armaments were merged into a single Disarmament Commission so that the two kinds of disarmament could be considered in conjunction. But all disarmament proposals continued to founder between Russian insistence that any disarmament must begin with an immediate ban on atomic weapons and the West's insistence that the first step must be the setting up of machinery for inspection and control, both to determine the existing levels of armaments and to ensure the carrying out of any agreements. Secrecy about her military strength and dispositions, impossible to maintain in an open democratic society, was one of the Soviet Union's great military advantages, and she was unwilling to surrender it in advance of any actual disarmament.

There was indeed one point in the negotiations at which agreement seemed close: this was in 1955 when the Russians substantially accepted a Western plan known as the Anglo-French plan, which seemed to meet the major objections on both sides while still embodying those basic requirements which the West was not prepared to forgo. At this point, however, the United States "placed a reservation" on all the positions it had taken on disarmament in all the preceding discussions, in effect backing away from an agreement which at last seemed within reach. From this time on all hopes of disarmament seemed to fade, and it was difficult to avoid the impression that while both sides felt it necessary to continue negotiations for the sake of their images as peace-loving states, neither had any genuine intention of reaching an agreement on any large-scale disarmament.

The Nuclear Test Ban

The continued testing of nuclear weapons meanwhile was causing considerable alarm and anxiety throughout the world about the contamination of the earth's

atmosphere and surface by radioactive materials. Scientists disagreed widely in their estimates of the danger, but this only served to make it clear that in their testing of weapons the nuclear powers were playing with forces whose effects were not yet fully understood. During the latter part of the 1950's, therefore, the hopes of the powers in the matter of disarmament were mainly directed towards a comparatively limited objective - the banning of nuclear tests. Here again the key question was that of control and inspection. Though the Soviet Union was persuaded to agree to the stationing of observers within her territory as a means of policing a ban on nuclear tests, there was a wide discrepancy between the degree of observation and inspection she was willing to permit and what the West regarded as the minimum necessary for effective enforcement. As before, the Soviet Union accused the West of designs to spy on her military dispositions. While the whole question of inspection and control was being thrashed out by an international conference of scientists in Geneva, the United States and Britain announced that they would suspend tests voluntarily from October 31st, 1958, provided the Soviet Union would do the same. The voluntary ban was observed; and though President Eisenhower announced that the United States considered the moratorium to be at an end on December 31st, 1959, it was in fact stretched out until September 1st, 1961, before the Soviet Union broke it by the resumption of tests.

In 1963 the attempts to arrange a permanent test ban finally bore fruit. It had already been agreed for some time past that nuclear explosions anywhere in the world - with the possible exception of small ones underground - could be detected by either side without the help of observers stationed in each other's territory. Now, as a result of direct communication between President Kennedy of the United States and Premier Khrushchev of the Soviet Union, a conference was held at Moscow in July at which the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union signed a treaty agreeing not to carry out any further nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, or under water (underground tests still being excluded from the scope of the treaty). The treaty was endorsed by 103 countries, but both France and Communist China, still intent on developing their nuclear armaments, refused to sign. As a further step towards limitation of nuclear armaments the United States, the Soviet Union, and Britain agreed in 1964 to make substantial reductions in their production of fissionable materials for military purposes.

C. FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN THE COLD WAR

Like other kinds of war, the cold war involves many kinds of activity besides those which take place on the main military and diplomatic fronts. It is a war of propaganda: both sides make whatever use they can of all the different media of mass communication to persuade the world at large of the purity of their own intentions and the superiority of their own achievements, and to win acceptance for their own versions of the news and their own interpretations of events. It is a war of espionage: all the Great Powers maintain organizations of spies in the countries on the other side of the cold war battle-line to find out whatever they can about their opponent's military plans and dispositions, his technological advances, and any other kind of information that can be put to use in the contest for supremacy. From time to time some of these activities are discovered and exposed. Such exposure may

lead to an international crisis, as did the most celebrated spy exposure of recent years which occurred when the Russians shot down an American U2 photographic reconnaissance aircraft over the Soviet Union in 1960. It was then revealed that these deliberate violations of Russian air space had been taking place for a number of years, and Khrushchev made the incident an excuse for cancelling a proposed summit meeting with President Eisenhower which was due to begin in Paris. Overflights by aircraft introduce serious and dangerous complications into the business of espionage, since they can be construed as military aggression.

The cold war is also a war of technologies. Quite apart from the arms race in missiles and warheads, the United States and the Soviet Union are engaged in an attempt to outdistance one another in their achievements in space in the belief that victory in the "space race" will not only demonstrate somehow the superiority of the victor's social and political philosophy but may also confer great military advantages. Many of the notable "firsts" in this field - the first artificial earth satellite (1957), the first man in space (1961), the first "walk in space" (1965), and the first "soft landing" on the moon (1966) have been Russian achievements, but the Americans are never very far behind.

Wooing the Neutral Nations

One of the most important aspects of the cold war is the rivalry for the friendship and good will of the neutral or "uncommitted" nations. For not all nations are committed to the support of one side or the other in the cold war. There are many - in South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East particularly - who feel that the power struggle between the Western and the communist worlds is one that does not concern them in their immediate task of developing their economies and achieving a better standard of living for their peoples. They are impressed by Western abundance; but they are also impressed by the astonishing material progress that the Soviet Union has made in the half-century since her Revolution and by the undoubted achievements of the Chinese communists in improving the lot of China's swarming millions in less than two decades. They may have no admiration for the harsh and oppressive features of communist society; but some of them at least have no admiration either for what they take to be the prevailing false values of Western society - as they are revealed, for example, on our TV and movie screens or on the magazine racks of almost any North American drugstore. However, while some, like India, are neutral as a matter of principle and are careful to avoid any act or commitment that would compromise their neutrality, others adopt the position mainly as a matter of expedience.

Except for a few neutral states in Europe, almost all the uncommitted nations are in the category called "underdeveloped" and are sorely in need of economic and technical assistance. It was in his Inaugural Address in 1949 that President Truman produced the response to this need that came to be known as the Point Four Program (so called because it was the fourth point in the address). What Truman called for was "a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas". The Point Four Program is only one of a large number of American foreign aid programs, public and private, for which several billion dollars are provided annually. Since 1961 all such programs have been

co-ordinated by the Agency for International Development (AID).

Another program for providing assistance in economic development for countries of South and Southeast Asia is the Colombo Plan. This plan was first proposed at a meeting of the Commonwealth Foreign Ministers at Colombo in 1950. Though originally a Commonwealth project, the scheme has now been extended so that it embraces nearly all the countries of South and Southeast Asia, together with Britain, the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan. There is little formal organization. The individual members draw up their own plans for economic development and then meet together to discuss ways and means of helping each other with the various plans by means of bilateral arrangements. While the wealthy, developed countries are in the plan in the role of donors, and others participate only as recipients, some take part in both capacities. By 1965 the amount of aid given under the Colombo Plan was about \$14 billion, the United States contributing the largest share.

Not all aid to the underdeveloped countries comes from the West. The West does in fact supply several times the amount contributed by the communist countries (and in the West the United States provides about twice as much as all the others together), but the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries, and Communist China too on a comparatively small scale, also extend aid to countries in Asia and Africa. It is natural, and not particularly reprehensible, that the donor countries should hope that the provision of aid and assistance will help to strengthen the bonds of friendship between themselves and the recipients. There has, however, been a tendency at times to regard it simply as a means of "buying allies". When the American Secretary of State in 1956, John Foster Dulles, spoke of "the economic contest between the West and Russia for the friendship of Middle Eastern and Asian lands", and followed up his remark a short time later with the judgement, "Neutrality (in the cold war) is an immoral and short-sighted conception," neutral countries justifiably resented both the charge of immorality and the implication that their allegiance was up for sale to the highest bidder. There seemed also to be the further implication that countries in receipt of American aid were expected to toe the American line. However, the very fact that there are two competitive sources of aid for neutrals has compelled both West and East to reject this crude approach. Military aid from both sides, of course, will continue to go only to those countries that are likely to use it in approved ways; and aid is likely to be withheld from those countries whose courses of action run directly counter to the policies of the donor country. But at least the right of neutrality itself is now conceded, and aid to neutrals is regarded perhaps more as a long-term investment and less as an outright bribe. It would be false and unfair, moreover, to ignore the element of genuine humanitarianism that has entered into the West's foreign-aid programs. If in the context of the cold war political calculation has generally seemed to predominate, the altruism and idealism that have found scope for expression in the United States' Peace Corps, and similar organizations elsewhere, have perhaps done something to restore a truer perspective.

The Cold War After Stalin

So long as Stalin was in power in the Soviet Union there was little

relaxation in the tensions of the cold war. His death in 1953, however, marked the end of a chapter both in the internal history of the Soviet Union and in its relations with the West. Internally it brought a welcome liberalization of the Russian communist regime, and the curtailment of the powers of the dreaded secret police. Though Russian society was still far from free in the Western sense, the conditions of life were appreciably less grim and oppressive than before.

In the Soviet Union's relations with the West there was for a time a noticeable relaxation of tension. It was perhaps unfortunate that just when Russian policy was becoming less intransigent, American policy became more bellicose. There was talk of liberating the Soviet Union's satellites from communism, of the necessity for going to "the brink of war", of countering aggression by massive retaliation "by means and at times and places of our own choosing". Nevertheless the year 1955 saw the signature of the Austrian peace treaty and a summit meeting in Geneva between President Eisenhower, the new Russian leaders - Premier Bulganin and the Secretary of the Communist Party, Nikita Khrushchev - and the British Prime Minister Sir Anthony Eden. Though no great decisions were taken, an amicable spirit prevailed - "the Geneva spirit" as it was called. Early in 1956 Khrushchev was extolling the virtues of "peaceful co-existence" at the Communist Party Congress and beginning the campaign of "destalinization" aimed at the removal of all Stalinist influences from Soviet life. Though this campaign was undertaken for internal political purposes in the Soviet Union, the new Russian assessment of Stalin as a ruthless tyrant was not one with which the West was likely to quarrel.

The newly relaxed atmosphere of East-West relations was suddenly tensed again by crisis towards the end of 1956. Partly as a result of the liberalization of the Russian regime and the hopes that it raised, there was anti-Russian rioting in Poland and Hungary in a bid for even greater freedom. The outbreak in Poland was dealt with fairly easily and a number of significant concessions were made to the Poles, but in Budapest the uprising became a full-scale battle and was only put down by a ruthless use of Russian troops, tanks, and artillery at a cost of thousands of lives. The tension was further heightened by the Suez crisis which occurred simultaneously and in which the Soviet Union threatened to intervene on Egypt's behalf.

By 1958 the cold war was once again in a period of thaw with the beginning of the voluntary suspension of nuclear tests, a visit by Khrushchev (now Premier of Russia) to the United States, and plans for a summit meeting in Paris in 1960. And once again, in an alternation that was now becoming a familiar pattern, the thaw gave way to crisis. At the end of 1958 the Russians demanded that the Western powers withdraw from Berlin and that the city become "free and demilitarized". Khrushchev threatened that, if the West refused, he would make a separate peace treaty with East Germany and turn over to her control the access routes to West Berlin from West Germany. The situation remained deadlocked throughout 1959, and worsened with the U2 incident in 1960 and Khrushchev's abrupt cancellation of the summit meeting.

In 1961 the Russian demands on Berlin were renewed and at a meeting with President Kennedy in Vienna in June Khrushchev insisted that a settlement had to be reached by the end of the year. As the tension increased, as many as

1,000 East Germans every day made their escape to the West by way of the still open border between East and West Berlin. To stop this embarrassing outflow of fugitives from East German communism, the East German government sealed off the border with a wall of concrete surmounted by barbed wire running through the very heart of the city. The last open frontier between East and West in Germany had now become an impassable barricade. Still a few people managed to escape, but anyone caught in the attempt was shot down by the East German police in cold blood.

While the West stood firm on Berlin, the cold war flared up suddenly in the western hemisphere, bringing the world closer to nuclear war perhaps than it has ever been at any other time. The scene was Cuba, where Premier Fidel Castro, who had seized power in 1959, had repelled an American-backed invasion of Cuban exiles in 1961, and was now openly allied with the Soviet Union. In October 1962 it was discovered that the Soviet Union had taken advantage of her relationship with Cuba to set up missile bases in the island, little more than 100 miles off the shores of the United States. President Kennedy immediately ordered a naval "quarantine" (in effect a blockade) to prevent the landing of any more military supplies in Cuba and demanded that the Soviet Union remove her missiles. At the same time he began to assemble an invasion force in Florida. For a week the world held its breath wondering if the third and last world war were about to begin. But Khrushchev showed good sense by complying with Kennedy's demand, and the missiles were removed.

A Changing World

The cold war since Stalin's death has thus been an alternation of crisis and relaxation of tension; but in spite of the recurrent crises, a steady change has been taking place in the Soviet Union's relations with the West, with her own satellites, and with Communist China. Between the communist European countries and the West there has been a rapidly expanding range of contacts in many different fields and an overall lessening of tension. Between the Soviet Union and her satellites Khrushchev's destalinization campaign set in train changes which have encouraged the Eastern European countries to assert their independence in ways which would probably have brought swift retribution a decade ago. Recently Rumania has become a leader in this trend, reducing her commitments to the Warsaw Pact unilaterally by cutting down the period of compulsory military service, pursuing her own program of industrialization in defiance of the role assigned to her by COMECON, and developing commercial relationships with the West without reference to Moscow. Both in foreign and economic policy Rumania has shown that she no longer intends to play the role of a Soviet satellite.

But undoubtedly the most significant of all these changes is the estrangement between the Soviet Union and China, which is now almost complete. While Khrushchev brought the Soviet Union closer to a state of peaceful co-existence with the West, the Chinese leaders held firmly to the Marxist-Leninist view of the inevitability of the conflict between capitalism and communism. They have been angrily scornful of any softening of Russian policy towards the West, and they criticized Khrushchev bitterly for his denunciation of Stalin, his backing down on the Cuban crisis, and his signing of the test ban treaty.

They charged the Russians with revisionism, with abandoning communism in a return to bourgeois ideals, with allying themselves with the "imperialist" powers to stifle the people's revolution in Vietnam, and with having a bourgeois fear of the nuclear bomb. The Russians in their turn accused the Chinese communists of dogmatism, of failing to realize the implications of recent technological and social change, of threatening Russian integrity and security, and even of preparing the Chinese people psychologically for war with the Soviet Union. So virulent did the quarrel become that in 1960 Khrushchev put an end to Russian technical and economic assistance for China and withdrew hundreds of Russian technical experts who had been sent to aid the country's development.

Khrushchev himself was forced out of power in October 1964, but his successors have continued to affirm their support for peaceful co-existence with the West. Obviously they have no desire to throw away by war with the West the great achievements of the last half-century. Renewed Russian efforts to heal the breach with China have, by the same token, had no discernible success. Some observers believe that the breach is in fact beyond healing. At all events, it can only be with the profoundest anxiety that the Soviet Union watches a nuclear power with a population of 700 million gathering strength rapidly on her eastern frontier and claiming the leadership of all who subscribe to the true Marxist-Leninist faith. How she will resolve the dilemma in which she finds herself between East and West is a question whose answer is likely to be of the first importance for the whole world.

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Do you think that the sequel to the Second World War justified Hitler's claim to be Europe's defender against communism? Did it justify those who sympathized with Nazism for this reason?
2. What in your opinion are the essential requirements of a workable and effective plan for world disarmament?
3. Can democratic and communist states co-exist peacefully?

CHAPTER 9

THE WORLD IN TRANSITION

A. THE DECLINE OF COLONIALISM

In Chapter 1 we saw how colonialism reached its high-water mark in the period preceding the First World War. We saw also the nature of the forces that were, even at that time, causing subject peoples to strain against the bonds of colonial rule. These bonds were much weakened by the First World War, which destroyed the world in which colonialism had grown up and flourished, and left the colonial powers themselves in an exhausted state and faced with gigantic problems at home. Moreover, the war ended with the proclamation of a principle that ran directly counter to colonialism - the principle of self-determination.

The principle of self-determination, it is true, was meant at that time chiefly for application in Europe. Nevertheless in the more advanced countries under colonial rule nationalist movements were increasingly active in the period between the two world wars. In Morocco, Tunisia, and Libya the Spanish, the French, and the Italians all found themselves engaged in fierce wars against the local peoples to maintain their hold on their possessions. In Egypt nationalist pressure and violence forced the pace of the process by which Britain restored independence to the country in 1922. Britain retained certain defence rights, which were restricted by a 1936 treaty to the right to garrison the Suez Canal zone and to maintain a naval base at Alexandria for a few more years.

The most intractable of Britain's imperial problems between the wars, however, was India, where the nationalist struggle for independence was complicated not only by the social and political disunity of the subcontinent but also by the religious antagonism between Hindu and Moslem. The most powerful of the nationalist organizations was the Indian National Congress Party, a mainly Hindu party led by Mohandas K. Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru. Gandhi, who endeavoured, not always successfully, to restrict his followers to methods of non-violence and civil disobedience, stood adamantly for full Indian independence and refused to co-operate with measures designed merely to increase the degree of Indian autonomy while leaving ultimate control still in British hands. The All-India Moslem League, led by Mohammed Ali Jinnah, knowing that the Moslems would be swamped if India were given independence as a single state, campaigned for a separate Moslem state of Pakistan.

The Second World War found India's political affairs still in a state of turmoil. The Japanese threat in the Far East prompted the British government to send Sir Stafford Cripps on a mission to India in 1942 to offer full Dominion status after the war, together with the right to leave the Commonwealth altogether if India should so wish. The Indians rejected the offer, demanding full independence immediately. Yet while political relations between Britain and India remained in a tense and uneasy stalemate during the rest of the war, Indian troops continued to fight under British command in the Allied

cause with all their traditional valour and skill.

The Second World War completed the empire-dissolving process which the First had begun. The easy Japanese conquests in the Far East had shown the European states to be quite incapable of defending their own colonial possessions. The fact was that even in the heyday of imperialism it had not been the strength of their comparatively small overseas armies but the lack of political consciousness among the colonial peoples that had enabled the European powers to keep their hold on their empires. Two world wars and the rapid growth of mass communications, combined with the Westernizing influences of imperialism itself, had made it almost impossible for any community except the most primitive and isolated to remain politically unconscious in the mid-20th century. In many colonies independence movements were now led by men who had been educated in Europe or the United States. The European states, weakened by war and reduced to the rank of (at best) second-class powers, were thus no longer able to resist the challenge of nationalism in their overseas empires.

Empire into Commonwealth

Britain, to do her justice, bowed more or less gracefully to the inevitable. Though Winston Churchill had declared in a wartime speech, "I have not become the King's First Minister in order to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire," when the time of decision came, Churchill was no longer the King's First Minister. That post was held by Clement Attlee at the head of a Labour government, representing a party which had always had a tradition of anti-colonialism. Most of the really knotty difficulties that hampered the transition of British overseas territories to independence arose not so much from British reluctance to set them free as from the dangerous antagonisms in some of the societies to which freedom was to be given - between Hindu and Moslem in India, Jew and Arab in Palestine, Greek and Turk in Cyprus, European and African in Kenya and Rhodesia.

In India the Congress Party renewed its demand for complete independence as soon as the war against Japan had ended. Britain agreed to the demand. The Moslem League continued to insist on a separate Moslem state. The upshot was the promulgation in June 1947 of a plan for the partition of the subcontinent between India and Pakistan, and the two new states were formally inaugurated on August 15th. Both countries chose to remain within the Commonwealth, though both eventually changed their status from that of Dominion to that of independent republic within the Commonwealth.

The granting of independence to India and Pakistan was followed by terrible massacres and acts of violence between Hindus and Moslems as millions of refugees of the minority religion in each of the two new countries fled or were driven into the other. A long-standing quarrel also developed between the two countries over the state of Kashmir, whose Hindu Maharajah joined his state to India although its population was predominantly Moslem. War raged in Kashmir until 1949, when a United Nations Commission arranged a truce which left Pakistan in control of the northwestern part of the region and India in possession of the rest. But the dispute has remained unsettled, flaring into

open war again as recently as 1965.

Of Britain's other possessions in the East, Burma became an independent republic in 1948 and chose at the same time to free herself from all connection with the Commonwealth. In the same year Ceylon, which had obtained almost complete autonomy in 1946, achieved independence as a Dominion. In Malaya, however, independence was delayed until 1957 by the long-drawn-out war against the communists.

In her African colonies Britain began to introduce new constitutions soon after the war to provide increased measures of self-government in preparation for full independence. The Gold Coast was the first African colony to complete the course, emerging as the Dominion of Ghana in 1957. Nigeria was next in 1960. By the beginning of 1966 Britain's possessions in Africa were reduced to the protectorates of Bechuanaland, Basutoland, and Swaziland (all due for independence shortly) and the self-governing colony of Rhodesia. Rhodesia has been a source of particular difficulty. With a population of 4 million Africans and about 215,000 Europeans, she was refused a grant of independence by Britain until measures should be taken to assure majority rule within a reasonable time. Prime Minister Ian Smith and his government, determined to keep control in the hands of the white minority, unilaterally declared Rhodesia independent in November 1965. Britain declared his action treasonable and organized economic sanctions against the country in an attempt to bring down Smith's government, but refused to use armed force as some of the African states demanded. At the beginning of 1966 the situation remained deadlocked.

The End of the French Empire

There is no question that Britain's policy of giving way without rancour to her colonies' demands for independence - at least in those regions where the transfer of power was not complicated by some special local circumstance - was the wise and enlightened one. To attempt to maintain an imperial position by force of arms was a course out of keeping with the temper of the times even if any of the European powers had been strong enough to succeed in it. Nevertheless, some imperial powers made the attempt. The Dutch in Indonesia and the French in Indo-China, as we have seen, fought long and bitter wars before conceding independence. While France was still embroiled in Indo-China, she was faced with demands for independence from her North African territories. The Middle Eastern countries mandated to Britain and France after the First World War had all become independent after the Second. Italy's former colony of Libya had been granted independence by the United Nations in 1951. Now Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco had their eyes on the same goal. The nationalist agitation in Tunisia and Morocco achieved the goal in 1956, but Algeria was a different story. This was no protectorate but, in French eyes, an integral part of France herself and represented as such in the French National Assembly. France had ruled Algeria for a century and a quarter, and the population of 9 million included at least a million European settlers. When France found herself faced with a large-scale nationalist revolt in Algeria in 1954 - even before she had recovered from the shock of the loss of Indo-China - she reinforced her armies there and vowed that the country should remain French.


The seven-and-a-half-years war that followed was a brutal and ferocious struggle in which both sides resorted to savage cruelties. France, it seemed, could neither win the war nor face the humiliation of yet another defeat. The European settlers in Algeria and the army, with the backing of the right-wing element in France, were ready for almost any measures that would avoid capitulation. By 1958 one thing at least was obvious: nothing was likely to be achieved without more determined political leadership. In May French Algerians and army leaders formed a Committee of Public Safety and seized control in Algeria. Under threat of civil war the French Fourth Republic was dissolved, and the war-time leader of the Free French forces, General de Gaulle, was called to head the state, given emergency powers, and authorized to frame a new constitution. In the Fifth Republic, inaugurated in the autumn, supreme power rested in the hands of the President, to which office De Gaulle was duly and predictably elected. It was expected that the new President would take forceful measures to secure victory in Algeria; but De Gaulle soon recognized that there was no practical alternative to Algerian independence, and French public opinion gradually came round to an acceptance of that fact. A cease-fire was arranged in March 1962, and despite the efforts of a die-hard French Secret Army Organization to wreck the peace by acts of terrorism, Algeria received her independence a few months later.

De Gaulle also brought independence to France's other African possessions*. When the 1958 constitution was introduced, the French colonies were offered the choice of complete independence in separation from France or autonomy in an association to be called the French Community. Only French Guinea chose the first course immediately. Within two or three years, however, all the others had also attained complete sovereign independence, some remaining associated with France in a "remodelled" French Community of free and equal states, others preferring to abandon the formal association with France altogether but retaining nevertheless loose cultural and economic ties.

Problems of the Emergent Nations

The great upsurge of nationalism which brought to an end in the space of less than two decades those European empires that had managed to survive the two world wars left in their place some dozens of new sovereign states struggling with desperate problems of independent existence. After the tensions of the journey towards independence, after the hopeful looking forward, after the parades and celebrations of the long-awaited day and the solemn raising of the new flag, came the hard, intractable reality of independence itself - the necessity of making one's own way in the world. Independence, it was soon discovered, did not automatically bring social harmony, any more than it brought political stability or economic improvement. It might quite easily bring the opposite, for antagonism to imperial rule had itself been a powerful unifying influence. With the removal of the common antagonist, or perhaps just with the removal of an externally imposed unity, social divisions within the new

*French Somaliland is the only exception. It remains an "overseas territory", administered by French officials responsible to a local Assembly.



The shaded areas on the map denote those territories that were not yet independent at the beginning of 1966.

nations were sometimes found to be unexpectedly deep and disruptive - divisions between tribes in Africa, between island communities in the Caribbean, between groups speaking different languages in Ceylon. In Africa there was the added complication that the boundaries of the new states were simply inherited from the colonial scramble and often defied the ethnic, economic, and strategic realities. Even without such complications the problems were staggering: the rapidly increasing population, the lack of capital, the insufficiently diversified economy, the high degree of illiteracy, the shortage of every kind of administrative, technical, and professional skill - the list was endless.

But while the conditions of life might not be much improved by the attainment of independence, the desire to change them acquired a new urgency. Colonialism, whatever might be said against it, had spread a knowledge of the material, intellectual, scientific, and humanitarian advances of Western civilization: it was colonialism itself that had made the new nations aware of the possibilities of progress and had kindled the "revolution of rising expectations". In a world where a new kind of life was now seen to be possible not merely for privileged minorities but for whole societies, a world where change and progress were now accepted as a normal condition of life, people were no longer content to accept a traditional unchanging order of things.

B. NEW FORMS OF CO-OPERATION

There is irony in the fact that the great outburst of nationalism among the emergent states, whose effects we have described, has taken place just at the time when the concept of nationalism is being subjected to increasing criticism among the more advanced states of the world, and when new forms of international and even supranational organization are being brought into existence. However, the very nationalism of the new states combines with their consciousness of their individual weakness to dispose them to some forms of organization beyond the national level. They are well aware that in a world dominated by large powers they cannot expect to carry much weight in isolation. They therefore tend to be among the more enthusiastic supporters of the United Nations, in whose Assembly the vote, say, of Gabon, with her population of less than half-a-million, counts for as much (formally, at least) as the vote of the United States or the Soviet Union, and where they can thus muster among themselves a formidable voting strength.

The Afro-Asian Bloc

Consciousness of their individual weakness and of their community of interest with others in the same situation has also led the emergent African and Asian nations to meet together as a bloc to try to concert policies that will make them an independent force in world affairs and enable them to pursue their own common interests, instead of being drawn into the orbit either of the Western or of the communist world. The first Afro-Asian Conference took place at Bandung in Indonesia in 1955 and was attended by delegates from 23 Asian and 6 African nations. (Most of the African states had not yet attained independence.) As an Asian nation Communist China was invited, and her Premier Chou En-lai made a highly favourable impression by his apparent moderation.

In spite of the dedication of the Afro-Asians to non-alignment with either side in the cold war, their common anti-colonialism tended, somewhat naturally, to produce a pronounced anti-Western sentiment among them and a corresponding bond of sympathy with China.

Conferences of non-aligned states have been held at intervals since Bandung (Cairo 1958, Belgrade 1961) and a number of different neutralist heads of state have aspired at different times to the leadership of the bloc. After her initial success at Bandung China too continued to exploit her position as an Asian nation in an attempt to dominate the Afro-Asians. It was in fact this Chinese ambition that was responsible for the fiasco of the second full-scale Afro-Asian Conference convened at Algiers in November 1965. China hoped to use the occasion to weld the Afro-Asians into a common front directed against both the West and the Soviet Union. Finding that she could not ensure the attainment of her objectives in advance, China killed the conference before it had properly started.

Regionalism

Except for their common antipathy to Western colonialism, which in any case is mainly a thing of the past, there is little to give cohesion as a "bloc" to such a widespread and heterogeneous grouping as the Afro-Asian nations. There appears to be greater promise at the present time in a number of regional groupings of states bound together more closely by common interests and in most cases by similar backgrounds and cultures. The formation of such regional organizations is not only permitted but is expressly encouraged under Article 52 of the United Nations Charter. Regionalism, of course, is not confined to the emergent or underdeveloped nations: it is exemplified also in NATO and COMECON and, as we shall see presently, in even more striking developments in Western Europe. "Region" itself is a loose term without any precise definition: for the present the limits of a region are defined perhaps more by certain political factors than anything else. A "region" may embrace most of a continent and include within itself a number of sub-regions, or it may comprise merely two or three neighbouring countries. Regardless of size, however, the motive for regional organization lies in the belief that there are benefits to be gained by setting up institutions representative of all the countries in the region for the co-ordination of national policies in certain designated fields. These benefits are particularly marked wherever regionalism has had the effect of breaking down economic barriers between the component countries. Some people look hopefully towards these regional organizations as the starting points of full-fledged political federations of the future.

The Organization for African Unity

One such regional organization was established in May 1963 when the leaders of 31 independent African states met in Addis Ababa and founded the Organization for African Unity (OAU) for the purpose of co-operation in political, economic, educational, technical, defence, and other matters. President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana went so far as to advocate a political union of all African states, but the conference almost unanimously rejected the idea.

It affirmed instead the sovereign equality of all member states, the principle of non-interference in one another's internal affairs, and the resolve to seek peaceful settlements of all disputes.

As the organ of Pan-Africanism, the OAU is dedicated to the liberation of the remaining colonial areas in Africa and to the fight against policies of apartheid and racial discrimination. It favours non-alignment and disarmament, and wishes to see Africa declared a nuclear-free area. It campaigns for increased African representation in the principal organs of the United Nations, in particular the Security Council. In the economic field it looks towards the establishment of an African free-trade area and the adoption of a common external tariff. Among its practical achievements it has been credited with obtaining cease-fires in border disputes between Morocco and Algeria in 1963 and Ethiopia and Somalia in 1964.

The principle organs of the OAU are an Assembly of heads of state, a Council of Ministers responsible to the Assembly, and a number of specialized commissions established by the Assembly, such as the Social and Economic Commission, the Educational and Cultural Commission, and the Defence Commission.

The Arab League

The record of the Arab League is much longer than that of the Organization for African Unity, but it cannot be called imposing. The League, whose headquarters are in Cairo, was created in 1945 with the signature of a pact by Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Transjordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen. Since its formation the membership of the League has been increased by the accession of Libya, Sudan, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, and Kuwait. Its purpose is co-operation - political, economic, military, cultural, and social. But such are the suspicions and jealousies among the Arab states that there is no part of the world in which co-operation has been more difficult of achievement. Almost the only thing on which the League appears to be united is hatred of Israel; and even this did not produce a sufficient degree of co-operation in 1948 to enable the members of the League, with their combined population of 40 million, to defeat Israel's fewer than one million Jews. When President Nasser came to power in Egypt in 1954, the Arab world acquired an ambitious and energetic leader with strong Pan-Arab aspirations; but Nasser was no more able than anyone else to overcome the suspicion and jealousy endemic to the Arab world.

The Organization of American States

The countries of Central and South America are not emergent nations in the same sense as the African and Asian countries that we have been discussing. Yet although it was nearly a century and a half ago, in the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars, that these Latin American countries threw off the yoke of colonialism, most of them are scarcely any further advanced than the newly independent states of Asia and Africa. They have remained desperately poor. Their politics, with a few exceptions, have been perennially unstable, government being carried on for the most part by dictators, and changes of government being effected by coup d'état and armed revolution. The one kind of revolution

that was needed, namely social and economic revolution, did not occur. The mass of the people remained destitute, illiterate, and without prospect of improvement. What wealth the Latin American countries possessed was concentrated in the hands of small, rich, privileged minorities, who owned most of the land and generally managed to avoid paying taxes. Compared with the realities of Latin American independence, much European colonialism showed an enviable degree of enlightenment.

Most of the Latin American peoples, then, are faced with problems of the same general nature as the emergent nations, and need to avail themselves of external assistance and self-help to the same degree as those that have only newly achieved independence. The beginnings of hemispheric organization by the American peoples go back to the 19th century, when the first Inter-American Conference was held in Washington in 1889. From the bureau set up by this conference for the exchange of information there developed in 1910 the Pan-American Union, which assumed the functions of a secretariat for the periodic Inter-American Conferences. Until 1933, however, the tone of these conferences was set by the fear, and the fact, of United States imperialism.

A new chapter in Latin American affairs opened with President Franklin D. Roosevelt's "Good Neighbour" policy. The immediate concerns of good neighbourliness were the ending of United States imperialism, abstention by the American countries from intervention in one another's affairs, the establishment of more cordial diplomatic relations, and mutual security agreements. After the war a regional security pact for the Western Hemisphere, the Rio Pact, was signed in 1947 by nineteen countries in North and South America.

At the Ninth Inter-American Conference held at Bogota, Colombia, in 1948 a more comprehensive organ of inter-American co-operation, entitled the Organization of American States (OAS), was created around the Pan-American Union. The purposes of the new body are again mainly political; namely, the peaceful settlement of disputes, the preservation of order and stability, the fostering of good relationships, and common action against external dangers. Major policies are worked out at periodic Inter-American Conferences, which thus have the function of general assemblies of the OAS. The executive is furnished by a permanent OAS Council and Secretary-General in Washington, while the Pan-American Union continues to discharge the function of a secretariat. A council of the Foreign Ministers of the member states may be called into special session at any time to deal with urgent matters, particularly those concerned with the maintenance of peace. The organization came into effect in 1951 when the required number of ratifications had been secured.

In the post-war years the OAS has been faced with the task of dealing with a considerable number of disputes and disturbances among its members. However, while it provides a means of bringing a certain moral pressure to bear, it has not proved to be a very effective instrument of collective action. Its greatest display of unanimity was in the backing it gave to President Kennedy at the time of the Cuba crisis. Earlier in the year it had been only by a small majority that the OAS had excluded Cuba from active membership. Among its recent activities the OAS has imposed economic and diplomatic sanctions against Cuba for plotting aggression in Venezuela, restored relations between the United States and Panama after an outbreak of anti-American rioting in Panama

at the beginning of 1964, and sent an Inter-American military force to the Dominican Republic in 1965 to help quell a civil war.

In 1961 President Kennedy launched a new attack upon Latin America's economic problems when, in his inaugural address, he offered "to our sister republics south of the border...a new alliance for progress". The outcome of the proposal was a broad new scheme for social and economic improvement in Latin America, to which the United States pledged \$20 billion in aid over a ten-year period. The detailed agreements, worked out at a meeting later in the year, were signed by the United States and nineteen Latin American republics. Each Latin American country was required to draw up its own development program with detailed financial estimates showing how much it could do for itself and how much help it would need. The plans were to be co-ordinated by the Inter-American Economic and Social Council of the OAS.

The Alliance for Progress has as its principal objective the raising of the abysmally low living standards of the great majority of Latin Americans. Economic reform, however, is impossible without social reform to ensure that the wealth generated by economic development is spread more equitably. The undertakings of the Latin American governments to introduce reforms in such matters as land distribution and taxation are therefore a vital part of the program. Low-cost housing projects and the improvement of educational and health facilities are also important parts of the development plans. Some useful work has been done in slum clearance, school building, the feeding of school children, the provision of water systems, and agricultural improvement. But the problems of Latin America are rooted in hundreds of years of backwardness and social abuses, and there will be no quick or easy solutions.

Although the United States has urged Canada to join the OAS, Canada has refrained from doing so. She has no wish to get mixed up in Latin American quarrels, and she feels that she is already fully committed to collective security, regional or otherwise, by her membership in the United Nations and NATO. Moreover, in the event of a difference of policy between the OAS and the Commonwealth, membership of the former might prove to be inconsistent with Canada's commitments to the latter.

The Commonwealth

The Commonwealth differs in a number of obvious ways from the organizations we have described so far. In the first place it is not a regional grouping. Like the British Empire of which it is the descendant, it embraces territories in all six continents. Further, it is constituted by no formal pact; it has no central institutions except its purely symbolic Head (the British monarch) and a small, recently formed secretariat; and it supports no special machinery, apart from periodic conferences of Commonwealth ministers, for evolving or implementing common policies. It is not even held together by an old-fashioned military alliance. One of the factors that has helped to hasten the transition from Empire to Commonwealth has been the awareness of the other members that Britain can no longer offer them the military protection that she once provided. Now each member makes its own arrangements and shapes its own policies as it sees fit, perhaps opting for neutralism, like India, or forming outside

alliances as Australia and New Zealand have done in ANZUS.

The Commonwealth owes its peculiar constitution, of course, to the fact that it is the outcome of a process of historical evolution. By the time of the Imperial Conference of 1926 five of the major components - Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and the Irish Free State - had already achieved complete independence as Dominions, being, in the words of the Balfour formula, "equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations". Changes required to give this definition the force of law were effected by the Statute of Westminster in 1931.

When Britain granted independence to her other major overseas possessions in the years following the Second World War, they had at first the choice between accepting Dominion status and severing all formal ties with the Commonwealth. Burma chose the latter course, and Eire (the former Irish Free State) also took the opportunity to leave the Commonwealth. All Britain's other former possessions chose to retain Commonwealth membership. India, however, created a precedent at the 1949 Commonwealth Conference by declaring her intention to become a republic while requesting at the same time that she might remain in the Commonwealth. A new formula was worked out to make this possible, and as a result India now recognizes the British monarch as Head of the Commonwealth and the symbol of its free association, though not as her own sovereign.

Following India's example a number of other former Dominions and colonies have chosen to become republics within the Commonwealth. After their change of status the new republics have to reapply for membership in the Commonwealth. Though in most cases this is a formality, when South Africa became a republic in 1961 the other members let it be known that they would not readmit her unless she renounced her apartheid policy, since this policy was recognized as inconsistent with the idea of a multi-racial Commonwealth. Rather than accept the condition, South Africa severed her relationship with the Commonwealth.

What, then, are the ties that hold this free and voluntary association of states together? The most easily discerned, no doubt, are the bonds of common economic interest. The Commonwealth still accounts for a very large proportion of world trade, and its members, with the exception of Canada, are all part of the sterling area. Though the world's trade patterns are changing, there still remain long-standing patterns of inter-Commonwealth trade established in the days of the Empire and enjoying the benefits of preferential tariffs adopted at the Ottawa Economic Conference in 1932. But no less strong perhaps than the economic bonds are the more intangible ones that spring from a shared historical experience, common institutions with their roots in a single tradition, and a certain community of values and ideals imparted during the period of British domination. It is impossible to assess in any precise terms the strength of such bonds. They have been compared, not inappropriately, to the bonds of family feeling, which give the members a right to look for a special measure of support and consideration and understanding from one another in their dealings with the rest of the world, and which continue to unite them and to provide a basis of reconciliation even at times when they may be quarrelling or fighting among themselves.

Towards a United Europe

While there has been a great multiplication of international organizations since the Second World War, the nations of the world for the most part remain jealous of their national sovereignty. Many people feel, however, that the best hope for a stable world order lies in the development of supranational organizations - organizations, that is to say, in which the member nations explicitly surrender some part of their national sovereignty to a higher authority which will therefore have the power, in the areas of responsibility assigned to it, to override national governments. It is in Europe that the most promising steps in this direction have so far been taken. The idea of a politically unified Europe has haunted many minds since the unity imposed by the Roman Empire was lost fifteen centuries ago, but it has recently acquired a new relevance and a new urgency. Europe, as we saw, is no longer the political powerhouse of the world: that function is divided between the United States and the Soviet Union, and in the years to come will be increasingly shared with China. How in this world of super-powers can a patchwork of small states perched on a peninsula at the western end of the great Eurasian land mass hope to exert and maintain an influence in world affairs?

To some people the answer to this question seems clear and indubitable: Europe must unite. She can only hope to carry weight in world affairs, it is argued, if she speaks with a single voice and acts with a single will. And to ensure that she can do this, something more than an alliance or an international organization is needed, something more like a United States of Europe with a supranational federal government. And some, looking further still into the future, see even this only as a kind of pilot project for a comprehensive scheme of world government.

While Europe is still a long way even from the more limited goal, there have been some significant steps in its direction. One of the first after the Second World War was the convoking of a Congress of Europe at The Hague in May 1948 which called upon the national governments of Europe to merge their sovereignties in a single European government. The result was the formation a year later of the Council of Europe at Strasbourg. The Council, to which most of the countries of Western Europe sent delegates, comprised a Committee of Ministers, a Consultative Assembly, and a Secretariat. But as the Council had no power to impose any of its decisions on national governments, it remained merely a body for deliberation and discussion, sadly disappointing the hopes of those who expected it to grow into a supranational government and parliament.

Six of the member states of the Council of Europe, however, were not prepared to let the matter rest there. These six - France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg - directed their efforts to the creation of supranational institutions with certain specialized functions, having in mind the possibility that supranationalism in particular limited fields of endeavour might pave the way for the crowning achievement of supranational government at a later date. Following a plan worked out by the French Foreign Minister, Robert Schuman, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was brought into existence in 1952, with headquarters in Luxembourg. This organization placed the entire coal, iron, and steel industries of the six nations under the control of a single supranational High Authority with the object

of establishing a common market for the three commodities throughout the whole six-country area. The ECSC assures completely fair and equal conditions of competition in the coal, iron, and steel industries of the area and has done away with all customs duties and restrictions on trade in the three commodities among its members. The High Authority, which is the governing body that carries on the work of immediate supervision, is responsible to an Assembly in Strasbourg, now known as the European Parliament. A Council of Ministers of the six nations is the organ of contact with the national governments and helps to implement the High Authority's decisions. There is also a Court of Justice in Luxembourg to hear appeals against the legality of any of these decisions and to interpret agreements. The really significant feature of the whole arrangement is that the supranational High Authority is empowered to give orders to the six national governments, and that they are bound to obey. The national governments, for their part, cannot give instructions to the High Authority.

The success of the ECSC has led to similar organizations in other fields. Though, as we saw earlier, the attempt to create a supranational army (EDC) failed for lack of British support, two more supranational organizations were established by treaties signed in Rome in March 1957 by the six nations of the ECSC. One of these was the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) for co-ordinating the work of developing atomic energy: the other was the Common Market or European Economic Community (EEC). The members of the EEC agreed to remove all tariff and trade restrictions among themselves by the early 1970's and to adopt a common external tariff. It was further agreed that there should be completely free movement of capital and labour within the EEC, and common policies were to be established for agriculture and transport.

The permanent executive body of the EEC - corresponding to the High Authority of the ECSC - is the European Commission, with headquarters in Brussels. The Commission makes proposals to a Council of Ministers, which is the chief executive body. The Council has a more important role than the corresponding body in the ECSC since it can reject the Commission's proposals, though it cannot make proposals of its own. The EEC is responsible to the same European Parliamentary Assembly and Court of Justice as the ECSC and Euratom. While the Parliament's functions are mainly deliberative, it can dismiss the Commission or the Council of Ministers on a two-thirds vote of censure. The organs of the EEC have wide powers, including some of a political nature, corresponding to the wide range of economic ends that the Community seeks to accomplish, and it is here that those who look towards a politically unified Europe find their surest grounds for hope.

Britain at first held aloof from all these European Communities, reluctant as always to involve her destiny irrevocably with that of the Continent. She was deterred from EEC membership in particular by the fact that the common external tariff seemed likely to mean an end of the system of Commonwealth preferences; and this would not only be unwelcome to the other members of the Commonwealth but would weaken one of the important economic bonds that helps to keep the Commonwealth together. As an alternative, therefore, Britain organized the European Free Trade Area (EFTA), with Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Austria, Switzerland, and Portugal as the other members. The members of EFTA (known as the "Outer Seven" in contrast with the "Inner Six" of the EEC)

plan only for a reduction of tariffs and restrictions among themselves and do not propose to adopt a common external tariff.

Nevertheless by 1961 the disadvantages of remaining outside the EEC were becoming so marked that Britain applied for membership, hoping to negotiate special concessions which would allow her to maintain her Commonwealth preferences, at least for a time. After protracted negotiations agreement had almost been reached when President de Gaulle, fearful that Britain's entry into the EEC would diminish French influence and would at the same time provide a point of application for American influence, ordered the French representative in the Council of Ministers to veto British membership. Since the other five members were all in favour of British membership, this created some dissension within the EEC, which has since been compounded by further French opposition to general EEC policy.

Looking to the Future

In the mid-1960's Europe, where modern nationalism had its origins, leads the world in the search for new forms of political organization beyond nationalism. But throughout the world nationalism is still strong. Among the newly independent states, nationalism and independence are almost synonymous. They have not thrown off colonial rule, they contend, simply to surrender their sovereignty to some other authority beyond their own borders. In Eastern Europe nationalism is the antidote to Soviet domination: it is a new upsurge of nationalism that is pushing the Soviet Union's satellites into independent courses without regard for the roles assigned to them by Moscow. Even in the very heart of the European Economic Community nationalism has reasserted itself in De Gaulle's obvious resentment of the EEC's supranationalist status and his determination to resist and reverse the trend towards political integration. This determination resulted in French withdrawal from EEC discussions in mid-1965 and a demand for sweeping revisions in the Treaty of Rome to enable France to retain a veto on all EEC proposals. NATO, too, is regarded by De Gaulle as constituting an infringement of France's absolute sovereignty. Announcing his determination to re-establish "a normal situation of sovereignty, so that everything French, including soil, sky, sea, and forces, and any foreign element in France will in the future be under French command alone," De Gaulle has ordered all NATO forces and establishments to be out of France by 1967 and has stated that all French forces will be withdrawn from NATO command.

The new phase of French nationalism, however, is mainly the nationalism of one man - France's authoritarian President. Though NATO may come to an end, it seems less likely that the movement towards a closer integration among the European states can be permanently diverted by idiosyncrasy. What the future may hold for Europe can only be guessed at; but it would be well in keeping with her great traditions if, by transcending the narrow nationalisms of her own recent past, she were to provide the vision and the wisdom that would point the way for the whole world to a new and more vital ordering of human society.

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. What are the advantages of Commonwealth membership for Canada? Are there any disadvantages? What would be the advantages and disadvantages for Canada of membership in the OAS? In which organization would she be able to play the more influential role in world affairs? Are there any cogent reasons why she should not belong to both organizations? (Try to carry the discussion beyond the points mentioned in the text.)
2. The problems of world organization are sometimes represented as being simply the problems of regional organization on a larger scale. Yet there are some fundamental differences. What are they?
3. Drawing on all that you have learnt during the year's course in social studies, outline the social, political, and economic trends and developments in today's world which in your opinion are likely to be of most importance in shaping the future.

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